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+16 -16
View File
@@ -10,25 +10,25 @@ jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: canina
steps:
- name: Authenticated host Stage deployment (Production blocked)
shell: bash
- name: Run deploy.sh from within the scripts folder
env:
BRANCH: ${{ github.ref_name }}
DEPLOY_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}
DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS }}
SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY: ${{ secrets.SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
set +x
[[ "${BRANCH}" == develop ]] || { echo 'Production blocked' >&2; exit 2; }
[[ "${DEPLOY_SHA}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]] || exit 2
# Provision DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS from an independently verified host key.
# Never use baked-in /opt/services, runner SSH keys or docker.sock.
[[ -n "${DEPLOY_KEY}" && -n "${DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS}" ]] || { echo 'Host boundary requires DEPLOY_KEY and verified DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS' >&2; exit 2; }
export http_proxy="" https_proxy="" HTTP_PROXY="" HTTPS_PROXY=""
# 1. رفع مشکل DNS و غیرفعال کردن پروکسی برای دامنه محلی
echo "87.248.133.138 git.parsaaghayi.ir" >> /etc/hosts
export http_proxy=""
export https_proxy=""
export HTTP_PROXY=""
export HTTPS_PROXY=""
export no_proxy="git.parsaaghayi.ir,localhost,127.0.0.1,87.248.133.138"
umask 077
wrapper=$(mktemp)
trap 'rm -f "$wrapper"' EXIT
wget --no-proxy -qO "$wrapper" "https://git.parsaaghayi.ir/parsa/canina/raw/commit/${DEPLOY_SHA}/scripts/ci-host-deploy.sh"
bash "$wrapper"
# 2. دانلود و اجرای اسکریپت deploy.sh بر اساس برنچ جاری
mkdir -p scripts
wget --no-proxy -qO scripts/deploy.sh https://git.parsaaghayi.ir/parsa/canina/raw/commit/${DEPLOY_SHA}/scripts/deploy.sh
chmod +x scripts/deploy.sh
cd scripts
./deploy.sh "${BRANCH}"
+2 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
import { registerPrepareWorker } from './orchestration-worker/worker-registration';
import { RouterUsageModule } from './router-usage/router-usage.module';
import { runtimeReadRegistration } from './hermes-management/runtime-read.registration';
import { HermesManagementModule } from './hermes-management/hermes-management.module';
import { TasksModule } from './common/services/tasks.module';
import { Module, NestModule, MiddlewareConsumer } from "@nestjs/common";
import { PrismaModule } from "./prisma/prisma.module";
@@ -46,10 +45,9 @@ import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from "express";
@Module({
imports: [
...registerPrepareWorker(),
RouterUsageModule,
// Deny-all registration: no request identity or runtime credentials are accepted yet.
runtimeReadRegistration(),
HermesManagementModule.register({origin:'http://canina-hermes:9119',token:async()=>''}),
OrchestrationModule,
SupportChatModule,
RevalidationModule,
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export class HermesManagementModule {
policy: RuntimeAuthorizer = {authorize: async () => false},
): DynamicModule {
const broker = new HermesSessionBroker(credentials);
return this.register({origin:'http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119',token:()=>broker.token()},policy);
return this.register({origin:'http://canina-hermes:9119',token:()=>broker.token()},policy);
}
static register(
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ describe('server-only Hermes session broker',()=>{
expect(await broker.token()).toBe('verified-test-token');
expect(fetcher).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const [url,options]=fetcher.mock.calls[0];
expect(url).toBe('http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119/auth/password-login');
expect(url).toBe('http://canina-hermes:9119/auth/password-login');
expect(JSON.parse(options.body)).toEqual({provider:'basic',username:'backend',password:'test-only'});
expect(options.redirect).toBe('error');
});
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ export class HermesSessionBroker {
try{
const creds=await Promise.race([this.credentials(),new Promise<never>((_,reject)=>controller.signal.addEventListener('abort',()=>reject(new HermesError('UNAVAILABLE')),{once:true}))]);
if(!creds.username || !creds.password) throw new HermesError('AUTH_REQUIRED');
const response=await this.fetcher('http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119/auth/password-login',{method:'POST',redirect:'error',signal:controller.signal,headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({provider:'basic',...creds})});
const response=await this.fetcher('http://canina-hermes:9119/auth/password-login',{method:'POST',redirect:'error',signal:controller.signal,headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({provider:'basic',...creds})});
if(!response.ok) throw new HermesError('AUTH_REQUIRED');
const reader=response.body?.getReader();
if(!reader) throw new HermesError('AUTH_REQUIRED');
+21 -94
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ export interface Health {
version: string;
commit: string;
auth_required: boolean;
provenance?: Row;
}
function object(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
if (!value || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value))
@@ -58,12 +57,7 @@ export class HermesAdapter {
private readonly config: HermesConfig,
private readonly fetcher: typeof fetch = fetch,
) {
if (
![
'http://canina-hermes:9119',
'http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119',
].includes(config.origin)
)
if (config.origin !== 'http://canina-hermes:9119')
throw new HermesError('CONFIGURATION');
this.origin = config.origin;
}
@@ -128,12 +122,7 @@ export class HermesAdapter {
} finally {
await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
}
const data: unknown = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8'));
if (this.origin === 'http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119') {
const rows = Array.isArray(data) ? data : [data];
for (const row of rows) provenance(row, true);
}
return data;
return JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')) as unknown;
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof HermesError) throw error;
throw new HermesError('UNAVAILABLE');
@@ -143,16 +132,12 @@ export class HermesAdapter {
}
}
async health(): Promise<Health> {
const raw = await this.request('/api/health');
const health = {
...fields(raw, {
ok: 'boolean',
version: 'string',
commit: 'string',
auth_required: 'boolean',
}),
...provenance(raw),
} as unknown as Health;
const health = fields(await this.request('/api/health'), {
ok: 'boolean',
version: 'string',
commit: 'string',
auth_required: 'boolean',
}) as unknown as Health;
if (!health.auth_required) throw new HermesError('AUTH_REQUIRED');
return health;
}
@@ -166,47 +151,23 @@ export class HermesAdapter {
});
if (raw.gateway_state !== null && typeof raw.gateway_state !== 'string')
throw new HermesError('CONTRACT');
return {
...row,
gateway_state: raw.gateway_state as Json,
...provenance(raw),
...(raw.provenance
? {
gateway_running: false,
active_agents: 0,
gateway_state: null,
overall: 'unknown',
liveGatewayState: 'unknown',
liveActiveAgents: null,
}
: {}),
};
return { ...row, gateway_state: raw.gateway_state as Json };
}
async profiles(): Promise<Row[]> {
return list(object(await this.request('/api/profiles')).profiles).map(
(r) => ({
...fields(r, {
name: 'string',
is_default: 'boolean',
gateway_running: 'boolean',
}),
...provenance(r),
...(object(r).provenance
? { gateway_running: false, liveGatewayState: 'unknown' }
: {}),
return list(object(await this.request('/api/profiles')).profiles).map((r) =>
fields(r, {
name: 'string',
is_default: 'boolean',
gateway_running: 'boolean',
}),
);
}
async modelInfo(profile: string): Promise<Row> {
const raw = await this.request('/api/model/info', profile);
return {
...fields(raw, {
model: 'string',
provider: 'string',
effective_context_length: 'number',
}),
...provenance(raw),
};
return fields(await this.request('/api/model/info', profile), {
model: 'string',
provider: 'string',
effective_context_length: 'number',
});
}
async modelOptions(profile: string): Promise<Row[]> {
return list(
@@ -228,7 +189,6 @@ export class HermesAdapter {
);
return {
...fields(raw, { period_days: 'number' }),
...provenance(raw),
totals: fields(raw.totals, {
total_input: 'number',
total_output: 'number',
@@ -258,11 +218,7 @@ export class HermesAdapter {
is_active: 'boolean',
}),
);
return {
...fields(raw, { total: 'number' }),
sessions: rows,
...provenance(raw),
};
return { ...fields(raw, { total: 'number' }), sessions: rows };
}
async crons(profile: string): Promise<Row[]> {
return list(await this.request('/api/cron/jobs', profile)).map((r) =>
@@ -309,34 +265,5 @@ function scoped(
): Row {
const row = fields(value, schema);
if (row.profile !== profile) throw new HermesError('FORBIDDEN');
return { ...row, ...provenance(value) };
}
/** Snapshot provenance is mandatory on inventory origin; never synthesize a capture time. */
function provenance(value: unknown, required = false): Row {
const raw = object(value);
if (!raw.provenance && !required) return {};
const p = object(raw.provenance);
if (
p.source !== 'snapshot' ||
p.liveProcess !== 'unknown' ||
typeof p.capturedAt !== 'string' ||
!p.capturedAt.endsWith('Z') ||
!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(p.capturedAt)) ||
Date.parse(p.capturedAt) > Date.now() ||
typeof p.ageSeconds !== 'number' ||
!Number.isInteger(p.ageSeconds) ||
p.ageSeconds < 0 ||
!['fresh', 'stale'].includes(String(p.freshness))
)
throw new HermesError('CONTRACT');
return {
provenance: {
source: 'snapshot',
capturedAt: p.capturedAt,
ageSeconds: p.ageSeconds,
freshness: p.freshness as string,
liveProcess: 'unknown',
},
};
return row;
}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
import { loadRuntimeGrants } from './runtime-read.module';
import { mkdtemp, writeFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
describe('reviewed runtime grants file', () => {
it('loads an exact reviewed file and fails closed for malformed grants', async () => {
const dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'runtime-grants-'));
const file = join(dir, 'grants.json');
try {
await writeFile(file, JSON.stringify({ 'subject-1': ['default'] }));
expect(await loadRuntimeGrants(file, dir)).toEqual({
'subject-1': ['default'],
});
for (const invalid of [
null,
[],
{ 'subject-1': [] },
{ 'subject-1': ['default', 'default'] },
{ 'subject-1': ['../x'] },
{ 'subject-1': [3] },
{ 'subject-1': ['default'], extra: true },
]) {
await writeFile(file, JSON.stringify(invalid));
await expect(loadRuntimeGrants(file, dir)).rejects.toThrow();
}
await expect(loadRuntimeGrants('/etc/passwd')).rejects.toThrow();
} finally {
await rm(dir, { recursive: true });
}
});
});
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
import { PassportModule } from '@nestjs/passport';
import { Strategy, ExtractJwt } from 'passport-jwt';
import passport from 'passport';
import { sign } from 'jsonwebtoken';
import request from 'supertest';
import { RuntimeReadModule } from './runtime-read.module';
import { HermesIntegrationService } from './hermes-integration.service';
describe('runtime HTTP authentication and read contract', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
const health = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ok: true, auth_required: true });
beforeAll(async () => {
passport.use(
'jwt',
new Strategy(
{
jwtFromRequest: ExtractJwt.fromAuthHeaderAsBearerToken(),
secretOrKey: 'test-only-http-key',
},
(payload, done) => done(null, { id: payload.sub, role: payload.role }),
),
);
const module = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [
PassportModule,
RuntimeReadModule.register({ 'admin-1': ['default'] }),
],
})
.overrideProvider(HermesIntegrationService)
.useValue({ health })
.compile();
app = module.createNestApplication();
await app.init();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
passport.unuse('jwt');
});
it('rejects missing and forged credentials before upstream', async () => {
health.mockClear();
await request(app.getHttpServer())
.get('/admin/orchestration/runtime/health')
.expect(401);
await request(app.getHttpServer())
.get('/admin/orchestration/runtime/health')
.set(
'Authorization',
'Bearer ' + sign({ sub: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin' }, 'forged'),
)
.expect(401);
expect(health).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('accepts verified allowlisted admin but rejects signed ungranted subject', async () => {
await request(app.getHttpServer())
.get('/admin/orchestration/runtime/health')
.set(
'Authorization',
'Bearer ' + sign({ sub: 'other', role: 'Admin' }, 'test-only-http-key'),
)
.expect(403);
const r = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.get('/admin/orchestration/runtime/health')
.set(
'Authorization',
'Bearer ' +
sign({ sub: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin' }, 'test-only-http-key'),
)
.expect(200);
expect(r.body).toEqual({ ok: true, auth_required: true });
expect(r.headers['set-cookie']).toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not register mutation handlers', async () => {
await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/admin/orchestration/runtime/schedules')
.set(
'Authorization',
'Bearer ' +
sign({ sub: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin' }, 'test-only-http-key'),
)
.expect(404);
});
});
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
import {
Controller,
Get,
Req,
Query,
UseGuards,
Injectable,
ForbiddenException,
ServiceUnavailableException,
HttpException,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '@nestjs/passport';
import {
HermesIntegrationService,
RuntimePrincipal,
} from './hermes-integration.service';
import { HermesError } from './hermes.adapter';
export interface VerifiedRuntimeRequest {
user?: {
id?: string;
role?: string;
isApiKey?: boolean;
profiles?: string[];
};
}
@Injectable()
export class RuntimeReadAccess {
private readonly grants: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>>;
constructor(grants: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>>) {
if (
!grants ||
typeof grants !== 'object' ||
Array.isArray(grants) ||
Object.keys(grants).length > 1000
)
throw new Error('Invalid runtime access configuration');
const copy: Record<string, readonly string[]> = Object.create(null);
for (const [subject, profiles] of Object.entries(grants)) {
if (
!/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9@._:-]{0,127}$/.test(subject) ||
['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype'].includes(subject) ||
!Array.isArray(profiles) ||
profiles.length === 0 ||
profiles.length > 100 ||
new Set(profiles).size !== profiles.length ||
profiles.some(
(p) =>
typeof p !== 'string' ||
!/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_-]{0,63}$/.test(p),
)
)
throw new Error('Invalid runtime access configuration');
copy[subject] = Object.freeze([...profiles]);
}
this.grants = Object.freeze(copy);
}
principal(req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest): RuntimePrincipal {
const u = req.user;
if (
!u?.id ||
u.isApiKey ||
!['admin', 'superadmin'].includes(
(u.role ?? '').toLowerCase().replace(/[_-]/g, ''),
) ||
!Object.hasOwn(this.grants, u.id)
)
throw new ForbiddenException('Runtime access denied');
return { subject: u.id, profiles: this.grants[u.id] };
}
authorize(
p: RuntimePrincipal,
permission: string,
profile?: string,
): Promise<boolean> {
return Promise.resolve(
permission === 'runtime.read' &&
Object.hasOwn(this.grants, p.subject) &&
(!profile || this.grants[p.subject].includes(profile)),
);
}
}
@Controller('admin/orchestration/runtime')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard('jwt'))
export class RuntimeReadController {
constructor(
private readonly runtime: HermesIntegrationService,
private readonly access: RuntimeReadAccess,
) {}
private async read(
req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest,
call: (p: RuntimePrincipal) => Promise<unknown>,
) {
const p = this.access.principal(req);
try {
return await call(p);
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof HermesError) {
if (e.code === 'FORBIDDEN')
throw new ForbiddenException('Runtime access denied');
if (e.code === 'LIMIT')
throw new HttpException('Runtime request limit', 429);
}
throw new ServiceUnavailableException('Runtime unavailable');
}
}
private profile(
q: Record<string, unknown>,
p: RuntimePrincipal,
extras: string[] = [],
): string {
if (
Object.keys(q).some((k) => !['profile', ...extras].includes(k)) ||
typeof q.profile !== 'string' ||
!p.profiles.includes(q.profile)
)
throw new HermesError('FORBIDDEN');
return q.profile;
}
private number(
q: Record<string, unknown>,
key: string,
fallback: number,
min: number,
max: number,
): number {
if (q[key] === undefined) return fallback;
if (typeof q[key] !== 'string' || !/^\d+$/.test(q[key]))
throw new HermesError('LIMIT');
const n = Number(q[key]);
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(n) || n < min || n > max)
throw new HermesError('LIMIT');
return n;
}
@Get('health') health(@Req() req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest) {
return this.read(req, (p) => this.runtime.health(p));
}
@Get('profiles') profiles(@Req() req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest) {
return this.read(req, (p) => this.runtime.profiles(p));
}
@Get('status') status(
@Req() req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest,
@Query() q: Record<string, unknown>,
) {
return this.read(req, (p) => this.runtime.status(p, this.profile(q, p)));
}
@Get('usage') usage(
@Req() req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest,
@Query() q: Record<string, unknown>,
) {
return this.read(req, (p) =>
this.runtime.usage(
p,
this.profile(q, p, ['days']),
this.number(q, 'days', 30, 1, 365),
),
);
}
@Get('sessions') sessions(
@Req() req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest,
@Query() q: Record<string, unknown>,
) {
return this.read(req, (p) =>
this.runtime.sessions(
p,
this.profile(q, p, ['limit', 'offset']),
this.number(q, 'limit', 20, 1, 100),
this.number(q, 'offset', 0, 0, 10000),
),
);
}
@Get('schedules') schedules(
@Req() req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest,
@Query() q: Record<string, unknown>,
) {
return this.read(req, (p) => this.runtime.crons(p, this.profile(q, p)));
}
@Get('model-info') modelInfo(
@Req() req: VerifiedRuntimeRequest,
@Query() q: Record<string, unknown>,
) {
return this.read(req, (p) => this.runtime.modelInfo(p, this.profile(q, p)));
}
}
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
import { DynamicModule, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { open, lstat } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { HermesManagementModule } from './hermes-management.module';
import {
RuntimeReadAccess,
RuntimeReadController,
} from './runtime-read.controller';
import { HermesError } from './hermes.adapter';
export async function runtimeSecret(path: string): Promise<string> {
if (!/^\/run\/secrets\/[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(path))
throw new HermesError('CONFIGURATION');
try {
const file = await open(path, 'r');
try {
const stat = await file.stat();
if (!stat.isFile() || stat.size > 4096) throw new Error();
const value = (await file.readFile('utf8')).trim();
if (!value || /[\r\n]/.test(value)) throw new Error();
return value;
} finally {
await file.close();
}
} catch {
throw new HermesError('AUTH_REQUIRED');
}
}
/** Exact fixed mount roots only; startup fails closed, never browser/JWT grants. */
export async function loadRuntimeGrants(
path = '/run/secrets/hermes_runtime_grants',
reviewedRoot?: string,
): Promise<Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>>> {
const roots = reviewedRoot
? [resolve(reviewedRoot)]
: ['/run/secrets', '/etc/canina'];
if (!roots.includes(dirname(path)) || resolve(path) !== path)
throw new HermesError('CONFIGURATION');
try {
const stat = await lstat(path);
if (
!stat.isFile() ||
stat.isSymbolicLink() ||
stat.size > 65536 ||
stat.mode & 0o022
)
throw new Error();
const file = await open(path, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
try {
const data: unknown = JSON.parse(await file.readFile('utf8'));
if (!data || typeof data !== 'object' || Array.isArray(data))
throw new Error();
new RuntimeReadAccess(data as Record<string, readonly string[]>);
return data as Record<string, readonly string[]>;
} finally {
await file.close();
}
} catch {
throw new HermesError('CONFIGURATION');
}
}
@Module({})
export class RuntimeReadModule {
static async registerFromFile(
path = '/run/secrets/hermes_runtime_grants',
): Promise<DynamicModule> {
return this.register(await loadRuntimeGrants(path));
}
static register(
grants: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>>,
): DynamicModule {
const access = new RuntimeReadAccess(grants);
return {
module: RuntimeReadModule,
imports: [
HermesManagementModule.registerAuthenticated(
async () => ({
username: await runtimeSecret('/run/secrets/hermes_username'),
password: await runtimeSecret('/run/secrets/hermes_password'),
}),
access,
),
],
controllers: [RuntimeReadController],
providers: [{ provide: RuntimeReadAccess, useValue: access }],
};
}
}
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
import { runtimeReadRegistration } from './runtime-read.registration';
import { RuntimeReadModule } from './runtime-read.module';
describe('application runtime registration',()=>{
afterEach(()=>jest.restoreAllMocks());
it('registers denied routes without reading files when not explicitly enabled',async()=>{
const file=jest.spyOn(RuntimeReadModule,'registerFromFile');
const register=jest.spyOn(RuntimeReadModule,'register');
await runtimeReadRegistration({});
expect(file).not.toHaveBeenCalled();expect(register).toHaveBeenCalledWith({});
});
it('uses only the fixed reviewed grants mount when enabled',async()=>{
const file=jest.spyOn(RuntimeReadModule,'registerFromFile').mockResolvedValue({module:RuntimeReadModule});
await runtimeReadRegistration({CANINA_RUNTIME_READ_ENABLED:'true'});
expect(file).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/run/secrets/hermes_runtime_grants');
});
});
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
import { RuntimeReadModule } from './runtime-read.module';
export function runtimeReadRegistration(env:Record<string,string|undefined>=process.env) {
return env.CANINA_RUNTIME_READ_ENABLED === 'true'
? RuntimeReadModule.registerFromFile('/run/secrets/hermes_runtime_grants')
: RuntimeReadModule.register({});
}
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import {
RuntimeReadController,
RuntimeReadAccess,
} from './runtime-read.controller';
import { HermesIntegrationService } from './hermes-integration.service';
import { HermesError } from './hermes.adapter';
import {
ForbiddenException,
ServiceUnavailableException,
} from '@nestjs/common';
describe('runtime read boundary', () => {
const health = jest.fn();
const profiles = jest.fn();
const status = jest.fn();
const service = {
health,
profiles,
status,
} as unknown as HermesIntegrationService;
const access = new RuntimeReadAccess({ 'admin-1': ['default'] });
const controller = new RuntimeReadController(service, access);
beforeEach(() => jest.clearAllMocks());
it('denies unconfigured identity without IO', async () => {
await expect(
controller.health({ user: { id: 'other', role: 'Admin' } }),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
expect(health).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('uses server scope not body or user supplied profiles', async () => {
status.mockResolvedValue({ overall: 'ok' });
await expect(
controller.status(
{ user: { id: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin', profiles: ['other'] } },
{ profile: 'other' },
),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
expect(status).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
await controller.status(
{ user: { id: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin' } },
{ profile: 'default' },
);
expect(status).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ subject: 'admin-1', profiles: ['default'] },
'default',
);
});
it('rejects duplicate/missing/unknown query parameters before IO', async () => {
for (const q of [
{},
{ profile: ['default', 'other'] },
{ profile: 'default', token: 'leak' },
])
await expect(
controller.status({ user: { id: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin' } }, q),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
expect(status).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('maps credential failure without leaking upstream errors', async () => {
health.mockRejectedValue(new HermesError('AUTH_REQUIRED'));
await expect(
controller.health({ user: { id: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin' } }),
).rejects.toThrow('Runtime unavailable');
});
it('rejects API keys and non-admins even when subject is configured', async () => {
for (const user of [
{ id: 'admin-1', role: 'User' },
{ id: 'admin-1', role: 'Admin', isApiKey: true },
])
await expect(controller.health({ user })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
ForbiddenException,
);
expect(health).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
import { HermesAdapter } from './hermes.adapter';
const provenance = {
source: 'snapshot',
capturedAt: '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z',
ageSeconds: 100,
freshness: 'stale',
liveProcess: 'unknown',
};
function adapter(data: unknown) {
return new HermesAdapter(
{
origin: 'http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119',
token: () => Promise.resolve('test'),
},
jest.fn(() =>
Promise.resolve(new Response(JSON.stringify(data), { status: 200 })),
) as typeof fetch,
);
}
describe('snapshot provenance boundary', () => {
it('rejects missing provenance from dedicated inventory origin', async () => {
await expect(
adapter({
ok: true,
version: '1',
commit: 'x',
auth_required: true,
}).health(),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'CONTRACT' });
});
it('cannot present copied gateway scalars as live telemetry', async () => {
const row = await adapter({
version: '1',
gateway_running: true,
active_agents: 12,
gateway_state: 'running',
overall: 'ok',
provenance,
}).status('default');
expect(row).toMatchObject({
gateway_running: false,
active_agents: 0,
gateway_state: null,
overall: 'unknown',
liveGatewayState: 'unknown',
liveActiveAgents: null,
provenance,
});
});
it('profile readiness cannot be inferred from copied PID state', async () => {
const rows = await adapter({
profiles: [
{
name: 'default',
is_default: true,
gateway_running: true,
provenance,
},
],
provenance,
}).profiles();
expect(rows[0]).toMatchObject({
gateway_running: false,
liveGatewayState: 'unknown',
provenance,
});
});
});
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# Opt-in fragment ONLY: merge into the reviewed Stage backend service definition.
# Not a standalone compose file; does not enable the worker automatically.
# Host files/dirs must already exist, with reviewed ownership and modes.
x-prepare-worker-backend:
environment:
PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED: "${PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED:-false}"
secrets:
- source: prepare_worker_grants
target: prepare_worker_grants
mode: 0400
volumes:
- type: bind
source: ${PREPARE_WORKER_ARTIFACT_HOST_DIRECTORY:?review private artifact directory}
target: /var/lib/canina/prepare-artifacts
bind:
create_host_path: false
secrets:
prepare_worker_grants:
file: ${PREPARE_WORKER_GRANTS_FILE:?review mounted grants JSON file}
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
import { constants, openSync, closeSync, fstatSync, readSync } from 'fs';
import { WorkerTransportConfig, WorkerTransportModule } from './worker-transport.module';
export const PREPARE_WORKER_CONFIG_PATH = '/run/secrets/prepare_worker_grants';
export const PREPARE_WORKER_ARTIFACT_DIRECTORY = '/var/lib/canina/prepare-artifacts';
const MAX_BYTES = 16384;
const fail = () => { throw new Error('Prepare worker startup configuration rejected'); };
function exact(value: any, keys: string[]): boolean {
return value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value) &&
Object.keys(value).length === keys.length && keys.every(k => Object.hasOwn(value, k));
}
/** Fixed-path, descriptor-pinned, bounded startup read; never logs file contents. */
export function loadPrepareWorkerConfig(): WorkerTransportConfig {
let dir: number | undefined, file: number | undefined;
try {
dir = openSync('/', constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY);
for (const part of ['run', 'secrets']) {
const next = openSync(`/proc/self/fd/${dir}/${part}`, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
closeSync(dir); dir = next;
if ((fstatSync(dir).mode & 0o022) !== 0) fail();
}
file = openSync(`/proc/self/fd/${dir}/prepare_worker_grants`, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
const stat = fstatSync(file);
if (!stat.isFile() || stat.nlink !== 1 || (stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0 || stat.size > MAX_BYTES ||
(stat.uid !== 0 && stat.uid !== process.getuid!())) fail();
const bytes = Buffer.alloc(MAX_BYTES + 1);
let length = 0, n: number;
do { n = readSync(file, bytes, length, bytes.length - length, length); length += n; }
while (n > 0 && length < bytes.length);
if (length > MAX_BYTES) fail();
const input = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(bytes.subarray(0, length)));
if (!exact(input, ['grants', 'workerIds', 'stageCiIds', 'artifactBaseUrl']) ||
!Array.isArray(input.grants) || input.grants.length < 1 || input.grants.length > 32 ||
!Array.isArray(input.workerIds) || !Array.isArray(input.stageCiIds) ||
input.workerIds.length < 1 || input.stageCiIds.length < 1 ||
input.workerIds.length + input.stageCiIds.length !== input.grants.length ||
typeof input.artifactBaseUrl !== 'string' || input.artifactBaseUrl.length > 2048 ||
input.grants.some((g: any) => !exact(g, ['id', 'role', 'credentialSha256']))) fail();
// Transport registration performs shared role, SHA256, ID, overlap and HTTPS validation.
const config: WorkerTransportConfig = { ...input, enabled: true, artifactDirectory: PREPARE_WORKER_ARTIFACT_DIRECTORY };
WorkerTransportModule.register(config); // Reuse the real transport's reviewed validation, no IO.
config.grants.forEach(Object.freeze);
Object.freeze(config.grants); Object.freeze(config.workerIds); Object.freeze(config.stageCiIds);
return Object.freeze(config);
} catch { return fail(); }
finally { if (file !== undefined) closeSync(file); if (dir !== undefined) closeSync(dir); }
}
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# Prepare worker startup boundary
Parent integration API (AppModule remains untouched here):
```ts
import { registerPrepareWorker } from './orchestration-worker/worker-registration';
// In AppModule imports:
...registerPrepareWorker(),
```
Only literal `PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED=true` registers the transport. Missing or other values register nothing (404 routes), do not read configuration, and do not instantiate Prisma. Enabled malformed/missing configuration throws synchronously before Nest starts, with one generic error and no secret logging.
The fixed mount `/run/secrets/prepare_worker_grants` contains JSON with exactly `grants`, `workerIds`, `stageCiIds`, `artifactBaseUrl`. Each grant contains exactly `id`, `role` (`WORKFLOW_WORKER` or `STAGE_CI`), `credentialSha256` (64 lowercase hexadecimal characters; never the bearer credential). Require at least one worker and CI, distinct role-bound IDs/digests, exact allowlist coverage, and at most 32 grants. No enabled flag, directory, token, user, or request-derived fields accepted in JSON.
`artifactBaseUrl` must be explicitly reviewed by the operator: canonical public-DNS HTTPS origin plus `/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts`, no credentials, IP, alternate port, query or fragment. Shared transport validation is authoritative. This loader does not fetch the URL or perform DNS resolution. Directory is always `/var/lib/canina/prepare-artifacts`.
Descriptor-relative Linux `/proc/self/fd` traversal refuses symlink directories/files, nonregular files, hardlinks, files over 16 KiB, group/world writable files/directories, and foreign-owned files (root/runtime UID only). Reads are bounded even on concurrent growth. Configuration is frozen recursively and transport takes its own frozen snapshot. Trusted operator owns mounted configuration; edits require restart and review.
`compose.prepare-worker.fragment.yml` is an extension fragment, not a deployable compose file. Parent must merge its `x-prepare-worker-backend` into the correct reviewed Stage backend service and merge `secrets`. Compose bind-backed secrets may ignore mode/UID declarations: provision actual host grants file as root/runtime-owned mode 0400 and artifact directory runtime-owned mode 0700 first. No mounts or live configuration are created by this change.
Tests deliberately use the fixed `/run/secrets` path. Run ONLY in a fresh disposable container with source and donor dependencies read-only, private dependency copy, and private `prisma generate`; never on a live service. Tests need a disposable Linux root filesystem and do not require DB credentials. Registration test uses a real Nest HTTP listener to prove disabled routes are absent. Existing DB-backed transport tracer remains separately gated by `WORKER_TRANSPORT_DB=1`.
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { writeFileSync, chmodSync, symlinkSync, mkdirSync, rmSync } from 'fs';
import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
import { registerPrepareWorker } from './worker-registration';
import { loadPrepareWorkerConfig } from './worker-config';
import { linkSync } from 'fs';
describe('reviewed prepare-worker startup registration', () => {
const path = '/run/secrets/prepare_worker_grants';
const valid = () => ({ grants: [{ id: 'worker', role: 'WORKFLOW_WORKER', credentialSha256: 'a'.repeat(64) }, { id: 'ci', role: 'STAGE_CI', credentialSha256: 'b'.repeat(64) }], workerIds: ['worker'], stageCiIds: ['ci'], artifactBaseUrl: 'https://stage.example.com/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts' });
it('loader itself rejects malformed SHA grants', () => {
mkdirSync('/run/secrets', { recursive: true });
const c = valid(); c.grants[0].credentialSha256 = 'secret-not-a-sha';
writeFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(c), { mode: 0o400 });
try { expect(() => loadPrepareWorkerConfig()).toThrow('Prepare worker startup configuration rejected'); }
finally { rmSync(path, { force: true }); }
});
it.each(['1', 'TRUE', 'yes', ' true', 'false', ''])('does not opt in for %s', value => {
expect(registerPrepareWorker({ PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED: value })).toEqual([]);
});
it.each(['missing', 'symlink', 'directory', 'fifo', 'oversize', 'group-write', 'world-write', 'hardlink'])('fails startup on unsafe file: %s', kind => {
mkdirSync('/run/secrets', { recursive: true });
const other = '/run/secrets/test-other';
try {
if (kind === 'fifo') execFileSync('mkfifo', [path]);
else if (kind === 'directory') mkdirSync(path);
else if (kind === 'symlink') symlinkSync(other, path);
else if (kind !== 'missing') {
writeFileSync(path, kind === 'oversize' ? ' '.repeat(16385) : JSON.stringify(valid()), { mode: 0o400 });
if (kind === 'group-write') chmodSync(path, 0o420);
if (kind === 'world-write') chmodSync(path, 0o402);
if (kind === 'hardlink') linkSync(path, other);
}
expect(() => registerPrepareWorker({ PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED: 'true' })).toThrow('Prepare worker startup configuration rejected');
} finally { rmSync(path, { recursive: true, force: true }); rmSync(other, { force: true }); }
});
it.each(['extra', 'raw-token', 'wrong-role', 'overlap', 'duplicate-sha', 'missing-grant', 'http', 'credentials', 'localhost', 'query', 'bad-json', 'null'])('rejects unreviewed JSON: %s without leaking contents or logging', kind => {
mkdirSync('/run/secrets', { recursive: true });
const c: any = valid();
if (kind === 'extra') c.artifactDirectory = '/user-selected';
if (kind === 'raw-token') c.grants[0].token = 'DO_NOT_LOG_THIS_SECRET';
if (kind === 'wrong-role') c.grants[0].role = 'Admin';
if (kind === 'overlap') c.stageCiIds = ['worker'];
if (kind === 'duplicate-sha') c.grants[1].credentialSha256 = c.grants[0].credentialSha256;
if (kind === 'missing-grant') c.workerIds.push('unbound');
if (kind === 'http') c.artifactBaseUrl = 'http://stage.example.com/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts';
if (kind === 'credentials') c.artifactBaseUrl = 'https://DO_NOT_LOG_THIS_SECRET@stage.example.com/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts';
if (kind === 'localhost') c.artifactBaseUrl = 'https://127.0.0.1/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts';
if (kind === 'query') c.artifactBaseUrl += '?secret=DO_NOT_LOG_THIS_SECRET';
writeFileSync(path, kind === 'bad-json' ? 'DO_NOT_LOG_THIS_SECRET' : kind === 'null' ? 'null' : JSON.stringify(c), { mode: 0o400 });
const logs = [jest.spyOn(console, 'log'), jest.spyOn(console, 'warn'), jest.spyOn(console, 'error')];
try {
expect(() => registerPrepareWorker({ PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED: 'true' })).toThrow(/^Prepare worker startup configuration rejected$/);
logs.forEach(log => expect(log).not.toHaveBeenCalled());
} finally { logs.forEach(log => log.mockRestore()); rmSync(path, { force: true }); }
});
it('defaults to no module/no config IO and exposes no worker routes', async () => {
expect(registerPrepareWorker({})).toEqual([]);
expect(registerPrepareWorker({ PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED: 'false' })).toEqual([]);
const module = await Test.createTestingModule({ imports: registerPrepareWorker({}) }).compile();
const app = module.createNestApplication();
await app.listen(0, '127.0.0.1');
try {
const response = await fetch((await app.getUrl()) + '/internal/prepare-worker/claim', { method: 'POST' });
expect(response.status).toBe(404);
} finally { await app.close(); }
});
it('loads immutable reviewed JSON into the real transport registration', async () => {
mkdirSync('/run/secrets', { recursive: true });
const file = '/run/secrets/prepare_worker_grants';
const config = { grants: [{ id: 'worker', role: 'WORKFLOW_WORKER', credentialSha256: 'a'.repeat(64) }, { id: 'ci', role: 'STAGE_CI', credentialSha256: 'b'.repeat(64) }], workerIds: ['worker'], stageCiIds: ['ci'], artifactBaseUrl: 'https://stage.example.com/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts' };
writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(config), { mode: 0o400 });
try {
const [registered] = registerPrepareWorker({ PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED: 'true' });
expect(registered.module.name).toBe('WorkerTransportModule');
expect(registered.controllers?.length).toBe(1);
const snapshot = (registered.providers as any[]).find(p => p.useValue?.artifactDirectory)?.useValue;
expect(snapshot).toEqual({ ...config, enabled: true, artifactDirectory: '/var/lib/canina/prepare-artifacts' });
expect(Object.isFrozen(snapshot)).toBe(true);
expect(Object.isFrozen(snapshot.grants[0])).toBe(true);
} finally { rmSync(file, { force: true }); }
});
});
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
import { DynamicModule } from '@nestjs/common';
import { loadPrepareWorkerConfig } from './worker-config';
import { WorkerTransportModule } from './worker-transport.module';
/** AppModule imports: ...registerPrepareWorker(); disabled means no module or IO. */
export function registerPrepareWorker(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): DynamicModule[] {
if (env.PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED !== 'true') return [];
try { return [WorkerTransportModule.register(loadPrepareWorkerConfig())]; }
catch { throw new Error('Prepare worker startup configuration rejected'); }
}
@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
import {
BadRequestException,
Body,
CanActivate,
ConflictException,
Controller,
DynamicModule,
ForbiddenException,
Get,
Inject,
Injectable,
Module,
NotFoundException,
Param,
Post,
Req,
UnauthorizedException,
UseGuards,
UsePipes,
ValidationPipe,
} from "@nestjs/common";
import { IsString, IsUUID, Matches, MaxLength } from "class-validator";
import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
import { mkdir, open, FileHandle } from "fs/promises";
import { constants } from "fs";
import { isAbsolute } from "path";
import { PrismaModule } from "../prisma/prisma.module";
import { PrismaService } from "../prisma/prisma.service";
import {
PREPARE_WORKFLOW_CONFIG,
PrepareWorkflowService,
WorkflowIdentity,
} from "../orchestration/prepare-workflow.service";
// This is reviewed static configuration, not a URL fetched by the transport.
function validArtifactBase(value: string): boolean {
try {
const u = new URL(value);
// DNS name only: reject all IP literals, localhost/private single-label names,
// noncanonical paths/escapes, credentials, query, fragment and alternate ports.
return u.protocol === "https:" && !u.username && !u.password && !u.port &&
/^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9.-]*[a-z0-9])?$/.test(u.hostname) &&
u.hostname.includes(".") && !/^[0-9.]+$/.test(u.hostname) &&
!/(^|\.)(localhost|local|internal|lan|home)$/.test(u.hostname) &&
u.pathname === "/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts" &&
value === u.origin + u.pathname;
} catch { return false; }
}
const CONFIG = Symbol("WORKER_TRANSPORT_CONFIG");
export interface WorkerTransportConfig {
enabled: boolean;
grants: {
id: string;
role: "WORKFLOW_WORKER" | "STAGE_CI";
credentialSha256: string;
}[];
workerIds: string[];
stageCiIds: string[];
artifactDirectory: string;
artifactBaseUrl: string;
}
class ClaimDto {
@IsUUID() taskId!: string;
}
class LeaseDto extends ClaimDto {
@IsUUID() runId!: string;
@IsUUID() leaseToken!: string;
}
class CompleteDto extends LeaseDto {
@IsString() @MaxLength(2048) report!: string;
}
class StageEvidenceDto extends ClaimDto {
@IsUUID() runId!: string;
@Matches(/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/) commitSha!: string;
@Matches(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/) sha256!: string;
@Matches(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/) evidenceSha256!: string;
@Matches(/^https:\/\/[^\s]+$/) @MaxLength(2000) uri!: string;
}
export function tracerReport(lease: {
taskId: string;
runId: string;
commitSha: string;
}) {
return JSON.stringify({
kind: "DETERMINISTIC_PREPARE_TRACER",
schemaVersion: 1,
taskId: lease.taskId,
runId: lease.runId,
commitSha: lease.commitSha,
environment: "staging",
llmPilot: false,
browserExecuted: false,
shellExecuted: false,
deploymentExecuted: false,
checks: ["lease-bound identity", "deterministic JSON serialization"],
actualCents: 0,
});
}
@Injectable()
class WorkerIdentityGuard implements CanActivate {
constructor(@Inject(CONFIG) private readonly config: WorkerTransportConfig) {}
canActivate(context: any) {
if (!this.config.enabled)
throw new ForbiddenException("Worker transport disabled");
const req = context.switchToHttp().getRequest();
const auth = req.headers.authorization;
if (typeof auth !== "string" || !/^Bearer [\x21-\x7e]{32,512}$/.test(auth))
throw new UnauthorizedException();
const digest = createHash("sha256").update(auth.slice(7)).digest();
const grant = this.config.grants.find((g) =>
timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(g.credentialSha256, "hex"), digest),
);
if (!grant) throw new UnauthorizedException();
req.workerIdentity = { id: grant.id, role: grant.role };
return true;
}
}
@Injectable()
class WorkerTransportService {
constructor(
private readonly workflow: PrepareWorkflowService,
private readonly db: PrismaService,
@Inject(CONFIG) private readonly config: WorkerTransportConfig,
) {}
// Linux descriptor-relative traversal pins each directory across renames. Never
// realpath-check then reopen by name: that reintroduces a symlink race.
private async artifactDir(): Promise<FileHandle> {
let dir = await open("/", constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY);
try {
for (const part of this.config.artifactDirectory.split("/").filter(Boolean)) {
const path = `/proc/self/fd/${dir.fd}/${part}`;
try { await mkdir(path, { mode: 0o700 }); }
catch (e: any) { if (e.code !== "EEXIST") throw e; }
const next = await open(path, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
await dir.close();
dir = next;
}
const stat = await dir.stat();
if (stat.uid !== process.getuid!() || (stat.mode & 0o077) !== 0)
throw new Error("Private owned artifact directory required");
return dir;
} catch (e) { await dir.close(); throw e; }
}
private worker(a: WorkflowIdentity) {
if (a.role !== "WORKFLOW_WORKER" || !this.config.workerIds.includes(a.id))
throw new ForbiddenException("Worker allowlist required");
}
async claim(a: WorkflowIdentity, dto: ClaimDto) {
this.worker(a);
const t = await this.db.orchestrationTask.findUnique({
where: { id: dto.taskId },
});
// Explicit per-task pilot scope; never opportunistically consume arbitrary queued work.
if (!t || !["READY", "RUNNING"].includes(t.state)) return { lease: null };
if (t.budgetLimitCents !== 20)
throw new ForbiddenException("Pilot hard task cap is 20 cents");
return { lease: await this.workflow.claim(a, dto.taskId) };
}
heartbeat(a: WorkflowIdentity, dto: LeaseDto) {
this.worker(a);
return this.workflow.heartbeat(a, dto);
}
async complete(a: WorkflowIdentity, dto: CompleteDto) {
this.worker(a);
// Recheck stop/interrupt and fencing before artifact creation; core rechecks atomically at commit.
await this.workflow.heartbeat(a, dto);
const run = await this.db.orchestrationRun.findUniqueOrThrow({
where: { id: dto.runId },
});
const expected = tracerReport({ ...dto, commitSha: run.commitSha });
if (dto.report !== expected)
throw new BadRequestException(
"Only deterministic harmless tracer report accepted",
);
const sha256 = createHash("sha256").update(expected).digest("hex");
let dir: FileHandle | undefined, file: FileHandle | undefined;
try {
dir = await this.artifactDir();
file = await open(`/proc/self/fd/${dir.fd}/${sha256}.json`,
constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);
await file.writeFile(expected, "utf8");
await file.sync();
} catch { throw new ConflictException("Artifact creation refused"); }
finally { await file?.close(); await dir?.close(); }
const result = await this.workflow.complete(a, {
...dto,
sha256,
uri: this.config.artifactBaseUrl + "/" + sha256,
actualCents: 0,
});
return {
state: result.state,
taskId: result.id,
runId: dto.runId,
sha256,
actualCents: 0,
};
}
async artifact(a: WorkflowIdentity, hash: string) {
if (!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(hash))
throw new BadRequestException("Invalid artifact hash");
const registered = await this.db.orchestrationArtifact.findFirst({
where: {
sha256: hash, kind: "QA", uri: this.config.artifactBaseUrl + "/" + hash,
run: { environment: "staging", status: "SUCCEEDED", task: {
operationMode: "PREPARE", budgetLimitCents: 20,
} },
},
});
if (!registered) throw new NotFoundException("Artifact not registered");
const run = await this.db.orchestrationRun.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: registered.runId } });
const task = await this.db.orchestrationTask.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: run.taskId } });
const outbox = await this.db.prepareWorkflowOutbox.findUnique({ where: { taskId: run.taskId } });
if (!outbox || outbox.status !== "DONE" || outbox.runId !== run.id ||
(a.role === "WORKFLOW_WORKER" && outbox.leaseOwner !== a.id))
throw new NotFoundException("Artifact not registered");
const metadata = task.metadata as any;
if (metadata?.workflowScope !== "STAGE_PREPARE" || metadata?.commitSha !== run.commitSha)
throw new NotFoundException("Artifact not registered");
let bytes: string;
let dir: FileHandle | undefined, file: FileHandle | undefined;
try {
dir = await this.artifactDir();
file = await open(`/proc/self/fd/${dir.fd}/${hash}.json`,
constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);
const stat = await file.stat();
if (!stat.isFile() || stat.nlink !== 1 || stat.uid !== process.getuid!() ||
(stat.mode & 0o077) !== 0 || stat.size > 2048)
throw new Error("Unsafe artifact file");
// Fixed-size descriptor read: concurrent growth cannot allocate unbounded memory.
const buffer = Buffer.alloc(2049);
const { bytesRead } = await file.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length, 0);
if (bytesRead > 2048) throw new Error("Oversized artifact");
bytes = buffer.subarray(0, bytesRead).toString("utf8");
} catch {
throw new NotFoundException("Artifact unavailable");
} finally { await file?.close(); await dir?.close(); }
if (createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex") !== hash)
throw new ConflictException("Artifact integrity mismatch");
if (bytes !== tracerReport({ taskId: run.taskId, runId: run.id, commitSha: run.commitSha }))
throw new ConflictException("Artifact binding mismatch");
return JSON.parse(bytes);
}
stage(a: WorkflowIdentity, dto: StageEvidenceDto) {
return this.workflow.stageEvidence(a, dto);
}
}
@Controller("internal/prepare-worker")
@UseGuards(WorkerIdentityGuard)
@UsePipes(
new ValidationPipe({
whitelist: true,
forbidNonWhitelisted: true,
transform: true,
}),
)
class WorkerTransportController {
constructor(private readonly service: WorkerTransportService) {}
@Post("claim") claim(@Req() req: any, @Body() dto: ClaimDto) {
return this.service.claim(req.workerIdentity, dto);
}
@Post("heartbeat") heartbeat(@Req() req: any, @Body() dto: LeaseDto) {
return this.service.heartbeat(req.workerIdentity, dto);
}
@Post("complete") complete(@Req() req: any, @Body() dto: CompleteDto) {
return this.service.complete(req.workerIdentity, dto);
}
@Post("stage-evidence") stage(
@Req() req: any,
@Body() dto: StageEvidenceDto,
) {
return this.service.stage(req.workerIdentity, dto);
}
@Get("artifacts/:hash") artifact(@Req() req: any, @Param("hash") hash: string) {
return this.service.artifact(req.workerIdentity, hash);
}
}
@Module({})
export class WorkerTransportModule {
static register(config: WorkerTransportConfig): DynamicModule {
if (typeof config.enabled !== "boolean" || !Array.isArray(config.grants) ||
!Array.isArray(config.workerIds) || !Array.isArray(config.stageCiIds))
throw new Error("Explicit boolean enable and credential allowlists required");
const allIds = [...config.workerIds, ...config.stageCiIds];
if (allIds.some(id => typeof id !== "string" || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,100}$/.test(id)) ||
new Set(allIds).size !== allIds.length)
throw new Error("Invalid or overlapping worker/CI allowlists");
const ids = new Set<string>(),
digests = new Set<string>();
if (
!isAbsolute(config.artifactDirectory) || config.artifactDirectory === "/" ||
config.artifactDirectory.split("/").some(p => p === "." || p === "..") ||
!validArtifactBase(config.artifactBaseUrl)
)
throw new Error(
"Absolute artifact directory and fixed HTTPS artifact base required",
);
for (const g of config.grants) {
const allowed =
g.role === "WORKFLOW_WORKER"
? config.workerIds
: g.role === "STAGE_CI"
? config.stageCiIds
: [];
if (
!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,100}$/.test(g.id) ||
!allowed.includes(g.id) ||
!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(g.credentialSha256) ||
ids.has(g.id) ||
digests.has(g.credentialSha256) ||
(config.workerIds.includes(g.id) && config.stageCiIds.includes(g.id))
)
throw new Error("Invalid or overlapping worker/CI credential grants");
ids.add(g.id);
digests.add(g.credentialSha256);
}
const snapshot = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(config)) as WorkerTransportConfig;
snapshot.grants.forEach(Object.freeze);
Object.freeze(snapshot.grants);
Object.freeze(snapshot.workerIds);
Object.freeze(snapshot.stageCiIds);
Object.freeze(snapshot);
return {
module: WorkerTransportModule,
imports: [PrismaModule],
controllers: [WorkerTransportController],
providers: [
PrepareWorkflowService,
WorkerIdentityGuard,
WorkerTransportService,
{ provide: CONFIG, useValue: snapshot },
{
provide: PREPARE_WORKFLOW_CONFIG,
useValue: Object.freeze({
workerIds: snapshot.workerIds,
stageCiIds: snapshot.stageCiIds,
}),
},
],
exports: [PrepareWorkflowService],
};
}
}
@@ -1,438 +0,0 @@
import { Test } from "@nestjs/testing";
import { INestApplication } from "@nestjs/common";
import { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
import { PrismaService } from "../prisma/prisma.service";
import { PrepareWorkflowService } from "../orchestration/prepare-workflow.service";
import { WorkerTransportModule, tracerReport } from "./worker-transport.module";
import { createHash, randomUUID } from "crypto";
import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile, symlink, link, rename } from "fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import { join } from "path";
import { execFile } from "child_process";
import { promisify } from "util";
const enabled = process.env.WORKER_TRANSPORT_DB === "1";
(enabled ? describe : describe.skip)(
"isolated PostgreSQL HTTP executor tracer",
() => {
const db = new PrismaClient();
const token = "test-only-worker-secret-".repeat(3);
const ciToken = "test-only-ci-secret-".repeat(3);
const digest = (s: string) => createHash("sha256").update(s).digest("hex");
let app: INestApplication,
workflow: PrepareWorkflowService,
base: string,
directory: string;
let pilot: any;
beforeAll(async () => {
directory = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "worker-artifacts-"));
const mod = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [
WorkerTransportModule.register({
enabled: true,
grants: [
{
id: "pilot",
role: "WORKFLOW_WORKER",
credentialSha256: digest(token),
},
{ id: "ci", role: "STAGE_CI", credentialSha256: digest(ciToken) },
{ id: "other", role: "WORKFLOW_WORKER", credentialSha256: digest("other-worker-secret-".repeat(3)) },
],
workerIds: ["pilot", "other"],
stageCiIds: ["ci"],
artifactDirectory: directory,
artifactBaseUrl:
"https://isolated.invalid/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts",
}),
],
})
.overrideProvider(PrismaService)
.useValue(db)
.compile();
workflow = mod.get(PrepareWorkflowService);
app = mod.createNestApplication();
await app.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
base = await app.getUrl();
pilot = {
runOnce: async (options: any) => {
const program =
'import {runOnce} from "../infra/hermes-worker/pilot.mjs"; console.log(JSON.stringify(await runOnce(JSON.parse(process.env.TEST_PILOT_OPTIONS))));';
const result = await promisify(execFile)(
process.execPath,
["--input-type=module", "-e", program],
{
env: {
...process.env,
TEST_PILOT_OPTIONS: JSON.stringify(options),
},
timeout: 15000,
},
);
return JSON.parse(result.stdout);
},
};
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app?.close();
await db.$disconnect();
if (directory) await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
const owner = { id: "author", role: "Admin" },
reviewer = { id: "reviewer", role: "SUPER_ADMIN" };
async function proposal(queue = true, budget = 20) {
let t = await workflow.create(
{
key: randomUUID(),
title: "deterministic tracer",
department: "TEST",
operationMode: "PREPARE",
budgetLimitCents: budget,
metadata: {
commitSha: "a".repeat(40),
scope: "Harmless tracer only",
acceptanceCriteria: ["writes deterministic JSON; no release"],
},
},
owner,
);
if (queue) {
t = await workflow.transition(
t.id,
{
toState: "GATE1_PENDING",
expectedVersion: t.version,
idempotencyKey: randomUUID(),
},
owner,
);
t = await workflow.decide(
t.id,
1,
{
decision: "APPROVED",
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60000).toISOString(),
expectedVersion: t.version,
idempotencyKey: randomUUID(),
},
reviewer,
);
t = await workflow.transition(
t.id,
{
toState: "READY",
expectedVersion: t.version,
idempotencyKey: randomUUID(),
},
owner,
);
}
return t;
}
async function post(route: string, body: any = {}, secret = token) {
const r = await fetch(base + "/internal/prepare-worker/" + route, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
authorization: "Bearer " + secret,
"content-type": "application/json",
},
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
return { status: r.status, body: await r.json() };
}
it("rejects overlapping worker and CI grants and accepts no credentials when disabled", async () => {
expect(() =>
WorkerTransportModule.register({
enabled: true,
grants: [
{
id: "both",
role: "WORKFLOW_WORKER",
credentialSha256: digest(token),
},
],
workerIds: ["both"],
stageCiIds: ["both"],
artifactDirectory: directory,
artifactBaseUrl: "https://isolated.invalid/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts",
}),
).toThrow(/overlapping/);
const mod = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [
WorkerTransportModule.register({
enabled: false,
grants: [],
workerIds: [],
stageCiIds: [],
artifactDirectory: directory,
artifactBaseUrl: "https://isolated.invalid/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts",
}),
],
})
.overrideProvider(PrismaService)
.useValue(db)
.compile();
const disabled = mod.createNestApplication();
await disabled.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
try {
const r = await fetch(
(await disabled.getUrl()) + "/internal/prepare-worker/claim",
{
method: "POST",
headers: {
authorization: "Bearer " + token,
"content-type": "application/json",
},
body: JSON.stringify({ taskId: randomUUID() }),
},
);
expect(r.status).toBe(403);
} finally {
await disabled.close();
}
});
it("rejects unsafe artifact bases and freezes validated configuration", () => {
const config = { enabled: true, grants: [], workerIds: [], stageCiIds: [], artifactDirectory: directory,
artifactBaseUrl: "https://isolated.invalid/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts" };
for (const artifactBaseUrl of ["https://user:pass@isolated.invalid/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts", "https://127.0.0.1/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts", "https://10.1.2.3/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts", "https://localhost/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts", "https://isolated.invalid/arbitrary", "https://isolated.invalid/x/../internal/prepare-worker/artifacts", "https://[::1]/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts"]) {
expect(() => WorkerTransportModule.register({ ...config, artifactBaseUrl })).toThrow();
}
const registered = WorkerTransportModule.register(config);
const snapshot = (registered.providers as any[]).find(p => p.useValue?.artifactBaseUrl)?.useValue;
expect(Object.isFrozen(snapshot)).toBe(true);
expect(Object.isFrozen(snapshot.workerIds)).toBe(true);
expect(Object.isFrozen(snapshot.grants)).toBe(true);
const workflowConfig = (registered.providers as any[]).find(p => p.provide === "PREPARE_WORKFLOW_CONFIG").useValue;
expect(Object.isFrozen(workflowConfig)).toBe(true);
expect(() => WorkerTransportModule.register({ ...config, enabled: "true" as any })).toThrow();
});
it("denies untrusted identities and body impersonation; dispatches nothing before Gate1", async () => {
const t = await proposal(false);
expect((await post("claim", {}, "wrong")).status).toBe(401);
expect((await post("claim", { taskId: t.id }, ciToken)).status).toBe(403);
expect(
(await post("claim", { taskId: t.id, actorId: "pilot" })).status,
).toBe(400);
expect((await post("claim", { taskId: t.id })).body).toEqual({
lease: null,
});
expect(await db.orchestrationRun.count({ where: { taskId: t.id } })).toBe(
0,
);
});
it("races claims, fences expired leases and reserves unknown cost against the 20 cent cap", async () => {
const t = await proposal();
const claims = await Promise.all([
post("claim", { taskId: t.id }),
post("claim", { taskId: t.id }),
]);
const leases = claims.map((r) => r.body.lease).filter(Boolean);
expect(leases).toHaveLength(1);
const lease = leases[0],
binding = {
taskId: t.id,
runId: lease.runId,
leaseToken: lease.leaseToken,
};
expect(
(await post("heartbeat", { ...binding, leaseToken: randomUUID() }))
.status,
).toBe(403);
expect(
(
await post("complete", {
...binding,
report: "arbitrary shell or prompt",
})
).status,
).toBe(400);
expect(
(await post("complete", { ...binding, report: "{}", actualCents: 21 }))
.status,
).toBe(400);
await db.prepareWorkflowOutbox.update({
where: { taskId: t.id },
data: { leaseUntil: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) },
});
expect((await post("heartbeat", binding)).status).toBe(403);
expect(
(await post("complete", { ...binding, report: "{}" })).status,
).toBe(403);
expect((await post("claim", { taskId: t.id })).status).toBe(403);
expect(await db.orchestrationRun.count({ where: { taskId: t.id } })).toBe(
1,
);
expect(
(
await db.orchestrationBudgetLedger.aggregate({
where: { taskId: t.id },
_sum: { amountCents: true },
})
)._sum.amountCents,
).toBe(20);
const larger = await proposal(true, 40);
expect((await post("claim", { taskId: larger.id })).status).toBe(403);
});
it("rechecks kill switch and task interrupt on heartbeat and completion; separates CI authority", async () => {
const t = await proposal(),
lease = (await post("claim", { taskId: t.id })).body.lease;
const binding = {
taskId: t.id,
runId: lease.runId,
leaseToken: lease.leaseToken,
};
await db.orchestrationKillSwitch.upsert({
where: { scope: "GLOBAL" },
create: {
scope: "GLOBAL",
level: "STOP_AGENTS",
active: true,
reason: "isolated test",
actorId: "test",
},
update: { level: "STOP_AGENTS", active: true },
});
try {
expect((await post("heartbeat", binding)).status).toBe(403);
expect(
(await post("complete", { ...binding, report: "{}" })).status,
).toBe(403);
expect((await post("claim", { taskId: t.id })).status).toBe(403);
} finally {
await db.orchestrationKillSwitch.deleteMany();
}
await db.orchestrationTask.update({
where: { id: t.id },
data: { state: "CANCELLED" },
});
expect((await post("heartbeat", binding)).status).toBe(403);
expect(
(await post("complete", { ...binding, report: "{}" })).status,
).toBe(403);
expect(
await db.orchestrationArtifact.count({ where: { runId: lease.runId } }),
).toBe(0);
const evidence = {
taskId: t.id,
runId: lease.runId,
commitSha: "a".repeat(40),
sha256: "b".repeat(64),
evidenceSha256: "c".repeat(64),
uri: "https://isolated.invalid/not-real-ci",
};
expect((await post("stage-evidence", evidence)).status).toBe(403);
expect((await post("stage-evidence", evidence, ciToken)).status).toBe(
403,
);
});
it("never follows or overwrites preexisting artifact links on completion", async () => {
const t = await proposal();
const lease = (await post("claim", { taskId: t.id })).body.lease;
const report = tracerReport(lease), hash = digest(report);
const target = join(directory, "sentinel");
await writeFile(target, "do not overwrite");
const file = join(directory, hash + ".json");
await symlink(target, file);
const result = await post("complete", { taskId: t.id, runId: lease.runId, leaseToken: lease.leaseToken, report });
expect(await readFile(target, "utf8")).toBe("do not overwrite");
expect(result.status).toBe(409);
expect(await db.orchestrationArtifact.count({ where: { runId: lease.runId } })).toBe(0);
await rm(file);
await link(target, file);
expect((await post("complete", { taskId: t.id, runId: lease.runId, leaseToken: lease.leaseToken, report })).status).toBe(409);
expect(await readFile(target, "utf8")).toBe("do not overwrite");
});
it("runs actual HTTP deterministic executor to VERIFYING with retrievable content-addressed artifact", async () => {
const t = await proposal();
const result = await pilot.runOnce({
baseUrl: base,
credential: token,
taskId: t.id,
allowLoopbackHttp: true,
});
expect(result.state).toBe("VERIFYING");
const row = await db.orchestrationTask.findUniqueOrThrow({
where: { id: t.id },
});
expect(row.state).toBe("VERIFYING");
const artifact = await db.orchestrationArtifact.findFirstOrThrow({
where: { run: { taskId: t.id } },
});
const bytes = await readFile(join(directory, artifact.sha256 + ".json"));
expect(digest(bytes.toString())).toBe(artifact.sha256);
expect(JSON.parse(bytes.toString())).toMatchObject({
kind: "DETERMINISTIC_PREPARE_TRACER",
commitSha: "a".repeat(40),
environment: "staging",
llmPilot: false,
});
const get = await fetch(
base + "/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts/" + artifact.sha256,
{ headers: { authorization: "Bearer " + token } },
);
expect(get.status).toBe(200);
expect(await get.text()).toBe(bytes.toString());
const artifactGet = (secret: string) => fetch(base + "/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts/" + artifact.sha256,
{ headers: { authorization: "Bearer " + secret } });
expect((await artifactGet("other-worker-secret-".repeat(3))).status).toBe(404);
expect((await artifactGet(ciToken)).status).toBe(200);
const foreignHash = digest("{}");
await writeFile(join(directory, foreignHash + ".json"), "{}");
await db.orchestrationArtifact.create({ data: { runId: artifact.runId, kind: "QA", sha256: foreignHash, uri: "https://foreign.invalid/" + foreignHash } });
expect((await fetch(base + "/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts/" + foreignHash, { headers: { authorization: "Bearer " + token } })).status).toBe(404);
const moved = directory + "-moved";
await rename(directory, moved);
try {
await symlink(moved, directory);
expect((await artifactGet(token)).status).toBe(404);
} finally { await rm(directory, { force: true }); await rename(moved, directory); }
const file = join(directory, artifact.sha256 + ".json"), saved = file + ".saved";
await rename(file, saved);
try {
await symlink(saved, file);
expect((await artifactGet(token)).status).toBe(404);
await rm(file);
await link(saved, file);
expect((await artifactGet(token)).status).toBe(404);
await rm(file);
} finally { await rm(file, { force: true }); await rename(saved, file); }
const cost = await db.orchestrationBudgetLedger.aggregate({
where: { taskId: t.id },
_sum: { amountCents: true },
});
expect(cost._sum.amountCents).toBe(0);
expect(
await db.orchestrationAttestation.findFirst({
where: { run: { taskId: t.id }, kind: "STAGE" },
}),
).toBeNull();
const evidence = {
taskId: t.id,
state: row.state,
sha256: artifact.sha256,
artifact: JSON.parse(bytes.toString()),
httpGet: get.status,
costCents: cost._sum.amountCents,
uriExternalReachability: "NOT_TESTED_ISOLATED_FIXTURE_HOST",
};
console.log("TRACER_EVIDENCE", JSON.stringify(evidence));
if (process.env.TRACER_EVIDENCE_PATH)
await writeFile(
process.env.TRACER_EVIDENCE_PATH,
JSON.stringify(evidence, null, 2),
);
await writeFile(
join(directory, artifact.sha256 + ".json"),
'{"tampered":true}',
);
expect(
(
await fetch(
base + "/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts/" + artifact.sha256,
{ headers: { authorization: "Bearer " + token } },
)
).status,
).toBe(409);
});
},
);
-95
View File
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
**Superseded wiring/provenance: see [snapshot repair](hermes-snapshot-provenance.md). Do not use literal grants or the old DNS alias below.**
# Runtime read vertical slice (not deployed)
Branch feature/v4-runtime-completion, base 5507fbc. No AppModule, live gateway,
production database, cron, dispatch, or existing compose was changed.
## Parent registration
Import `RuntimeReadModule.register({ '<verified-user-id>': ['default', '<department>'] })`
from `backend/src/hermes-management/runtime-read.module` into AppModule.
This module uses the existing Passport `jwt` strategy (DB-resolved user identity),
not the API-key fallback. Parent must retain AuthModule/JwtStrategy initialization.
Missing grants deny. Never construct grants from browser body, JWT profile claims,
or unreviewed environment input. Allowlist is copied/frozen. Admin/SUPER_ADMIN
role AND exact subject grant required; API-key identities forbidden.
GET `/admin/orchestration/runtime/{health,profiles,status,usage,sessions,schedules,model-info}`.
All except health/profiles require exactly one allowed `profile` query string.
Usage accepts days 1..365 (30); sessions limit 1..100 (20), offset 0..10000 (0).
Unknown parameters on profile routes rejected. Profiles is filtered to server grants.
Responses use existing adapter projections, no prompts/transcripts/config/tokens.
Missing/forged JWT ->401; missing grant/role/profile ->403; runtime auth/network/
contract failure ->503 `Runtime unavailable`; limits ->429. No browser Hermes
cookie, credential, socket ticket or mutation handler is provided.
Mount backend `/run/secrets/hermes_username` and `hermes_password` as files.
Only these fixed secret paths are read, after authorization. Broker login/cache
stays server-side. Backend and isolated inventory runtime must receive matching
credentials. Runtime additionally mounts `hermes_signing_key` (>=32 random chars).
Do not put credentials in YAML/env, commands, logs or Git. Rotate key to invalidate
sessions; rotate password and restart inventory plus backend to clear cached access.
Stateless old sessions remain valid until TTL/key rotation.
## Deliberately separate snapshot topology
Installed Hermes `serve` lifespan starts reconciliation and hosted-room recovery;
GET sessions auto-archives. Sharing its writable home with existing gateway is
therefore NOT a safe read-only sidecar. `serve.py` runs the pinned installed app
with lifespan OFF and an outer exact GET allowlist, password-login only and all
WebSockets denied1008. It does NOT start scheduler/gateway/MCP/rooms/provider chat.
The existing gateway and external volume `canina-hermes_canina_hermes_data` remain
unchanged, solely owned by existing gateway. Inventory mounts an independently
provisioned snapshot volume `canina_hermes_inventory_snapshot`; it NEVER mounts
original home. Its incidental session auto-archive writes affect only snapshot.
This is snapshot inventory, NOT live runtime freshness/status acceptance. A copy
of gateway PID state is not evidence of live gateway health. UI must not claim live
readiness from this deployment. Parent should expose snapshot provenance/freshness
before enabling it for business use.
Provisioning must use an approved consistent SQLite backup/checkpoint/export and
redacted profile config inventory, not raw `cp` of changing SQLite/WAL or credentials.
No automatic snapshot job is installed here. No secrets need be copied from live
home. Review which configs the model/status APIs need and omit auth.json/.env.
Missing store/schema -> unavailable, not fabricated empty healthy telemetry.
Dedicated internal network must contain only backend and inventory; do NOT connect
existing gateway with same `canina-hermes` DNS alias. Backend name resolves inventory.
Inventory network must have no external egress. Compose refers to external network;
operator must create it `--internal`. No host ports/socket are published.
## CI ownership / apply
`compose.readonly.yml` is deployable ONLY after external snapshot, internal network,
secret files and backend mounts/registration are provisioned. `ci-apply.sh` requires
CI=true, exact reviewed HEAD SHA, clean checkout, snapshot-reviewed assertion,
existing volume/network/files, then compose config/up. Never run alongside any
other inventory instance writing same snapshot. CI job fragment is tracked under
infra ownership; parent owns real workflow wiring and approval environment. No
active deployment trigger added. Existing review-only compose template is unchanged.
## Executed evidence
Remote `/opt/services/canina/validation/v4-runtime-completion/`:
- read-red.log missing controller regression; read-green.log 6 suites/27 tests.
- read-http-green.log 7 suites/30 tests: real Nest HTTP with signed JWT strategy,
bad signature/no auth401, ungranted admin403, allowed admin200, no cookie,
mutation404. This uses a mocked runtime service, not live Canina credentials.
- pinned-http.log exact installed image FastAPI login/protected inventory:
wrong password401, real login200/HttpOnly provider-verifiable token, profiles200,
tampered token401. No lifespan/live home.
- serve-http.log actual loopback TCP9119 in network-none disposable pinned image:
unauth inventory401, wrong password401, login200, profiles200, health auth true,
mutation/config/ws HTTP404. Generated test-only credentials. No live volume.
- ws-red.log existing socket rejection code differed; ws-green.log explicit
outer boundary denies authenticated sockets1008 independently of upstream tickets.
- build.log private Prisma generation and full backend tsc build exit0.
Pinned local exact image ID sha256:373ddd5e6649f525b17993e1c885cdf1352127f8e98fd329140a73237125e52f;
tracked registry digest sha256:9774f4f39a9bb8c2f68ce728ed5e99ddbad282163be56764afacf88ed952b784.
Node22 disposable runner copied read-only source/dependency donor privately;
no DB migration. broker-pinned-e2e.log proves actual compiled Node broker -> TCP pinned Hermes login -> adapter -> policy-filtered inventory (and deny zero secret reads). Nest HTTP authentication tested separately; these tests do not establish full Canina application E2E, snapshot
refresh, CI deployment, live gateway truth or business workflow acceptance.
Those remain explicit integration/provisioning gates, not claimed completion.
Final full non-DB regression: 106 suites / 850 tests pass; expected legacy negative SSL/payment logs. Scoped ESLint has zero errors, six type-safety warnings; full build passes. No RELEASE_AUTHORIZE integration suite run.
-86
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@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
# Snapshot provenance repair — integration contract
This is independent snapshot inventory, **not a live Hermes executor**. No Production,
deployment, live gateway edits, or RELEASE_AUTHORIZE execution is included.
## Parent-owned application wiring
Keep AuthModule/JwtStrategy. Replace literal user grants in parent-owned app.module.ts with:
```ts
RuntimeReadModule.registerFromFile('/run/secrets/hermes_runtime_grants')
```
Nest supports the resulting Promise<DynamicModule> in imports. Alternatively pass the
reviewed nonsecret file `/etc/canina/runtime-grants.json`. No env/JWT/browser grant
input is accepted by this registration. File is JSON object mapping exact verified DB
user IDs to nonempty unique profile arrays; `{}` explicitly denies everyone. Missing,
malformed, symlinked, group/world-writable, oversized files fail startup closed. Mount
read-only and provision via reviewed configuration/secrets management; do not commit
real user grants. Existing explicit register(grants) remains for tests/legacy consumers.
Backend also mounts `/run/secrets/hermes_username` and `hermes_password` read-only.
No app.module.ts modification belongs to this commit.
## Required coordinated origin change
Authenticated management module and broker now exclusively use
`http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119`. compose.readonly.yml uses the distinct alias
`canina-hermes-inventory`, NEVER `canina-hermes`. Generic adapter allowlist retains
both reviewed exact origins for compatibility with separate existing consumers.
No arbitrary origin/env URL accepted. Parent must cherry-pick broker/module/adapter
and inventory compose together; do not add an alias to the existing gateway.
No deployment performed. External network should still be internal and only contain
backend/inventory; the distinct alias cannot shadow the live canina-hermes hostname.
## Snapshot exporter/operator gate
Every independent inventory root must include `snapshot-manifest.json`:
```json
{"schemaVersion":1,"source":"snapshot","capturedAt":"2026-10-23T12:00:00Z"}
```
The example is a schema example, NOT an actual capture attestation. Exporter must
write the real capture instant from the approved consistent export. Never copy the
example, use startup time, filesystem mtime, or claim this change captures/refreshes
snapshots. Missing/invalid/future manifest prevents startup. It is revalidated per
successful GET; invalid after startup returns503. Manifest is exporter metadata,
not a cryptographic proof of consistency. Immutable reviewed export provisioning
remains required. Fresh means age <=3600 seconds, otherwise stale; even fresh is
NOT live readiness. No snapshot scheduler installed.
## Additive public response fields / panel handoff
All object read DTOs (health/status/usage/sessions/model-info) add:
`provenance:{source:'snapshot',capturedAt:string,ageSeconds:number,freshness:'fresh'|'stale',liveProcess:'unknown'}`.
Profile and schedule array shapes are preserved: provenance is on each row. Empty
arrays have no rows to annotate; use the health response to display snapshot metadata.
Profile rows add `liveGatewayState:'unknown'`; status adds the same plus
`liveActiveAgents:null`. Existing required scalars remain typed but are conservative
placeholders: `gateway_running:false`, `active_agents:0`, `gateway_state:null`,
`overall:'unknown'`. False/zero MUST NOT render as measured offline/idle: when
provenance.source is snapshot use the explicit unknown fields, label snapshot and
show capturedAt/freshness. Health.ok only means inventory HTTP app responsiveness,
never live gateway readiness. Profile existence is inventory availability, NOT
process readiness. Adapter enforces provenance on dedicated snapshot origin and
conservatively overwrites copied PID-derived status/profile scalars again.
Installed status handler was unsafe here: it probes gateway HTTP/PIDs/platforms and
can stall despite this being an independent snapshot. Snapshot server replaces that
route with measured package version and explicit unknown process fields; no status
probe is run. Password auth/mutation denial/WebSocket denial remain intact.
## Executed acceptance
Remote disposable network-none exact pinned Hermes image, no original volumes:
manifest-missing regression failed first; TCP login/profile/health/status provenance
and stale capture assertions now pass; authenticated sockets denied1008. Disposable
Node22 copy of source/dependencies: 9 hermes-management suites /34 tests pass and
full backend tsc build passes. Adapter copied-live-state regression failed first;
grants-loader missing-function regression failed first. Compiled actual Node broker
-> TCP pinned server -> adapter -> policy-filtered profiles/status passes, deny reads
zero credentials. Test timestamps/credentials are fixtures, not live telemetry.
The first HTTP retry raced fixture startup and returned UNAVAILABLE; retry after
server startup passed. No claim of full app/user-flow or live runtime integration.
Full non-DB Jest regression: 108 suites/854 tests passed; 1 suite/18 tests skipped. No RELEASE_AUTHORIZE suite was enabled.
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
# Admin v4 completion integration contract
Frontend-only slice based on 5507fbc. No deployment or runtime writes. The historical read-only integration document does not authorize enabling routes. Backend policy remains the authority; UI adds deny-only safety restrictions, never permissions.
## Workflow (existing routes retained)
- GET `/admin/orchestration/overview`: ResourceSnapshot with `items`, ISO `measuredAt`, `capabilities:{mutations:boolean,chat:boolean,runtime:boolean}`. Missing/failed capability read defaults false.
- GET `/admin/orchestration/tasks`: Task[] (or `{success:true,data:Task[]}`).
- GET `/admin/orchestration/tasks/:id`: Task. Required identity/version/state/mode/budget and server-computed `availableActions`; optional scope/acceptance metadata, runs/artifacts, immutable decisions, events and budgetLedger. Missing actions means no permission. Include structured redacted scope metadata for a useful Gate1 review; no secrets or arbitrary event payloads.
- POST `/admin/orchestration/tasks`: existing CreateTaskInput `{key,title,department,operationMode,budgetLimitCents,metadata:{scope,acceptanceCriteria:string[]}}`. UI allows OBSERVE/PREPARE only, not Production. Key is unique business identity; after an ambiguous create, reconcile key before resubmission. Success locks the form to prevent accidental duplicate submission.
- PUT `/admin/orchestration/tasks/:id/transition`: TransitionDto `{toState,expectedVersion,idempotencyKey,reason}`.
- POST `/admin/orchestration/tasks/:id/gates/:gate/decide`: GateDecisionDto `{decision:'APPROVED'|'REJECTED',expectedVersion,idempotencyKey,expiresAt,notes}`; Gate2 approval additionally binds `{runId,artifactHash,commitSha,environment}` from a registered SUCCEEDED run, never editable commit/environment. Gate1 is bounded work, not release permission.
- ServerAction `{id,label,toState? ,gate?:1|2,decision?:'APPROVED'|'REJECTED',disabledReason?}`. Exactly one of transition or gate decision. All role/policy/kill/version checks remain backend-side. Browser identity fields are never posted; actor must derive from verified JWT. HOLD/request changes only appear if advertised as supported transitions. EDIT_AND_APPROVE is unavailable without a separately reviewed DTO; no guessed mutation endpoint.
- HTTP409 stale version/idempotency mismatch, 410 expired, 401/403 denied and other 4xx permanently lock that dialog; refresh and review afresh. Network/5xx ambiguous failures allow only identical payload/key. Inputs and navigation are locked after first attempt; authoritative refresh invalidates selection and pending detail reads. No optimistic status update.
- Production task actions and release transitions remain disabled even if advertised. Gate2 evidence inspection is not deployment authorization. Server still enforces TTL; browser time is a usability check, not trusted authorization.
## Runtime read API (aligned by read-only inspection with runtime sibling)
Uses existing JWT Axios client, never upstream Hermes paths or tokens. No automatic runtime mutations. Tab is explicitly selected; failed auth/config/routes show unavailable.
- GET `/admin/orchestration/runtime/health` -> `{ok:boolean,version:string,commit:string,auth_required:true}`. Any false/missing authentication flag is rejected.
- GET `/admin/orchestration/runtime/profiles` -> `{name:string,is_default:boolean,gateway_running:boolean}[]`, already filtered to principal grants.
- GET `/admin/orchestration/runtime/status?profile=<authorized>` -> `{version,gateway_running,overall,active_agents,gateway_state:string|null}`.
- GET `/admin/orchestration/runtime/sessions?profile=<authorized>&limit=20&offset=0` -> `{total:number,sessions:{id,profile,source,is_active}[]}`. UI paginates; profile mismatch is rejected.
- GET `/admin/orchestration/runtime/usage?profile=<authorized>&days=30` -> `{period_days:number,totals:{total_input,total_output,total_sessions,total_estimated_cost}}`.
Runtime client explicitly projects known fields; unknown secret fields are discarded. Numeric zero survives. Cost is labelled **upstream estimate**, unspecified currency, not settled billing and never added to overlapping 9router totals. Client observation time is not server heartbeat/freshness. Profile gateway flags and active agent count are source observations, not invented readiness/department counts. Generic Resources for existing agents/model-policy/schedules/releases remain unchanged; unavailable contracts stay visibly unavailable. Runtime schedules/model-info may exist backend-side but are not guessed into generic Resources.
## Verification
Runner: disposable node:22-bookworm, --userns=host --network none; source and dependency donor read-only, private copies in /work. No donor/source build writes. Required final gates: `tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.app.json`, `npm run build`, `npm test -- --maxWorkers=2`. Logs under `/opt/services/canina/validation/v4-panel-completion/` (outside discovery). Earlier RED proves 7 workflow failures and 2 selection/idempotency failures; runtime RED is missing new component. Existing test fixtures migrated from invented VERIFIED run status to backend SUCCEEDED status. No tests skipped or permissions inferred.
Not claimed: live backend browser acceptance, real authenticated runtime availability, Stage publication, CI evidence authority or Production execution. Parent owns integration and publication.
@@ -3,14 +3,12 @@ import {it,expect,vi} from 'vitest';
import api from '../services/api';
import CreateOrchestrationTask from './CreateOrchestrationTask';
vi.mock('../services/api',()=>({default:{post:vi.fn()}}));
it('submits exact bounded PREPARE contract only after valid commit and budget',async()=>{
it('submits explicit bounded scope and acceptance criteria, only after valid input',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.post).mockResolvedValue({data:{id:'new'}});const done=vi.fn();render(<CreateOrchestrationTask onCreated={done}/>);
expect(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Create bounded task'})).toBeDisabled();
for(const [label,value] of Object.entries({'Task key':'audit-1','Title':'Audit schema','Department':'SEO','Commit SHA (40 lowercase hex)':'a'.repeat(40),'Budget cap in cents':'500','Scope':'Audit staging only','Acceptance criteria (one per line)':'Schema checked\nEvidence attached'}))fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText(label),{target:{value}});
for(const value of ['19','10001','20.5']){fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText('Budget cap in cents'),{target:{value}});expect(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Create bounded task'})).toBeDisabled();}
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText('Budget cap in cents'),{target:{value:'500'}});
for(const [label,value] of Object.entries({'Task key':'audit-1','Title':'Audit schema','Department':'SEO','Bounded scope':'Staging schema audit only','Acceptance criteria (one per line)':'Report all failures','Budget cap in cents':'500'}))fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText(label),{target:{value}});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Create bounded task'}));
await screen.findByText('Task created by backend.');
expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks',{key:'audit-1',title:'Audit schema',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:500,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40),scope:'Audit staging only',acceptanceCriteria:['Schema checked','Evidence attached']}});
expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks',expect.objectContaining({operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:500,metadata:{scope:'Staging schema audit only',acceptanceCriteria:['Report all failures']}}));
expect(done).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
import {useState} from 'react';
import Button from './ui/Button';
import {orchestration,proposalError} from '../services/orchestration';
import {orchestration} from '../services/orchestration';
import type {CreateTaskInput} from '../services/orchestration';
export default function CreateOrchestrationTask({onCreated}:{onCreated:()=>void}){
const [fields,setFields]=useState({key:'',title:'',department:'',commitSha:'',budget:'',scope:'',criteria:''});
const [busy,setBusy]=useState(false);const [error,setError]=useState('');const [success,setSuccess]=useState('');
const input:CreateTaskInput={key:fields.key,title:fields.title,department:fields.department,operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:Number(fields.budget),metadata:{commitSha:fields.commitSha,scope:fields.scope,acceptanceCriteria:fields.criteria.split('\n')}};
const valid=Object.values(fields).every(value=>value.trim())&&!proposalError(input);
return <details className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5"><summary className="font-bold cursor-pointer">Create bounded work</summary><form className="space-y-3 mt-4" onSubmit={async e=>{e.preventDefault();if(!valid||busy||success)return;setBusy(true);setError('');setSuccess('');try{await orchestration.create(input);setSuccess('Task created by backend.');onCreated()}catch(error){setError(error instanceof Error?error.message+' — Refresh and reconcile the task key before resubmitting.':'Create failed; reconcile task key before retry')}finally{setBusy(false)}}}>
{([['key','Task key'],['title','Title'],['department','Department'],['commitSha','Commit SHA (40 lowercase hex)'],['budget','Budget cap in cents'],['scope','Scope'],['criteria','Acceptance criteria (one per line)']] as const).map(([key,label])=><label key={key} className="block">{label}<textarea aria-label={label} disabled={busy||!!success} required value={fields[key]} onChange={e=>setFields(prev=>({...prev,[key]:e.target.value}))} className="block border p-2 w-full rounded-lg"/></label>)}
<p>Operation mode: PREPARE · Environment: staging. Budget: 20..10000 cents. Scope: nonblank, at most 2000 characters. Acceptance criteria: 1..20 nonblank lines, at most 500 characters each. Human scope and criteria are persisted unchanged; the workflow restriction is server-owned.</p><p>Creation does not authorize work. Gate1 is a separate immutable decision. Production proposals are disabled. After an ambiguous failure, refresh and reconcile the unique task key before resubmitting.</p>
{error&&<p role="alert">{error}</p>}{success&&<p role="status">{success}</p>}<Button type="submit" disabled={!valid||busy||!!success}>Create bounded task</Button>
const [fields,setFields]=useState({key:'',title:'',department:'',scope:'',criteria:'',budget:''});
const [mode,setMode]=useState<CreateTaskInput['operationMode']>('PREPARE');const [busy,setBusy]=useState(false);const [error,setError]=useState('');const [success,setSuccess]=useState('');
const valid=Object.values(fields).every(value=>value.trim())&&Number.isSafeInteger(Number(fields.budget))&&Number(fields.budget)>=0;
return <details className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5"><summary className="font-bold cursor-pointer">Create bounded work</summary><form className="space-y-3 mt-4" onSubmit={async e=>{e.preventDefault();if(!valid||busy)return;setBusy(true);setError('');setSuccess('');try{await orchestration.create({key:fields.key,title:fields.title,department:fields.department,operationMode:mode,budgetLimitCents:Number(fields.budget),metadata:{scope:fields.scope,acceptanceCriteria:fields.criteria.split('\n').map(s=>s.trim()).filter(Boolean)}});setSuccess('Task created by backend.');onCreated()}catch(error){setError(error instanceof Error?error.message:'Create failed; reconcile task key before retry')}finally{setBusy(false)}}}>
{([['key','Task key'],['title','Title'],['department','Department'],['scope','Bounded scope'],['criteria','Acceptance criteria (one per line)'],['budget','Budget cap in cents']] as const).map(([key,label])=><label key={key} className="block">{label}<textarea aria-label={label} disabled={busy} required value={fields[key]} onChange={e=>setFields(prev=>({...prev,[key]:e.target.value}))} className="block border p-2 w-full rounded-lg"/></label>)}
<label>Operation mode<select aria-label="Operation mode" value={mode} disabled={busy} onChange={e=>setMode(e.target.value as CreateTaskInput['operationMode'])}>{['OBSERVE','PREPARE','MUTATE_PRODUCTION'].map(m=><option key={m}>{m}</option>)}</select></label><p>Creation does not authorize work. Gate1 is a separate immutable decision.</p>
{error&&<p role="alert">{error}</p>}{success&&<p role="status">{success}</p>}<Button type="submit" disabled={!valid||busy}>Create bounded task</Button>
</form></details>;
}
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
import {render,screen,fireEvent,waitFor} from '@testing-library/react';
import {beforeEach,it,expect,vi} from 'vitest';
import api from '../services/api';
import RuntimeReadPanel from './RuntimeReadPanel';
const provenance={source:'snapshot',capturedAt:'2020-01-01T00:00:00Z',ageSeconds:5000,freshness:'stale',liveProcess:'unknown'};
it('labels snapshot inventory without presenting stopped gateway, zero agents or active sessions as live',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/health')?{ok:true,version:'v1',commit:'abc',auth_required:true,provenance}:url.endsWith('/profiles')?[{name:'dev',is_default:false,gateway_running:false,liveGatewayState:'unknown',provenance}]:url.endsWith('/status')?{version:'v1',gateway_running:false,overall:'unknown',active_agents:0,gateway_state:null,liveGatewayState:'unknown',liveActiveAgents:null,provenance}:url.endsWith('/sessions')?{total:1,sessions:[{id:'session-1',profile:'dev',source:'cli',is_active:true}],provenance}:{period_days:30,totals:{total_input:1,total_output:2,total_sessions:1,total_estimated_cost:0},provenance}}));
render(<RuntimeReadPanel/>);
expect(await screen.findByText('Inventory service: responsive (not live Hermes health)')).toBeInTheDocument();
screen.getAllByText(/Captured at: 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z/).forEach(row=>expect(row).toHaveTextContent('stale'));
fireEvent.change(screen.getByLabelText('Authorized runtime profile'),{target:{value:'dev'}});
expect(await screen.findByText(/Active agents: unknown/)).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(await screen.findByText(/historical snapshot flag: active; live activity unknown/)).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText(/Gateway.*stopped/)).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText(/Active agents: 0/)).not.toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.queryByText(/runtime health: healthy/)).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
vi.mock('../services/api',()=>({default:{get:vi.fn()}}));
beforeEach(()=>{vi.resetAllMocks();vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>{
if(url.endsWith('/health'))return {data:{ok:true,version:'v1',commit:'abc',auth_required:true}};
if(url.endsWith('/profiles'))return {data:[{name:'dev',is_default:false,gateway_running:false}]};
if(url.endsWith('/status'))return {data:{version:'v1',gateway_running:false,overall:'degraded',active_agents:0,gateway_state:null}};
if(url.endsWith('/sessions'))return {data:{total:0,sessions:[]}};
if(url.endsWith('/usage'))return {data:{period_days:30,totals:{total_input:0,total_output:0,total_sessions:0,total_estimated_cost:0}}};
throw new Error('Runtime unavailable');
});});
it('shows actual health identity, explicit stopped gateway, zero usage and profile-bound reads',async()=>{
render(<RuntimeReadPanel/>);expect(await screen.findByText('v1 · abc')).toBeInTheDocument();
fireEvent.change(await screen.findByLabelText('Authorized runtime profile'),{target:{value:'dev'}});
expect(await screen.findByText('degraded')).toBeInTheDocument();expect(await screen.findByText('No sessions returned.')).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText('Input tokens: 0')).toBeInTheDocument();expect(screen.getByText(/Upstream estimated cost: 0/)).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(api.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/runtime/sessions',{params:{profile:'dev',limit:20,offset:0}});
});
it('shows unavailable rather than healthy when runtime cannot be authenticated',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockRejectedValue(new Error('Runtime unavailable'));
render(<RuntimeReadPanel/>);expect(await screen.findByText(/Health unavailable/)).toBeInTheDocument();expect(screen.queryByText('Authenticated runtime health: healthy')).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it('rejects malformed health and never renders unknown secret fields',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/health')?{ok:true,version:'v1',commit:'abc',auth_required:false,password:'secret-value'}:[]}));
render(<RuntimeReadPanel/>);expect(await screen.findByText(/Health unavailable/)).toBeInTheDocument();expect(screen.queryByText(/secret-value/)).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it('refreshes the authenticated runtime reads without a browser runtime connection',async()=>{
render(<RuntimeReadPanel/>);await screen.findByText('v1 · abc');fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Refresh runtime'}));await waitFor(()=>expect(vi.mocked(api.get).mock.calls.filter(([u])=>u.endsWith('/health'))).toHaveLength(2));
});
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
import {useEffect,useState} from 'react';
import Button from './ui/Button';
import {runtime} from '../services/runtime';
import type {RuntimeProvenance,RuntimeHealth,RuntimeProfile,RuntimeStatus,RuntimeSessions,RuntimeUsage} from '../services/runtime';
function Snapshot({value}:{value?:RuntimeProvenance}){return value?<p>Snapshot inventory · Captured at: {value.capturedAt} · Age: {value.ageSeconds} seconds · {value.freshness} · Live process: {value.liveProcess}. Even fresh snapshots are not live readiness.</p>:null}
export default function RuntimeReadPanel(){
const [revision,setRevision]=useState(0);const [profile,setProfile]=useState('');const [offset,setOffset]=useState(0);
const [health,setHealth]=useState<RuntimeHealth|null>(null);const [profiles,setProfiles]=useState<RuntimeProfile[]>([]);const [errors,setErrors]=useState<Record<string,string>>({});
const [status,setStatus]=useState<RuntimeStatus|null>(null);const [sessions,setSessions]=useState<RuntimeSessions|null>(null);const [usage,setUsage]=useState<RuntimeUsage|null>(null);
const [observed,setObserved]=useState('');
useEffect(()=>{let active=true;setHealth(null);setProfiles([]);setErrors({});
runtime.health().then(value=>{if(active){setHealth(value);setObserved(new Date().toISOString())}}).catch(()=>{if(active)setErrors(e=>({...e,health:'Health unavailable — authenticated backend runtime read failed.'}))});
runtime.profiles().then(value=>{if(active){setProfiles(value);setProfile(current=>value.some(p=>p.name===current)?current:'')}}).catch(()=>{if(active){setProfile('');setErrors(e=>({...e,profiles:'Profiles unavailable — no authorized runtime identity list.'}))}});
return ()=>{active=false};
},[revision]);
useEffect(()=>{let active=true;setStatus(null);setSessions(null);setUsage(null);setErrors(e=>({health:e.health,profiles:e.profiles}));if(!profile)return;
const fail=(name:string)=>{if(active)setErrors(e=>({...e,[name]:name+' unavailable — no fallback values.'}))};
runtime.status(profile).then(v=>{if(active)setStatus(v)}).catch(()=>fail('Status'));
runtime.sessions(profile,offset).then(v=>{if(active)setSessions(v)}).catch(()=>fail('Sessions'));
runtime.usage(profile).then(v=>{if(active)setUsage(v)}).catch(()=>fail('Usage'));
return ()=>{active=false};
},[profile,offset,revision]);
return <section aria-label="Authenticated runtime" className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5 space-y-4">
<div className="flex justify-between"><h2 className="font-bold">Hermes runtime — backend authenticated reads</h2><Button onClick={()=>setRevision(r=>r+1)}>Refresh runtime</Button></div>
<p>No browser runtime credentials or direct Hermes connection. Refresh observations are not heartbeat timestamps.</p>
{Object.entries(errors).filter(([,message])=>message).map(([name,message])=><p key={name} role="alert">{message}</p>)}
{health&&<div><p>Inventory service: {health.ok?'responsive':'not responsive'} (not live Hermes health)</p><Snapshot value={health.provenance}/><p>{health.version} · {health.commit}</p><p>Client observed at: {observed}. Client receipt time only; not capture time or live heartbeat.</p></div>}
<label>Authorized runtime profile<select aria-label="Authorized runtime profile" value={profile} onChange={e=>{setProfile(e.target.value);setOffset(0)}}><option value="">Select authorized profile</option>{profiles.map(p=><option key={p.name} value={p.name}>{p.name}</option>)}</select></label>
{!profiles.length&&!errors.profiles&&<p>No authorized profiles returned.</p>}
{profiles.map(p=><div key={p.name}>{p.name} · Gateway {p.provenance?'unknown (snapshot; not process readiness)':p.gateway_running?'running':'stopped'} · {p.is_default?'default profile':'non-default profile'}<Snapshot value={p.provenance}/></div>)}
{status&&<div><h3>Profile status</h3><Snapshot value={status.provenance}/><p>{status.overall}</p><p>Gateway: {status.provenance?'unknown':status.gateway_running?'running':'stopped'} · State: {status.provenance?'unknown':status.gateway_state??'Unknown'} · Active agents: {status.provenance?'unknown':status.active_agents}</p></div>}
{usage&&<div><h3>Runtime usage — {usage.period_days} days, selected profile only</h3><Snapshot value={usage.provenance}/><p>Input tokens: {usage.totals.total_input}</p><p>Output tokens: {usage.totals.total_output}</p><p>Sessions: {usage.totals.total_sessions}</p><p>Upstream estimated cost: {usage.totals.total_estimated_cost} (currency unspecified by source; not settled billing)</p><p>Do not add this to 9router totals; attribution overlaps and is not reconciled.</p></div>}
{sessions&&<div><h3>Sessions — {sessions.total} returned total</h3><Snapshot value={sessions.provenance}/>{!sessions.sessions.length&&<p>No sessions returned.</p>}{sessions.sessions.map(s=><article key={s.id} className="border rounded p-2"><p>{s.id} · {s.profile} · {s.source} · {sessions.provenance?`historical snapshot flag: ${s.is_active?'active':'inactive'}; live activity unknown`:s.is_active?'active':'inactive'}</p></article>)}<Button disabled={offset===0} onClick={()=>setOffset(n=>Math.max(0,n-20))}>Previous sessions</Button><Button disabled={offset+20>=sessions.total} onClick={()=>setOffset(n=>n+20)}>Next sessions</Button></div>}
</section>;
}
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ vi.mock('../services/api', () => ({ default: {get:vi.fn(),post:vi.fn(),put:vi.fn
const task={id:'t1',key:'bounded-1',title:'Bounded SEO audit',department:'SEO',state:'GATE1_PENDING',version:4,operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:500,availableActions:[{id:'g1',label:'Approve bounded work',gate:1,decision:'APPROVED'}],runs:[],metadata:{scope:'Only staging',acceptanceCriteria:['Audit schema']}};
describe('command center', () => {
beforeEach(() => { vi.resetAllMocks(); vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url => {
if(url.endsWith('/overview'))return {data:{items:[],measuredAt:'2026-10-22T00:00:00Z',capabilities:{mutations:true,killSwitch:true,chat:true,runtime:false}}};
if(url.endsWith('/overview'))return {data:{items:[],measuredAt:'2026-10-22T00:00:00Z',capabilities:{mutations:true,chat:true,runtime:false}}};
if(url.endsWith('/tasks')) return {data:[task]};
if(url.endsWith('/tasks/t1')) return {data:task};
throw new Error('Unavailable: '+url);
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ describe('command center', () => {
expect(screen.getByText('BLOCKED')).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it('binds Gate2 using registered evidence, never editable commit or environment',async()=>{
const release={...task,state:'GATE2_PENDING',availableActions:[{id:'g2',label:'Approve release',gate:2,decision:'APPROVED'}],runs:[{id:'run-1',status:'SUCCEEDED',commitSha:'abc123',environment:'staging',artifacts:[{id:'artifact-1',sha256:'a'.repeat(64)}]}]};
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/overview')?{items:[],measuredAt:'2026-10-23T00:00:00Z',capabilities:{mutations:true,chat:false,runtime:false}}:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[release]:release}));
const release={...task,state:'GATE2_PENDING',availableActions:[{id:'g2',label:'Approve release',gate:2,decision:'APPROVED'}],runs:[{id:'run-1',status:'VERIFIED',commitSha:'abc123',environment:'staging',artifacts:[{id:'artifact-1',sha256:'a'.repeat(64)}]}]};
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[release]:release}));
vi.mocked(api.post).mockResolvedValue({data:{id:'decision-2'}});
render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);
fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Bounded SEO audit'}));
@@ -114,23 +114,3 @@ describe('command center', () => {
});
});
it('requires explicit kill capability rather than generic mutations',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/overview')?{items:[],measuredAt:'now',capabilities:{mutations:true}}:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[task]:task}));
render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Bounded SEO audit'});
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Kill switch'}));
expect(screen.queryByRole('button',{name:'Apply kill switch'})).not.toBeInTheDocument();expect(api.put).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([{}, {scope:'STAGE_PREPARE'}, {scope:'Human scope',acceptanceCriteria:[]}])('does not claim incomplete or legacy metadata is scope evidence: %j',async metadata=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[{...task,metadata}]:{...task,metadata}}));
render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Bounded SEO audit'}));
expect(await screen.findByText(/Scope \/ acceptance criteria unavailable/)).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText('Server workflow scope: unavailable in safe projection.')).toBeInTheDocument();
});
it('separates human evidence from server workflow scope without inventing a marker',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[task]:task}));
render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Bounded SEO audit'}));
expect(await screen.findByText('Backend-reported scope / acceptance criteria')).toBeInTheDocument();
expect(screen.getByText('Server workflow scope: unavailable in safe projection.')).toBeInTheDocument();
});
@@ -1,19 +1,17 @@
import { useEffect, useState, useRef } from 'react';
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import Button from '../components/ui/Button';
import RouterUsagePanel from '../components/RouterUsagePanel';
import RuntimeReadPanel from '../components/RuntimeReadPanel';
import CreateOrchestrationTask from '../components/CreateOrchestrationTask';
import { orchestration, killLevels, actionBlockReason, commandFailure } from '../services/orchestration';
import { orchestration, killLevels } from '../services/orchestration';
import type { Task, ServerAction, Resource, ResourceSnapshot, KillLevel, ChatMessage } from '../services/orchestration';
const sections = ['Overview','Tasks & approvals','Runs & artifacts','Agents & departments','Models & budgets','Schedules','Audit & releases','Kill switch','9router usage & quota','Runtime health & sessions','Chat'] as const;
const sections = ['Overview','Tasks & approvals','Runs & artifacts','Agents & departments','Models & budgets','Schedules','Audit & releases','Kill switch','9router usage & quota','Chat'] as const;
type Section = typeof sections[number];
const resources:Partial<Record<Section,Resource>> = {'Agents & departments':'agents','Models & budgets':'model-policy','Schedules':'schedules','Audit & releases':'releases'};
const errorText=(e:unknown)=> e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'Unknown backend error';
function Json({value}:{value:unknown}) {return <pre className="text-xs whitespace-pre-wrap break-all bg-gray-50 border rounded-xl p-3" dir="ltr">{JSON.stringify(value,null,2)}</pre>}
export default function OrchestrationCommandCenter() {
const detailEpoch=useRef(0);
const [section,setSection]=useState<Section>('Overview');
const [capabilities,setCapabilities]=useState({mutations:false,chat:false,runtime:false,killSwitch:false});
const [capabilities,setCapabilities]=useState({mutations:false,chat:false,runtime:false});
const [tasks,setTasks]=useState<Task[]>([]);
const [selected,setSelected]=useState<Task|null>(null);
const [snapshot,setSnapshot]=useState<ResourceSnapshot|null>(null);
@@ -24,15 +22,12 @@ export default function OrchestrationCommandCenter() {
const [binding,setBinding]=useState(''); const [confirmed,setConfirmed]=useState(false);
const [attempted,setAttempted]=useState(false); const [busy,setBusy]=useState(false); const [commandError,setCommandError]=useState('');
const [success,setSuccess]=useState('');
const [blocked,setBlocked]=useState(false);
const [now,setNow]=useState(Date.now());
useEffect(()=>{const timer=setInterval(()=>setNow(Date.now()),1000);return ()=>clearInterval(timer)},[]);
const [kill,setKill]=useState<KillLevel>('FREEZE_NEW_WORK');
const [session,setSession]=useState(''); const [message,setMessage]=useState('');
const [messages,setMessages]=useState<ChatMessage[]>([]);
const [chatKey,setChatKey]=useState(()=>crypto.randomUUID());
const loadTasks=async()=> {setLoading(true);setError(''); try {setTasks(await orchestration.tasks())} catch(e){setTasks([]);setSelected(null);setError(errorText(e))} finally {setLoading(false)}};
useEffect(()=>{void loadTasks(); orchestration.resource('overview').then(s=>setCapabilities({mutations:s.capabilities?.mutations===true,chat:s.capabilities?.chat===true,runtime:s.capabilities?.runtime===true,killSwitch:s.capabilities?.killSwitch===true})).catch(()=>setCapabilities({mutations:false,chat:false,runtime:false,killSwitch:false}));},[]);
useEffect(()=>{void loadTasks(); orchestration.resource('overview').then(s=>setCapabilities({mutations:s.capabilities?.mutations===true,chat:s.capabilities?.chat===true,runtime:s.capabilities?.runtime===true})).catch(()=>setCapabilities({mutations:false,chat:false,runtime:false}));},[]);
useEffect(()=> {
const resource=resources[section]; setSnapshot(null);setError('');
if(!resource)return;
@@ -40,21 +35,21 @@ export default function OrchestrationCommandCenter() {
orchestration.resource(resource).then(data=>{if(active)setSnapshot(data)}).catch(e=>{if(active)setError(errorText(e))}).finally(()=>{if(active)setLoading(false)});
return ()=>{active=false};
},[section]);
const select=async(task:Task)=>{const epoch=++detailEpoch.current;setSelected(null);setError('');try {const detail=await orchestration.task(task.id);if(epoch===detailEpoch.current)setSelected(detail)}catch(e){if(epoch===detailEpoch.current)setError(errorText(e))}};
const open=(task:Task,action:ServerAction)=>{if(!capabilities.mutations||actionBlockReason(task,action))return;setBlocked(false);setAttempted(false);setPending({task,action,key:crypto.randomUUID()});setExpires('');setReason('');setConfirmed(false);setBinding('');setCommandError('');setSuccess('')};
const select=async(task:Task)=>{setSelected(null);setError('');try {setSelected(await orchestration.task(task.id))}catch(e){setError(errorText(e))}};
const open=(task:Task,action:ServerAction)=>{setAttempted(false);setPending({task,action,key:crypto.randomUUID()});setExpires('');setReason('');setConfirmed(false);setBinding('');setCommandError('');setSuccess('')};
const execute=async()=> {
if(!pending||busy||!confirmed||blocked||!capabilities.mutations)return;
if(!pending||busy||!confirmed)return;
setAttempted(true);setBusy(true);setCommandError('');
try { const [runId,artifactHash]=binding.split('|');
await orchestration.command(pending.task,pending.action,{idempotencyKey:pending.key,reason,expiresAt:expires?new Date(expires).toISOString():undefined,runId,artifactHash});
setPending(null);setSelected(null);setSuccess('Command accepted by backend; refreshed authoritative state.');await loadTasks();
} catch(e) {const failure=commandFailure(e);setBlocked(!failure.retryable);setCommandError(failure.message)} finally {setBusy(false)}
} catch(e) {setCommandError(errorText(e)+' — Refresh before retrying a version conflict; network retries keep the same key.')} finally {setBusy(false)}
};
const refresh=()=>{detailEpoch.current++;setSelected(null);setPending(null);void loadTasks()};
const refresh=()=>{setSelected(null);setPending(null);void loadTasks()};
const filtered=tasks.filter(t=>(t.title+' '+t.department+' '+t.state).toLowerCase().includes(search.toLowerCase()));
return <div className="space-y-5 font-vazir pb-12">
<header className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5 flex justify-between gap-4"><div><h1 className="text-xl font-black">Orchestration command center</h1><p className="text-sm text-gray-600">Backend-authoritative operations · Gate1 bounded work · Gate2 immutable release binding</p></div><Button onClick={refresh} disabled={busy||loading}>Refresh authoritative state</Button></header>
<nav aria-label="Orchestration sections" className="flex flex-wrap gap-2">{sections.map(s=><Button key={s} disabled={!!pending||busy} onClick={()=>{setSection(s);setSuccess('');setReason('');setConfirmed(false)}} variant={section===s?'primary':'outline'}>{s}</Button>)}</nav>
<nav aria-label="Orchestration sections" className="flex flex-wrap gap-2">{sections.map(s=><Button key={s} onClick={()=>{setSection(s);setSuccess('');setReason('');setConfirmed(false)}} variant={section===s?'primary':'outline'}>{s}</Button>)}</nav>
{loading&&<p role="status">Loading measured backend state…</p>}
{error&&<p role="alert" className="border border-red-200 bg-red-50 rounded-xl p-4">Unknown / unavailable: {error}. No fallback data. <button onClick={refresh}>Reload tasks</button></p>}
{success&&<p role="status">{success}</p>}
@@ -64,25 +59,24 @@ export default function OrchestrationCommandCenter() {
{!loading&&!error&&!tasks.length&&<p>No tasks returned by backend.</p>}
<div className="overflow-x-auto"><table className="w-full text-sm"><thead><tr>{['Task','Department','State','Mode','Budget cap (cents)','Version'].map(h=><th key={h} className="text-start p-2">{h}</th>)}</tr></thead><tbody>{filtered.map(t=><tr key={t.id} className="border-t"><td className="p-2"><button className="text-purple-700 underline" onClick={()=>void select(t)}>{t.title}</button></td><td>{t.department}</td><td>{t.state}</td><td>{t.operationMode}</td><td>{t.budgetLimitCents??'Unknown'}</td><td>{t.version}</td></tr>)}</tbody></table></div>
</section>}
{selected&&<section aria-label="Task detail" className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5 space-y-4"><h2 className="font-bold">{selected.title} · v{selected.version}</h2>{typeof selected.metadata?.scope==='string'&&selected.metadata.scope.trim()&&Array.isArray(selected.metadata.acceptanceCriteria)&&selected.metadata.acceptanceCriteria.length>0&&selected.metadata.acceptanceCriteria.every(value=>typeof value==='string'&&value.trim())?<h3>Backend-reported scope / acceptance criteria</h3>:<p>Scope / acceptance criteria unavailable — omitted by the safe backend projection.</p>}<p>Server workflow scope: unavailable in safe projection.</p><Json value={{operationMode:selected.operationMode,budgetLimitCents:selected.budgetLimitCents,metadata:selected.metadata}}/>
<h3>Server-authorized actions</h3>{!selected.availableActions.length&&<p>No actions advertised. Read-only; the browser does not infer transitions.</p>}<div className="flex flex-wrap gap-2">{selected.availableActions.map(a=><Button key={a.id} disabled={!capabilities.mutations||!!actionBlockReason(selected,a)} title={!capabilities.mutations?'Backend mutations unavailable':actionBlockReason(selected,a)} onClick={()=>open(selected,a)}>{a.label}</Button>)}</div>
{selected&&<section aria-label="Task detail" className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5 space-y-4"><h2 className="font-bold">{selected.title} · v{selected.version}</h2>{selected.metadata?<h3>Backend-reported scope / acceptance criteria</h3>:<p>Scope / acceptance criteria unavailable — omitted by the safe backend projection.</p>}<Json value={{operationMode:selected.operationMode,budgetLimitCents:selected.budgetLimitCents,metadata:selected.metadata}}/>
<h3>Server-authorized actions</h3>{!selected.availableActions.length&&<p>No actions advertised. Read-only; the browser does not infer transitions.</p>}<div className="flex flex-wrap gap-2">{selected.availableActions.map(a=><Button key={a.id} disabled={!!a.disabledReason} title={a.disabledReason} onClick={()=>open(selected,a)}>{a.label}</Button>)}</div>
<h3>Immutable approval decisions</h3><Json value={selected.decisions??[]}/>
<h3>Runs & registered artifacts</h3>{!selected.runs?.length&&<p>No registered runs.</p>}{selected.runs?.map(r=><article key={r.id} className="border rounded-xl p-3 space-y-2"><h4>{r.id} · {r.status}</h4><p>Commit: {r.commitSha} · Environment: {r.environment}</p>{r.artifacts.map(a=><Json key={a.id} value={a}/>)}</article>)}
<h3>Budget ledger (cents; not inferred usage)</h3><Json value={selected.budgetLedger??[]}/><h3>Ordered audit events</h3><Json value={selected.events??[]}/>
</section>}
{snapshot&&<section className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5 space-y-4"><h2>{section}</h2><p>Measured at: {snapshot.measuredAt}</p>{!snapshot.items.length&&<p>No records returned by backend.</p>}<div className="grid md:grid-cols-2 gap-3">{snapshot.items.map(item=><article key={item.id} className="border rounded-xl p-4"><h3>{item.title??item.id}</h3><dl>{Object.entries(item).filter(([k])=>k!=='id'&&k!=='title').map(([k,v])=><div key={k} className="flex justify-between gap-3"><dt>{k}</dt><dd>{String(v??'Unknown')}</dd></div>)}</dl></article>)}</div><p>Configuration mutations require backend-advertised commands; none are inferred by this client.</p></section>}
{section==='Kill switch'&&!capabilities.killSwitch&&<p>Mutation controls unavailable: backend security hardening pending.</p>}
{section==='Kill switch'&&capabilities.killSwitch&&<section className="border border-red-300 rounded-2xl bg-white p-5 space-y-3"><h2>Global kill switch — four escalating levels</h2><p>Applies globally, not only to selected task. No implicit resume. Current active level: unknown until backend returns state.</p><label>Level<select aria-label="Kill level" value={kill} onChange={e=>{setKill(e.target.value as KillLevel);setConfirmed(false)}}>{killLevels.map(l=><option key={l}>{l}</option>)}</select></label><p>Freeze new work → stop agents → disable mutations → emergency halt.</p><label>Reason<input aria-label="Kill reason" value={reason} onChange={e=>setReason(e.target.value)} className="border p-2"/></label><label className="block"><input type="checkbox" checked={confirmed} onChange={e=>setConfirmed(e.target.checked)}/>I confirm global operational impact</label><Button disabled={busy||!reason.trim()||!confirmed} onClick={async()=>{setBusy(true);setError('');try{const result=await orchestration.kill(kill,reason);setSuccess('Backend acknowledged kill switch: '+JSON.stringify(result));setConfirmed(false)}catch(e){setError(errorText(e))}finally{setBusy(false)}}}>Apply kill switch</Button></section>}
{section==='Kill switch'&&!capabilities.mutations&&<p>Mutation controls unavailable: backend security hardening pending.</p>}
{section==='Kill switch'&&capabilities.mutations&&<section className="border border-red-300 rounded-2xl bg-white p-5 space-y-3"><h2>Global kill switch — four escalating levels</h2><p>Applies globally, not only to selected task. No implicit resume. Current active level: unknown until backend returns state.</p><label>Level<select aria-label="Kill level" value={kill} onChange={e=>{setKill(e.target.value as KillLevel);setConfirmed(false)}}>{killLevels.map(l=><option key={l}>{l}</option>)}</select></label><p>Freeze new work → stop agents → disable mutations → emergency halt.</p><label>Reason<input aria-label="Kill reason" value={reason} onChange={e=>setReason(e.target.value)} className="border p-2"/></label><label className="block"><input type="checkbox" checked={confirmed} onChange={e=>setConfirmed(e.target.checked)}/>I confirm global operational impact</label><Button disabled={busy||!reason.trim()||!confirmed} onClick={async()=>{setBusy(true);setError('');try{const result=await orchestration.kill(kill,reason);setSuccess('Backend acknowledged kill switch: '+JSON.stringify(result));setConfirmed(false)}catch(e){setError(errorText(e))}finally{setBusy(false)}}}>Apply kill switch</Button></section>}
{section==='9router usage & quota'&&<RouterUsagePanel/>}
{section==='Runtime health & sessions'&&<RuntimeReadPanel/>}
{section==='Chat'&&!capabilities.chat&&<p>Chat unsupported: trusted runtime bridge unavailable.</p>}
{section==='Chat'&&capabilities.chat&&<section className="bg-white border rounded-2xl p-5 space-y-3"><h2>Typed backend chat bridge</h2><p>Advisory text only. No terminal, PTY, runtime token, or direct Hermes connection. Decisions use explicit approval controls.</p><label>Session ID<input value={session} onChange={e=>{setSession(e.target.value);setMessages([])}} className="border p-2"/></label><div role="log">{messages.map(m=><p key={m.id}>{m.role}: {m.content}</p>)}</div><label>Message<textarea value={message} onChange={e=>{setMessage(e.target.value);setChatKey(crypto.randomUUID())}} className="border p-2 block w-full"/></label><Button disabled={busy||!session.trim()||!message.trim()} onClick={async()=>{setBusy(true);setError('');try{const reply=await orchestration.chat(session,message,chatKey);setMessages(prev=>[...prev,{id:chatKey,role:'user',content:message},reply]);setMessage('');setChatKey(crypto.randomUUID())}catch(e){setError(errorText(e))}finally{setBusy(false)}}}>Send advisory message</Button></section>}
{pending&&<div role="dialog" aria-modal="true" aria-label="Confirm immutable command" className="fixed inset-0 z-50 bg-black/50 overflow-y-auto p-8"><div className="bg-white rounded-2xl p-6 max-w-2xl mx-auto space-y-4"><h2>{pending.action.label}</h2><Json value={{taskId:pending.task.id,expectedVersion:pending.task.version,idempotencyKey:pending.key,scope:pending.task.metadata,budgetLimitCents:pending.task.budgetLimitCents,operationMode:pending.task.operationMode}}/>
{pending.action.gate&&<label className="block">Expires at<input aria-label="Expires at" type="datetime-local" value={expires} onChange={e=>setExpires(e.target.value)} disabled={busy||attempted}/></label>}
{pending.action.gate===2&&pending.action.decision==='APPROVED'&&<label>Registered run / artifact binding<select aria-label="Registered run / artifact binding" value={binding} onChange={e=>{setBinding(e.target.value);setConfirmed(false)}} disabled={busy||attempted}><option value="">Select immutable evidence</option>{pending.task.runs?.filter(r=>r.status==='SUCCEEDED').flatMap(r=>r.artifacts.map(a=><option key={r.id+'|'+a.sha256} value={r.id+'|'+a.sha256}>{r.id} · {r.commitSha} · {r.environment} · {a.sha256}</option>))}</select></label>}
{pending.action.gate===2&&pending.action.decision==='APPROVED'&&<label>Registered run / artifact binding<select aria-label="Registered run / artifact binding" value={binding} onChange={e=>{setBinding(e.target.value);setConfirmed(false)}} disabled={busy||attempted}><option value="">Select immutable evidence</option>{pending.task.runs?.flatMap(r=>r.artifacts.map(a=><option key={r.id+'|'+a.sha256} value={r.id+'|'+a.sha256}>{r.id} · {r.commitSha} · {r.environment} · {a.sha256}</option>))}</select></label>}
<label className="block">Reason<input aria-label="Reason" value={reason} onChange={e=>setReason(e.target.value)} disabled={busy||attempted} className="border p-2"/></label>
<label className="block"><input type="checkbox" checked={confirmed} onChange={e=>setConfirmed(e.target.checked)} disabled={busy}/>I reviewed the immutable scope and binding</label>
{commandError&&<p role="alert">{commandError}</p>}<div className="flex gap-3"><Button disabled={busy||blocked||!capabilities.mutations||!confirmed||!reason.trim()|| (!!pending.action.gate&&!(Date.parse(expires)>now)) || (['APPROVE_GATE1','REJECT_GATE1'].includes(pending.action.id)&&Date.parse(expires)>now+86400000) || (pending.action.gate===2&&pending.action.decision==='APPROVED'&&!binding)} onClick={()=>void execute()}>Confirm command</Button><Button variant="outline" disabled={busy} onClick={()=>setPending(null)}>Cancel</Button></div>
{commandError&&<p role="alert">{commandError}</p>}<div className="flex gap-3"><Button disabled={busy||!confirmed||!reason.trim()|| (!!pending.action.gate&&!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(expires))) || (pending.action.gate===2&&pending.action.decision==='APPROVED'&&!binding)} onClick={()=>void execute()}>Confirm command</Button><Button variant="outline" disabled={busy} onClick={()=>setPending(null)}>Cancel</Button></div>
</div></div>}
</div>;
}
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
import {render,screen,fireEvent,within,waitFor,act} from '@testing-library/react';
import {it,expect,vi} from 'vitest';
import api from '../services/api';
import OrchestrationCommandCenter from './OrchestrationCommandCenter';
vi.mock('../services/api',()=>({default:{get:vi.fn(),post:vi.fn(),put:vi.fn()}}));
it('does not restore stale detail after authoritative refresh while detail request is pending',async()=>{
const t={id:'t',key:'t',title:'Task identity',department:'DEV',state:'GATE1_PENDING',version:2,operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:0,availableActions:[]};
let resolve!:(v:unknown)=>void;
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>{if(url.endsWith('/overview'))return {data:{items:[],measuredAt:'2026-10-23',capabilities:{mutations:true}}};if(url.endsWith('/tasks'))return {data:[t]};return await new Promise<unknown>(r=>{resolve=r}) as never});
render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Task identity'}));fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Refresh authoritative state'}));
await act(async()=>resolve({data:t}));await waitFor(()=>expect(screen.queryByText('Loading measured backend state…')).not.toBeInTheDocument());
expect(screen.queryByRole('region',{name:'Task detail'})).not.toBeInTheDocument();
});
it('keeps payload immutable when navigating after an ambiguous network failure',async()=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();const t={id:'t',key:'t',title:'Task identity',department:'DEV',state:'GATE1_PENDING',version:2,operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:0,availableActions:[{id:'g1',label:'Approve safe work',gate:1,decision:'APPROVED'}]};
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/overview')?{items:[],measuredAt:'2026-10-23',capabilities:{mutations:true}}:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[t]:t}));vi.mocked(api.post).mockRejectedValue(new Error('network'));
render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Task identity'}));fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Approve safe work'}));const d=within(screen.getByRole('dialog'));fireEvent.change(d.getByLabelText('Expires at'),{target:{value:'2099-01-01T12:00'}});fireEvent.change(d.getByLabelText('Reason'),{target:{value:'Reviewed'}});fireEvent.click(d.getByLabelText('I reviewed the immutable scope and binding'));fireEvent.click(d.getByRole('button',{name:'Confirm command'}));await d.findByRole('alert');
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Tasks & approvals'}));expect(d.getByLabelText('Reason')).toHaveValue('Reviewed');expect(d.getByLabelText('I reviewed the immutable scope and binding')).toBeChecked();
});
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
import {render,screen,fireEvent,within,waitFor} from '@testing-library/react';
import {beforeEach,it,expect,vi} from 'vitest';
import api from '../services/api';
import {orchestration} from '../services/orchestration';
import type {CreateTaskInput} from '../services/orchestration';
import OrchestrationCommandCenter from './OrchestrationCommandCenter';
vi.mock('../services/api',()=>({default:{get:vi.fn(),post:vi.fn(),put:vi.fn()}}));
const action={id:'g1',label:'Review Gate1',gate:1 as const,decision:'APPROVED' as const};
const task={id:'t',key:'t',title:'Safe proposal',department:'DEV',state:'GATE1_PENDING',version:2,operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:0,availableActions:[action],runs:[]};
beforeEach(()=>{vi.resetAllMocks();vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/overview')?{items:[],measuredAt:'2026-10-23T00:00:00Z',capabilities:{mutations:true,chat:false,runtime:false}}:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[task]:task}));});
it('refuses Production creation even when called outside form',async()=>{
await expect(orchestration.create({key:'x',title:'x',department:'DEV',operationMode:'MUTATE_PRODUCTION',budgetLimitCents:0,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40)}} as unknown as CreateTaskInput)).rejects.toThrow(/PREPARE|advertised/);
expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('rejects ambiguous advertised action rather than selecting a mutation path',async()=>{
const ambiguous={...action,toState:'READY'};
await expect(orchestration.command({...task,availableActions:[ambiguous]},ambiguous,{idempotencyKey:'key',expiresAt:'2099-01-01T00:00:00Z'})).rejects.toThrow(/advertised/);
expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('blocks release transitions even when advertised by server',async()=>{
const release={id:'release',label:'Release',toState:'RELEASING'};
await expect(orchestration.command({...task,availableActions:[release]},release,{idempotencyKey:'key'})).rejects.toThrow(/PREPARE|advertised/);
expect(api.put).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('rejects Gate2 evidence from failed runs',async()=>{
const g2={...action,gate:2 as const};
await expect(orchestration.command({...task,availableActions:[g2],runs:[{id:'r',status:'FAILED',commitSha:'abc',environment:'stage',artifacts:[{id:'a',sha256:'a'.repeat(64)}]}]},g2,{idempotencyKey:'key',expiresAt:'2099-01-01T00:00:00Z',runId:'r',artifactHash:'a'.repeat(64)})).rejects.toThrow(/successful/);
expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
async function dialog(){render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Safe proposal'}));fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Review Gate1'}));const d=within(screen.getByRole('dialog'));fireEvent.change(d.getByLabelText('Expires at'),{target:{value:'2099-01-01T12:00'}});fireEvent.change(d.getByLabelText('Reason'),{target:{value:'Reviewed bounds'}});fireEvent.click(d.getByLabelText('I reviewed the immutable scope and binding'));return d;}
it('locks stale 409 command until authoritative refresh instead of retrying stale payload',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.post).mockRejectedValue({response:{status:409,data:{message:'Version conflict'}}});
const d=await dialog();fireEvent.click(d.getByRole('button',{name:'Confirm command'}));
await waitFor(()=>expect(d.getByRole('button',{name:'Confirm command'})).toBeDisabled());
expect(await d.findByRole('alert')).toHaveTextContent(/stale/i);
fireEvent.click(d.getByRole('button',{name:'Confirm command'}));expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Refresh authoritative state'}));expect(screen.queryByRole('dialog')).not.toBeInTheDocument();await waitFor(()=>expect(screen.queryByText('Loading measured backend state…')).not.toBeInTheDocument());
});
it('does not expose authorized task mutations when capabilities are unavailable',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>{if(url.endsWith('/overview'))throw new Error('offline');return {data:url.endsWith('/tasks')?[task]:task};});
render(<OrchestrationCommandCenter/>);fireEvent.click(await screen.findByRole('button',{name:'Safe proposal'}));await screen.findByRole('region',{name:'Task detail'});
expect(screen.getByRole('button',{name:'Review Gate1'})).toBeDisabled();
});
it('prevents confirming an already expired approval',async()=>{
const d=await dialog();fireEvent.change(d.getByLabelText('Expires at'),{target:{value:'2020-01-01T12:00'}});
expect(d.getByRole('button',{name:'Confirm command'})).toBeDisabled();
});
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ describe('orchestration adapter', () => {
expect(api.put).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('binds Gate2 to immutable registered run and sends version and retry-stable key', async () => {
const run={id:'r',commitSha:'abc',environment:'staging',status:'SUCCEEDED',artifacts:[{id:'a',sha256:'a'.repeat(64)}]};
const run={id:'r',commitSha:'abc',environment:'staging',status:'VERIFIED',artifacts:[{id:'a',sha256:'a'.repeat(64)}]};
const input={idempotencyKey:'same-key',expiresAt:'2099-01-01T00:00:00Z',runId:'r',artifactHash:'a'.repeat(64)};
vi.mocked(api.post).mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('network')).mockResolvedValueOnce({data:{id:'decision'}});
await expect(orchestration.command({...task,runs:[run]},task.availableActions[0],input)).rejects.toThrow('network');
@@ -46,84 +46,9 @@ describe('orchestration adapter', () => {
expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/chat/messages',{sessionId:'session',message:'Review task',idempotencyKey:'key'});
});
it('creates bounded work without permitting invalid caps or client-supplied state',async()=>{
await expect(orchestration.create({key:'t',title:'Audit',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:-1,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40),scope:'Audit staging only',acceptanceCriteria:['Schema checked']}})).rejects.toThrow(/budget/);
await expect(orchestration.create({key:'t',title:'Audit',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:-1,metadata:{scope:'staging',acceptanceCriteria:['report']}})).rejects.toThrow(/budget/);
vi.mocked(api.post).mockResolvedValue({data:{id:'new-task'}});
await orchestration.create({key:'t',title:'Audit',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:20,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40),scope:'Audit staging only',acceptanceCriteria:['Schema checked']}});
expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks',{key:'t',title:'Audit',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:20,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40),scope:'Audit staging only',acceptanceCriteria:['Schema checked']}});
await orchestration.create({key:'t',title:'Audit',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:0,metadata:{scope:'staging',acceptanceCriteria:['report']}});
expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks',{key:'t',title:'Audit',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:0,metadata:{scope:'staging',acceptanceCriteria:['report']}});
});
});
describe('actual PREPARE backend contract',()=>{
beforeEach(()=>vi.resetAllMocks());
it('normalizes strings by fixed mapping, drops unknown and tampered objects, never infers from state',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:{...task,state:'DRAFT',availableActions:['SUBMIT_GATE1','APPROVE_GATE1','REJECT_GATE1','QUEUE_PREPARE','RELEASE_AUTHORIZE',{id:'SUBMIT_GATE1',label:'bad',toState:'RELEASING'},null]}});
const detail=await orchestration.task('t/1');
expect(detail.availableActions.map(a=>a.id)).toEqual(['SUBMIT_GATE1','APPROVE_GATE1','REJECT_GATE1','QUEUE_PREPARE']);
vi.mocked(api.put).mockResolvedValue({data:{}});
await orchestration.command(detail,detail.availableActions[0],{idempotencyKey:'submit'});
expect(api.put).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks/t%2F1/transition',{toState:'GATE1_PENDING',expectedVersion:7,idempotencyKey:'submit',reason:undefined});
vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:[{...task,state:'DRAFT',availableActions:[]}]});
expect((await orchestration.tasks())[0].availableActions).toEqual([]);
});
it('rejects arbitrary object transitions and conflicting known mappings',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:{...task,availableActions:[{id:'evil',label:'go',toState:'RUNNING'},{id:'SUBMIT_GATE1',label:'go',toState:'READY'}]}});
expect((await orchestration.task('t/1')).availableActions).toEqual([]);
});
it.each([0,19,10001,20.5])('rejects invalid budget %s',async budget=>{
await expect(orchestration.create({key:'k',title:'t',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:budget,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40),scope:'Audit staging only',acceptanceCriteria:['Schema checked']}})).rejects.toThrow(/budget/i);
expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each(['abc','A'.repeat(40),'a'.repeat(64),''])('rejects invalid commit %s',async commitSha=>{
await expect(orchestration.create({key:'k',title:'t',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:20,metadata:{commitSha,scope:'Audit staging only',acceptanceCriteria:['Schema checked']}})).rejects.toThrow(/commit/i);
});
it.each([20,10000])('posts exact DTO at boundary %s',async budget=>{
vi.mocked(api.post).mockResolvedValue({data:{}});
const dto={key:'k',title:'t',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE' as const,budgetLimitCents:budget,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40),scope:'Audit staging only',acceptanceCriteria:['Schema checked']}};
await orchestration.create(dto);expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks',dto);
});
});
it.each([
['APPROVE_GATE1','post','/gates/1/decide',{decision:'APPROVED'}],
['REJECT_GATE1','post','/gates/1/decide',{decision:'REJECTED'}],
['QUEUE_PREPARE','put','/transition',{toState:'READY'}],
])('routes actual advertised %s regardless of state',async(id,method,path,payload)=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:{...task,state:'DRAFT',availableActions:[id]}});
vi.mocked(api.post).mockResolvedValue({data:{}});vi.mocked(api.put).mockResolvedValue({data:{}});
const detail=await orchestration.task('t/1');
await orchestration.command(detail,detail.availableActions[0],{idempotencyKey:'k',expiresAt:new Date(Date.now()+3600000).toISOString()});
expect(method==='post'?api.post:api.put).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks/t%2F1'+path,expect.objectContaining({...payload,expectedVersion:7,idempotencyKey:'k'}));
});
it('rejects canonical Gate1 decisions beyond backend 24 hour limit',async()=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:{...task,availableActions:['APPROVE_GATE1']}});
const detail=await orchestration.task('t/1');
await expect(orchestration.command(detail,detail.availableActions[0],{idempotencyKey:'k',expiresAt:'2099-01-01T00:00:00Z'})).rejects.toThrow(/24 hours/);
expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
const validProposal={key:'scope-1',title:'Review staging',department:'SEO',operationMode:'PREPARE' as const,budgetLimitCents:20,metadata:{commitSha:'a'.repeat(40),scope:' Human scope ',acceptanceCriteria:[' Evidence reviewed ']}};
it('preserves immutable human metadata exactly and strips server-owned fields from exact DTO',async()=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();
const projected={id:'new',...validProposal,state:'DRAFT',version:1,metadata:{...validProposal.metadata,environment:'staging'},availableActions:['SUBMIT_GATE1']};
vi.mocked(api.post).mockResolvedValue({data:projected});
await expect(orchestration.create({...validProposal,metadata:{...validProposal.metadata,workflowScope:'PRODUCTION',createdBy:'forged'}} as unknown as import('./orchestration').CreateTaskInput)).resolves.toEqual(projected);
expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks',validProposal);
vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:projected});
expect((await orchestration.task('new')).metadata).toEqual(projected.metadata);
vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:[projected]});
expect((await orchestration.tasks())[0].metadata).toEqual(projected.metadata);
});
it.each(['', ' ', 'x'.repeat(2001),undefined,42])('rejects invalid human scope %s before HTTP',async scope=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();await expect(orchestration.create({...validProposal,metadata:{...validProposal.metadata,scope}} as unknown as import('./orchestration').CreateTaskInput)).rejects.toThrow(/scope/i);expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([[],Array(21).fill('x'),[''],[' '],['x'.repeat(501)],undefined,'criterion',[42]])('rejects invalid acceptance criteria %s before HTTP',async acceptanceCriteria=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();await expect(orchestration.create({...validProposal,metadata:{...validProposal.metadata,acceptanceCriteria}} as unknown as import('./orchestration').CreateTaskInput)).rejects.toThrow(/criteria/i);expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('rejects array-coerced commit hashes',async()=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();await expect(orchestration.create({...validProposal,metadata:{...validProposal.metadata,commitSha:['a'.repeat(40)]}} as unknown as import('./orchestration').CreateTaskInput)).rejects.toThrow(/commit/i);expect(api.post).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('accepts scope and criteria at exact backend limits',async()=>{
vi.resetAllMocks();vi.mocked(api.post).mockResolvedValue({data:{}});
const dto={...validProposal,metadata:{...validProposal.metadata,scope:'x'.repeat(2000),acceptanceCriteria:Array(20).fill('x'.repeat(500))}};
await orchestration.create(dto);expect(api.post).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/orchestration/tasks',dto);
});
@@ -1,82 +1,26 @@
import api from './api';
export interface ServerAction { id: string; label: string; toState?: string; gate?: 1 | 2; decision?: 'APPROVED' | 'REJECTED'; disabledReason?: string }
// Only advertised IDs select commands; task state never manufactures authorization.
const actionCommands: Record<string, ServerAction> = {
SUBMIT_GATE1:{id:'SUBMIT_GATE1',label:'Submit Gate1',toState:'GATE1_PENDING'},
APPROVE_GATE1:{id:'APPROVE_GATE1',label:'Approve Gate1',gate:1,decision:'APPROVED'},
REJECT_GATE1:{id:'REJECT_GATE1',label:'Reject Gate1',gate:1,decision:'REJECTED'},
QUEUE_PREPARE:{id:'QUEUE_PREPARE',label:'Queue PREPARE',toState:'READY'},
};
export function normalizeActions(value:unknown):ServerAction[] {
if(!Array.isArray(value))return [];
const result:ServerAction[]=[];
for(const raw of value){
let action:ServerAction|undefined;
if(typeof raw==='string')action=Object.hasOwn(actionCommands,raw)?actionCommands[raw]:undefined;
else if(raw&&typeof raw==='object'&&typeof raw.id==='string'){
const fixed=Object.hasOwn(actionCommands,raw.id)?actionCommands[raw.id]:undefined;
if(fixed){
if(['toState','gate','decision'].some(k=>raw[k]!==undefined&&raw[k]!==fixed[k as keyof ServerAction]))continue;
action={...fixed};
}else if(!raw.toState&&[1,2].includes(raw.gate)&&['APPROVED','REJECTED'].includes(raw.decision)){
// Legacy object format may describe only dedicated gate decisions, never arbitrary transitions.
action={id:raw.id,label:raw.id,gate:raw.gate,decision:raw.decision};
}
if(action){
if(typeof raw.label==='string'&&raw.label.trim())action={...action,label:raw.label};
if(typeof raw.disabledReason==='string')action={...action,disabledReason:raw.disabledReason};
}
}
if(action&&!result.some(a=>a.id===action.id))result.push({...action});
}
return result;
}
export interface Artifact { id: string; sha256: string; kind?: string; uri?: string }
export interface Run { id: string; commitSha: string; environment: string; status: string; artifacts: Artifact[] }
export interface Task { id: string; key: string; title: string; department: string; state: string; version: number; operationMode: string; budgetLimitCents: number; metadata?: Record<string, unknown>; availableActions: ServerAction[]; runs?: Run[]; decisions?: Record<string, unknown>[]; events?: Record<string, unknown>[]; budgetLedger?: Record<string, unknown>[] }
export interface CommandInput { idempotencyKey: string; reason?: string; expiresAt?: string; runId?: string; artifactHash?: string }
export interface TransitionDto {toState:string;expectedVersion:number;idempotencyKey:string;reason?:string}
export interface GateDecisionDto {decision:'APPROVED'|'REJECTED';expectedVersion:number;idempotencyKey:string;expiresAt:string;notes?:string;runId?:string;artifactHash?:string;commitSha?:string;environment?:string}
export function actionBlockReason(task:Task,action:ServerAction):string|undefined {
if(action.disabledReason)return action.disabledReason;
if(task.operationMode==='MUTATE_PRODUCTION'||['RELEASING','PRODUCTION_VERIFYING','LIVE_VERIFIED'].includes(action.toState??''))return 'Production actions are unavailable in this panel';
if(task.state==='EXPIRED')return 'Expired proposal: create a fresh proposal';
if((action.toState&&action.gate)||(!action.toState&&(![1,2].includes(action.gate??0)||!['APPROVED','REJECTED'].includes(action.decision??''))))return 'Unsupported server action';
return undefined;
}
export function commandFailure(error:unknown):{message:string;retryable:boolean} {
const status=(error as {response?:{status?:number}})?.response?.status;
if(status===409)return {message:'Stale version or idempotency conflict. Refresh authoritative state and review a fresh decision.',retryable:false};
if(status===410)return {message:'Proposal or approval expired. Refresh; expired proposals require a new proposal.',retryable:false};
if(status===401||status===403)return {message:'Backend denied this action. Refresh permissions before continuing.',retryable:false};
if(status&&status>=400&&status<500)return {message:'Backend rejected this action (HTTP '+status+'). Refresh and review the proposal.',retryable:false};
return {message:(error instanceof Error?error.message:'Backend request unavailable')+' — Outcome unknown. Retry only the identical payload/key, or refresh to reconcile.',retryable:true};
}
export type Resource = 'agents' | 'model-policy' | 'schedules' | 'releases' | 'overview';
export interface ResourceSnapshot { capabilities?: {mutations:boolean;chat:boolean;runtime:boolean;killSwitch?:boolean}; items: Array<{id:string; title?:string; status?:string; department?:string; readiness?:string; model?:string; budgetLimitCents?:number; spentCents?:number; cron?:string; timezone?:string; environment?:string; commitSha?:string; reason?:string}>; measuredAt: string }
export interface ResourceSnapshot { capabilities?: {mutations:boolean;chat:boolean;runtime:boolean}; items: Array<{id:string; title?:string; status?:string; department?:string; readiness?:string; model?:string; budgetLimitCents?:number; spentCents?:number; cron?:string; timezone?:string; environment?:string; commitSha?:string; reason?:string}>; measuredAt: string }
export const killLevels = ['FREEZE_NEW_WORK','STOP_AGENTS','DISABLE_MUTATIONS','EMERGENCY_HALT'] as const;
export type KillLevel = typeof killLevels[number];
export interface ChatMessage {id:string;role:'assistant'|'user';content:string}
function unwrap<T>(data: T | {success:boolean;data:T}): T { if (data && typeof data === 'object' && 'success' in data) {if (!data.success) throw new Error('Orchestration request failed'); return data.data;} return data as T; }
export interface CreateTaskInput {key:string;title:string;department:string;operationMode:'PREPARE';budgetLimitCents:number;metadata:{commitSha:string;scope:string;acceptanceCriteria:string[]}}
export function proposalError(input:CreateTaskInput):string|undefined {
if(input.operationMode!=='PREPARE')return 'Only bounded Stage PREPARE proposals are available';
if(!Number.isSafeInteger(input.budgetLimitCents)||input.budgetLimitCents<20||input.budgetLimitCents>10000)return 'PREPARE budget must be an integer 20..10000 cents';
if(typeof input.metadata?.commitSha!=='string'||!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(input.metadata.commitSha))return 'Immutable commit must be 40 lowercase hex characters';
if(typeof input.metadata?.scope!=='string'||!input.metadata.scope.trim()||input.metadata.scope.length>2000)return 'Scope must be nonblank and at most 2000 characters';
if(!Array.isArray(input.metadata?.acceptanceCriteria)||input.metadata.acceptanceCriteria.length<1||input.metadata.acceptanceCriteria.length>20||input.metadata.acceptanceCriteria.some(value=>typeof value!=='string'||!value.trim()||value.length>500))return 'Acceptance criteria must contain 1..20 nonblank strings of at most 500 characters';
if(!input.key.trim()||input.key.length>120||!input.title.trim()||input.title.length>255||!input.department.trim()||input.department.length>50)return 'Proposal requires key (1..120), title (1..255), department (1..50)';
}
export interface CreateTaskInput {key:string;title:string;department:string;operationMode:'OBSERVE'|'PREPARE'|'MUTATE_PRODUCTION';budgetLimitCents:number;metadata:{scope:string;acceptanceCriteria:string[]}}
export const orchestration = {
async create(input:CreateTaskInput):Promise<unknown> {
const error=proposalError(input);if(error)throw new Error(error);
// Preserve human evidence exactly; workflowScope/environment/identity remain server-owned.
return (await api.post('/admin/orchestration/tasks',{key:input.key,title:input.title,department:input.department,operationMode:'PREPARE',budgetLimitCents:input.budgetLimitCents,metadata:{commitSha:input.metadata.commitSha,scope:input.metadata.scope,acceptanceCriteria:[...input.metadata.acceptanceCriteria]}})).data;
if(!Number.isSafeInteger(input.budgetLimitCents)||input.budgetLimitCents<0)throw new Error('Nonnegative integer budget required');
if(!input.key.trim()||!input.title.trim()||!input.department.trim()||!input.metadata.scope.trim()||!input.metadata.acceptanceCriteria.length)throw new Error('Bounded scope and acceptance criteria required');
return (await api.post('/admin/orchestration/tasks',{key:input.key,title:input.title,department:input.department,operationMode:input.operationMode,budgetLimitCents:input.budgetLimitCents,metadata:input.metadata})).data;
},
async task(id:string):Promise<Task> {
const data=unwrap<Task>((await api.get('/admin/orchestration/tasks/'+encodeURIComponent(id))).data);
if (!data?.id || !Number.isInteger(data.version)) throw new Error('Invalid task detail');
return {...data,availableActions:normalizeActions(data.availableActions)};
return {...data,availableActions:data.availableActions??[]};
},
async resource(name:Resource):Promise<ResourceSnapshot> {
const data=unwrap<ResourceSnapshot>((await api.get('/admin/orchestration/'+name)).data);
@@ -94,18 +38,15 @@ export const orchestration = {
return data;
},
async command(task: Task, requested: ServerAction, input: CommandInput): Promise<unknown> {
const action = normalizeActions(task.availableActions).find(a => a.id === requested.id);
const action = task.availableActions.find(a => a.id === requested.id);
if (!action || action.disabledReason) throw new Error('Action is not advertised or is disabled');
const blocked=actionBlockReason(task,action);if(blocked)throw new Error(blocked);
if (!input.idempotencyKey || !Number.isInteger(task.version)) throw new Error('Version and idempotency key required');
const base = '/admin/orchestration/tasks/' + encodeURIComponent(task.id);
if (action.gate && action.decision) {
if (!input.expiresAt || !(Date.parse(input.expiresAt) > Date.now())) throw new Error('Future expiry required');
if(['APPROVE_GATE1','REJECT_GATE1'].includes(action.id)&&Date.parse(input.expiresAt)>Date.now()+86400000)throw new Error('Gate1 expiry must be within 24 hours');
let binding = {};
if (action.gate === 2 && action.decision === 'APPROVED') {
const run = task.runs?.find(r => r.id === input.runId);
if(run?.status!=='SUCCEEDED')throw new Error('Registered successful run binding required for Gate2 evidence');
if (!run?.commitSha || !run.environment || !run.artifacts.some(a => a.sha256 === input.artifactHash)) throw new Error('Registered immutable Gate2 binding required');
binding = {runId:run.id, artifactHash:input.artifactHash, commitSha:run.commitSha, environment:run.environment};
}
@@ -118,6 +59,6 @@ export const orchestration = {
const { data } = await api.get('/admin/orchestration/tasks');
const rows = Array.isArray(data) ? data : data.data;
if (!Array.isArray(rows)) throw new Error('Invalid orchestration task response');
return rows.map(row => ({ ...row, availableActions: normalizeActions(row.availableActions) }));
return rows.map(row => ({ ...row, availableActions: row.availableActions ?? [] }));
},
};
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
import {it,expect,vi} from 'vitest';
import api from './api';
import {runtime} from './runtime';
vi.mock('./api',()=>({default:{get:vi.fn()}}));
const provenance={source:'snapshot',capturedAt:'2020-01-01T00:00:00Z',ageSeconds:100,freshness:'stale',liveProcess:'unknown'};
it.each([{source:'live'},{capturedAt:'not-a-date'},{capturedAt:'2999-01-01T00:00:00Z'},{ageSeconds:-1},{ageSeconds:0.5},{freshness:'live'},{liveProcess:'running'}])('rejects invalid provenance %j',async invalid=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:{ok:true,version:'1',commit:'x',auth_required:true,provenance:{...provenance,...invalid}}});
await expect(runtime.health()).rejects.toThrow('Invalid snapshot provenance');
});
it('retains fresh snapshots as inventory with unknown process state',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockResolvedValue({data:{ok:true,version:'1',commit:'x',auth_required:true,provenance:{...provenance,freshness:'fresh'}}});
expect(await runtime.health()).toMatchObject({provenance:{freshness:'fresh',liveProcess:'unknown'}});
});
it('retains validated snapshot provenance and unknown live telemetry across inventory reads',async()=>{
vi.mocked(api.get).mockImplementation(async url=>({data:url.endsWith('/health')?{ok:true,version:'1',commit:'x',auth_required:true,provenance}:url.endsWith('/profiles')?[{name:'dev',is_default:false,gateway_running:false,liveGatewayState:'unknown',provenance}]:url.endsWith('/status')?{version:'1',overall:'unknown',gateway_running:false,active_agents:0,gateway_state:null,liveGatewayState:'unknown',liveActiveAgents:null,provenance}:url.endsWith('/sessions')?{total:0,sessions:[],provenance}:{period_days:30,totals:{total_input:0,total_output:0,total_sessions:0,total_estimated_cost:0},provenance}}));
expect(await runtime.health()).toMatchObject({provenance});
expect(await runtime.profiles()).toMatchObject([{provenance,liveGatewayState:'unknown'}]);
expect(await runtime.status('dev')).toMatchObject({provenance,liveGatewayState:'unknown',liveActiveAgents:null});
expect(await runtime.sessions('dev')).toMatchObject({provenance});
expect(await runtime.usage('dev')).toMatchObject({provenance});
});
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
import api from './api';
export interface RuntimeProvenance {source:'snapshot';capturedAt:string;ageSeconds:number;freshness:'fresh'|'stale';liveProcess:'unknown'}
interface Inventory {provenance?:RuntimeProvenance}
export interface RuntimeHealth extends Inventory {ok:boolean;version:string;commit:string;auth_required:true}
export interface RuntimeProfile extends Inventory {name:string;is_default:boolean;gateway_running:boolean;liveGatewayState?:'unknown'}
export interface RuntimeStatus extends Inventory {version:string;gateway_running:boolean;overall:string;active_agents:number;gateway_state:string|null;liveGatewayState?:'unknown';liveActiveAgents?:null}
export interface RuntimeSession {id:string;profile:string;source:string;is_active:boolean}
export interface RuntimeSessions extends Inventory {total:number;sessions:RuntimeSession[]}
export interface RuntimeUsage extends Inventory {period_days:number;totals:{total_input:number;total_output:number;total_sessions:number;total_estimated_cost:number}}
function object(value:unknown):Record<string,unknown>{if(!value||typeof value!=='object'||Array.isArray(value))throw new Error('Invalid runtime contract');return value as Record<string,unknown>}
function text(value:unknown):string{if(typeof value!=='string')throw new Error('Invalid runtime text');return value}
function bool(value:unknown):boolean{if(typeof value!=='boolean')throw new Error('Invalid runtime flag');return value}
function count(value:unknown):number{if(typeof value!=='number'||!Number.isFinite(value)||value<0)throw new Error('Invalid runtime count');return value}
function list(value:unknown):unknown[]{if(!Array.isArray(value)||value.length>1000)throw new Error('Invalid runtime list');return value}
async function read(path:string,params?:Record<string,string|number>):Promise<unknown>{const {data}=await api.get('/admin/orchestration/runtime/'+path,...(params?[{params}]:[]));const row=data&&typeof data==='object'&&!Array.isArray(data)?data:null;if(row&&'success' in row){if(row.success!==true)throw new Error('Runtime unavailable');return row.data}return data}
function provenance(r:Record<string,unknown>):Inventory {
if(r.provenance===undefined)return {};
const p=object(r.provenance);
if(p.source!=='snapshot'||p.liveProcess!=='unknown'||typeof p.capturedAt!=='string'||!p.capturedAt.endsWith('Z')||!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(p.capturedAt))||Date.parse(p.capturedAt)>Date.now()||typeof p.ageSeconds!=='number'||!Number.isInteger(p.ageSeconds)||p.ageSeconds<0||!['fresh','stale'].includes(String(p.freshness)))throw new Error('Invalid snapshot provenance');
return {provenance:{source:'snapshot',capturedAt:p.capturedAt,ageSeconds:p.ageSeconds,freshness:p.freshness as 'fresh'|'stale',liveProcess:'unknown'}};
}
export const runtime={
async health():Promise<RuntimeHealth>{const r=object(await read('health'));if(r.auth_required!==true)throw new Error('Authenticated runtime required');return {...provenance(r),ok:bool(r.ok),version:text(r.version),commit:text(r.commit),auth_required:true}},
async profiles():Promise<RuntimeProfile[]>{return list(await read('profiles')).map(value=>{const r=object(value);return {...provenance(r),...(r.provenance?{liveGatewayState:'unknown' as const}:{}),name:text(r.name),is_default:bool(r.is_default),gateway_running:bool(r.gateway_running)}})},
async status(profile:string):Promise<RuntimeStatus>{const r=object(await read('status',{profile}));return {...provenance(r),...(r.provenance?{liveGatewayState:'unknown' as const,liveActiveAgents:null}:{}),version:text(r.version),gateway_running:bool(r.gateway_running),overall:text(r.overall),active_agents:count(r.active_agents),gateway_state:r.gateway_state===null?null:text(r.gateway_state)}},
async sessions(profile:string,offset=0):Promise<RuntimeSessions>{const r=object(await read('sessions',{profile,limit:20,offset}));return {...provenance(r),total:count(r.total),sessions:list(r.sessions).map(value=>{const s=object(value);if(s.profile!==profile)throw new Error('Runtime profile mismatch');return {id:text(s.id),profile:text(s.profile),source:text(s.source),is_active:bool(s.is_active)}})}},
async usage(profile:string):Promise<RuntimeUsage>{const r=object(await read('usage',{profile,days:30}));const t=object(r.totals);return {...provenance(r),period_days:count(r.period_days),totals:{total_input:count(t.total_input),total_output:count(t.total_output),total_sessions:count(t.total_sessions),total_estimated_cost:count(t.total_estimated_cost)}}},
};
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# Real bounded Tech/Dev Hermes pilot (experimental, NOT enabled)
Owned files only in `infra/hermes-pilot`; no existing core, module, tracer, profile or runtime config changed. No push/deploy/RELEASE_AUTHORIZE. Do not wire this into the existing tracer completion endpoint: that endpoint deliberately accepts only deterministic JSON.
## Fixed task and boundaries
Task `tech-dev-clamp-quantity-v1`: produce one <=2048-byte Python `clamp_quantity(quantity)` implementation, integer range 0..99. No input/browser prompt is accepted. The model has **zero tools**, no shell/browser/Git/deploy credentials. Trusted code alone writes `quantity.py`, runs separate AST-allowlisted QA (9 boundary cases), and commits an isolated, remote-free fixture repository. This is real generated-code QA, not application QA. Source commit is recorded as provenance, not represented as the fixture's base commit.
`infer.py` uses installed `run_agent.AIAgent`, verified from the installed signature and `agent/agent_init.py`; `enabled_toolsets=[]` is additionally enforced by asserting empty `agent.tools`. Existing approved `OPENAI_API_KEY` is read in memory only; no messaging/API-server credentials/auth pools copied. Separate temporary HERMES_HOME, no memories/context/background review/fallback. Provider/model pinned to current canina-hermes `custom`, `https://nr.parsaaghayi.ir/v1`, `Free`; no provider installation or account changes. Existing configs remain untouched. Model output is untrusted and never directly shell-executed; QA rejects all syntax except the single nested min/max return expression before isolated Python execution.
Installed image identity: `sha256:373ddd5e6649f525b17993e1c885cdf1352127f8e98fd329140a73237125e52f`, install stamp commit `818c13be1dc4fd28987e1e881a9408224afd4535`, v0.21.6. Discovery: `/opt/hermes/hermes chat --help` supports `--oneshot`, `--max-turns`, `--run-budget`; `/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python` loads installed API. Official skills and https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/llms.txt consulted. The initially guessed developer API docs URL returned404; installed source/signature is authoritative for this pinned build.
## PREPARE mapping — parent integration required
`executor.execute(lease, artifact_root, infer, heartbeat)` only accepts a fresh staging, first-attempt, 20-cent, 40hex-source lease and exact lease fields; heartbeat failure aborts before inference and before QA/commit. Trusted adapter must obtain this lease via existing authenticated claim AFTER independent Gate1/READY, verify the explicitly allowlisted task identity/scope/criteria server-side, and supply heartbeat connected to the authenticated backend. A caller-created dict is NOT an authorization. Never expose this Python interface to browser requests.
## Heartbeat runner and parent API (this revision)
After independent READY/Gate1, allowlist and provider-cap admission, parent constructs
`runner = executor.pinned_inference(executor.IMAGE)` and calls
`executor.execute(authenticated_lease, artifact_root, runner, authenticated_heartbeat)`.
Only trusted Python may construct runners. Callback receives an unchanged COPY of the
original lease binding (taskId/runId/leaseToken), must use authenticated server transport,
and must raise on any non-2xx, ownership/fencing/expiry denial or malformed response.
Explicit `False` also denies; `None` means success for existing raise-on-error adapters.
Callback MUST impose <=5s network timeout, no retries; a blocked callback thread cannot
be forcibly killed by Python. It is daemonized; its result cannot restart inference or
extend a local lease. Parent must serialize executions per server lease; the runner is
single-use and concurrent reuse of that runner is locked out. This is not a browser API.
Immediate initial heartbeat; dedicated ongoing thread waits 5s between acknowledged
calls. With required <=5s transport ceiling, heartbeat starts are <=10s apart. A stalled
heartbeat (10s without acknowledgment), exception or denial aborts actual subprocess
inference, not just its caller. No leaseUntil mutation/local extension occurs. Fresh
server-authorized heartbeats retain fencing; this code cannot create authorization.
Guard checks also fence QA/artifact commit/report return. A denial during QA prevents
report return; any partial local fixture is not accepted completion evidence.
Monotonic wall ceiling 90s with cancellation reserve: work aborts at85s, remote kill
command <=2s and local reap <=1s; bounded QA3s/Git1s. Pinned runner uses one model
call, max_iterations1/max_tokens160, run_budget80s, tools0, no retries. An independent
in-container timeout85s survives loss of the Docker client. Cancellation addresses
the actual in-container process session via a random PID file plus cancellation
marker (handles cancellation before PID publication); it kills that process group.
Cancellation transport failure raises and prevents success, but cannot prove immediate
remote death; independent inner timeout is the fallback. Small random marker files
in container /tmp are intentional fencing tombstones, not configuration changes.
`rehearse.py` remains synthetic, never a live lease. It uses this cancellable runner
but is NOT admission evidence. Do not run it until provider-cap approval. Existing
20-cent reservation remains UNKNOWN, never zero, and no completion/claim/release or
backend transport is implemented here. Existing tracer endpoint still rejects model
reports; parent must separately implement authenticated allowlisted artifact ingestion.
No changes to installed Hermes or runtime/profile configuration.
## Actual evidence and blockers
Evidence directory `/opt/services/canina/validation/v4-real-pilot`:
- `red.log`: missing executor assertion failed before implementation.
- `inference-private.log`: actual installed Hermes/provider inference exit0 under75s diagnostic ceiling; generated source saved, not fabricated. This ceiling was ONLY diagnostic, not accepted as a PREPARE lease run.
- `model-artifact/quantity.py`: actual model artifact; independent QA passes9 cases, SHA256 `0125246b551896c5f9ee98fabeb02982a6690a9974c0eb24ef3ae676d46380d5`; isolated Git commit `95cb3d27d636ae817d6a778e8053e2f87b50e57b`.
- `actual.log`: bounded full rehearsal failed with inner timeout exit137 at18s; no completion/QA success was assumed. Previous client-only timeout was corrected to inner process kill. **Installed model/startup cannot currently complete reliably inside30s PREPARE lease without authenticated ongoing heartbeat.** Do not extend lease locally or call the75s diagnostic a bounded lease success.
Contract tests: `python3 infra/hermes-pilot/test_contract.py`. Parent still owns backend integration, authenticated heartbeat orchestration, allowlist admission, billing caps, signed artifact transport and Stage CI. This commit is a real generation/independent-QA proof and fail-closed executor seam, not a live autonomous Tech department or released product.
## Verification of heartbeat revision
`python3 -m unittest discover -s infra/hermes-pilot -v`: 11 passing tests, including
real OS child/descendant cancellation, ongoing rejection, stalled heartbeat, wall
ceiling, concurrent runner reuse, immutable lease and unknown-cost preservation.
The artifact success test is explicitly a deterministic process fixture, NOT model
inference. TDD red observed for missing ongoing runner and explicit false denial;
additional cancellation/concurrency regression cases were added and executed.
Previously generated real model artifact was rechecked by current AST allowlist QA:
9 cases pass, SHA256 `0125246b551896c5f9ee98fabeb02982a6690a9974c0eb24ef3ae676d46380d5`.
No new real inference was run: README provider pricing/cap gate remains unresolved.
Docker cancellation path is implemented but not runtime-exercised here; OS process
group cancellation is exercised. No live backend/claim/release, push or deploy.
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"""Fixed Tech/Dev pilot. Adapter must supply a fresh authenticated PREPARE lease."""
import datetime, hashlib, json, os, pathlib, re, subprocess, tempfile, time
TASK='tech-dev-clamp-quantity-v1'
IMAGE='sha256:373ddd5e6649f525b17993e1c885cdf1352127f8e98fd329140a73237125e52f'
def validate_lease(lease):
if (set(lease) != {'taskId','runId','leaseToken','leaseUntil','commitSha','environment','maxCostCents','attempt'}
or lease['environment']!='staging' or lease['maxCostCents']!=20 or lease['attempt']!=1
or not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9]{40}',lease['commitSha'])):
raise ValueError('Bounded PREPARE lease required')
for k in ('taskId','runId','leaseToken'):
if not re.fullmatch('[a-f0-9-]{36}',lease[k]): raise ValueError('Invalid lease binding')
expiry=datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(lease['leaseUntil'].replace('Z','+00:00')).timestamp()
if not 5 < expiry-time.time() <= 31: raise ValueError('Fresh 30-second lease required')
return lease
def _execute(lease, artifact_root, infer, heartbeat):
"""No claim/approval generation. heartbeat must call trusted server; errors abort.
infer is the pinned runner, not a browser-supplied command or prompt.
Completion is deliberately NOT sent: existing transport accepts tracer JSON only.
"""
validate_lease(lease)
heartbeat(lease)
root=pathlib.Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='real-pilot-',dir=artifact_root))
def git(*args):
return subprocess.check_output(['git','-C',str(root),*args],stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,text=True,timeout=1).strip()
git('init','-q'); git('config','user.email','pilot@invalid'); git('config','user.name','Bounded Hermes Pilot')
(root/'README').write_text('Disposable fixture; PREPARE source '+lease['commitSha']+'\n')
git('add','README'); git('commit','-qm','Seed isolated pilot fixture')
base=git('rev-parse','HEAD')
# One cancellable inference, no tools; ongoing authenticated guard.
source=infer()
heartbeat(lease)
if not isinstance(source,str) or len(source.encode())>2048: raise ValueError('Invalid generated artifact')
(root/'quantity.py').write_text(source)
qa=subprocess.check_output(['python3','-I',str(pathlib.Path(__file__).with_name('qa.py')),str(root)],timeout=3,text=True)
heartbeat(lease)
git('add','quantity.py'); git('commit','-qm','Hermes generated quantity clamp; independent QA passed')
patch=git('diff',base,'HEAD','--','quantity.py')+'\n'
(root/'artifact.patch').write_text(patch)
report={'kind':'REAL_HERMES_TECH_DEV_PILOT','task':TASK,'taskId':lease['taskId'],'runId':lease['runId'],
'sourceCommit':lease['commitSha'],'artifactCommit':git('rev-parse','HEAD'),'baseCommit':base,
'patchSha256':hashlib.sha256(patch.encode()).hexdigest(),'qa':json.loads(qa),
'costCents':None,'costStatus':'UNKNOWN_RETAIN_FULL_20_CENT_RESERVATION',
'gate1':'EXTERNAL_LEASE_REQUIRED','published':False,'deploymentExecuted':False}
(root/'evidence.json').write_text(json.dumps(report,indent=2)+'\n')
return root,report
from runtime import LeaseGuard, ProcessInference, pinned_inference
def execute(lease, artifact_root, infer, heartbeat):
validate_lease(lease)
with LeaseGuard(lease, heartbeat) as guard:
guard.check()
if not isinstance(infer, ProcessInference):
raise TypeError("Cancellable ProcessInference required")
def generate():
response = json.loads(infer.run(guard))
if not isinstance(response,dict) or response.get("tools") != 0 or response.get("model") != "Free":
raise ValueError("Pinned tool-less model required")
return response["source"]
result = _execute(lease, artifact_root, generate, lambda _: guard.check())
guard.check()
return result
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"""Executed only inside pinned canina-hermes image by controlled runner."""
import contextlib, io, json, os, pathlib, tempfile
# Copy ONE existing inference credential in memory; no auth pools or messaging keys.
from dotenv import dotenv_values
key=dotenv_values('/opt/data/.env').get('OPENAI_API_KEY')
if not key: raise RuntimeError('Existing OPENAI_API_KEY unavailable')
home=tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='canina-real-pilot-')
os.environ.clear()
os.environ.update({'PATH':'/usr/bin:/bin','HOME':home.name,'HERMES_HOME':home.name,'OPENAI_API_KEY':key,'OPENAI_BASE_URL':'https://nr.parsaaghayi.ir/v1','HERMES_DISABLE_PLUGINS':'1'})
# Installed API verified by inspect.signature at pinned image commit 818c13be.
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()), contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
from run_agent import AIAgent
agent=AIAgent(model='Free',provider='custom',base_url='https://nr.parsaaghayi.ir/v1',api_key=key,
enabled_toolsets=[],max_iterations=1,max_tokens=160,run_budget_seconds=80,
skip_context_files=True,skip_memory=True,skip_background_review=True,load_soul_identity=False,
quiet_mode=True,fallback_model={},cwd=home.name)
if agent.tools: raise RuntimeError('Tool-less invariant failed')
result=agent.run_conversation('Write only Python source, no markdown: define clamp_quantity(quantity) returning integer quantity clamped to inclusive 0..99. Use one return with nested min/max calls only. No annotations, comments, imports, decorators, docstrings or other statements.')
final=result.get('final_response')
if not isinstance(final,str) or not final.strip(): raise RuntimeError('No model artifact; result keys='+','.join(result.keys()))
print(json.dumps({'source':final.strip()+'\n','model':'Free','tools':0}))
home.cleanup()
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"""Independent structural + behavior QA. Never executes arbitrary model Python."""
import ast, hashlib, json, pathlib, sys
def verify(root):
p=pathlib.Path(root)/'quantity.py'
if p.is_symlink() or not p.is_file() or p.stat().st_size>2048: raise ValueError('Invalid file')
raw=p.read_bytes(); tree=ast.parse(raw)
if len(tree.body)!=1 or not isinstance(tree.body[0],ast.FunctionDef): raise ValueError('Single function required')
fn=tree.body[0]
if fn.name!='clamp_quantity' or fn.decorator_list or fn.returns or fn.args.defaults or fn.args.kw_defaults or fn.args.kwonlyargs or fn.args.posonlyargs or fn.args.vararg or fn.args.kwarg or len(fn.args.args)!=1 or fn.args.args[0].arg!='quantity' or fn.args.args[0].annotation or len(fn.body)!=1 or not isinstance(fn.body[0],ast.Return): raise ValueError('Unexpected function structure')
def expr(n):
if isinstance(n,ast.Constant) and type(n.value) is int and 0<=n.value<=99: return
if isinstance(n,ast.Name) and n.id=='quantity': return
if isinstance(n,ast.Call) and isinstance(n.func,ast.Name) and n.func.id in ('min','max') and len(n.args)==2 and not n.keywords:
for a in n.args: expr(a)
return
raise ValueError('Nonallowlisted syntax')
expr(fn.body[0].value)
scope={'__builtins__':{},'min':min,'max':max}
exec(compile(tree,'generated-quantity','exec'),scope)
cases=[-1000,-1,0,1,50,98,99,100,10**30]
for q in cases:
actual=scope['clamp_quantity'](q)
if type(actual) is not int or actual!=max(0,min(q,99)): raise ValueError('Behavior QA failed')
return {'passed':True,'cases':len(cases),'sha256':hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(),'scope':'quantity clamp fixture only'}
if __name__=='__main__': print(json.dumps(verify(sys.argv[1])))
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"""Disposable model/artifact exercise, NOT a live Gate1 approval or service completion."""
import datetime, json, pathlib, subprocess, time, uuid
from executor import execute, IMAGE, pinned_inference
def main():
image=subprocess.check_output(['docker','inspect','--format','{{.Image}}','canina-hermes'],text=True).strip()
if image!=IMAGE: raise RuntimeError('Pinned installed image mismatch')
infer=pinned_inference(IMAGE)
deadline=time.monotonic()+90
lease={k:str(uuid.uuid4()) for k in ('taskId','runId','leaseToken')}
lease.update(leaseUntil=(datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)+datetime.timedelta(seconds=30)).isoformat(),commitSha=subprocess.check_output(['git','rev-parse','HEAD'],text=True).strip(),environment='staging',maxCostCents=20,attempt=1)
def fixture_heartbeat(binding):
if time.monotonic()>deadline: raise TimeoutError('Fixture hard deadline')
root,report=execute(lease,'/opt/services/canina/validation/v4-real-pilot',infer,fixture_heartbeat)
report['executionContext']='DISPOSABLE_FIXTURE_NOT_LIVE_PREPARE_LEASE'
(root/'evidence.json').write_text(json.dumps(report,indent=2)+'\n')
print(json.dumps({'artifactDirectory':str(root),'report':report}))
if __name__=='__main__': main()
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"""Trusted subprocess boundary; no claim, lease extension or completion transport."""
import json
import os
import pathlib
import signal
import subprocess
import tempfile
import threading
import time
import uuid
HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL = 5.0
HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT = 5.0
MAX_WALL_SECONDS = 90.0
class LeaseGuard:
def __init__(self, lease, heartbeat):
self.lease, self.heartbeat = lease, heartbeat
self.stop = threading.Event()
self.ready = threading.Event()
self.error = None
self.started = time.monotonic()
self.last = self.started
self.thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run, daemon=True)
def _run(self):
while not self.stop.is_set():
try:
if self.heartbeat(dict(self.lease)) is False:
raise PermissionError("Authenticated heartbeat denied")
self.last = time.monotonic()
self.ready.set()
except BaseException as exc:
self.error = exc
self.ready.set()
return
if self.stop.wait(HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL):
return
def check(self):
if self.error is not None:
raise self.error
now = time.monotonic()
if now - self.started >= MAX_WALL_SECONDS - 5:
raise TimeoutError('Pilot wall deadline (cancellation reserve included)')
if now - self.last >= HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL + HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT:
raise TimeoutError('Authenticated heartbeat stalled')
def __enter__(self):
self.thread.start()
if not self.ready.wait(HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT):
self.stop.set()
raise TimeoutError('Initial authenticated heartbeat stalled')
try:
self.check()
except BaseException:
self.stop.set()
raise
return self
def __exit__(self, *args):
self.stop.set()
self.thread.join(timeout=.05)
class ProcessInference:
"""Trusted argv only. cancel_remote MUST kill the in-container process group."""
def __init__(self, argv, input_text=None, cancel_remote=None):
self.argv, self.input_text, self.cancel_remote = argv, input_text, cancel_remote
self.used = False
self.lock = threading.Lock()
def run(self, guard):
with self.lock:
if self.used:
raise RuntimeError('Exactly one inference allowed; no retry')
self.used = True
guard.check()
# Files avoid pipe deadlocks and unbounded captured output in memory.
with tempfile.TemporaryFile(mode='w+') as incoming, tempfile.TemporaryFile(mode='w+') as out, tempfile.TemporaryFile(mode='w+') as err:
incoming.write(self.input_text or '')
incoming.seek(0)
child = subprocess.Popen(self.argv, stdin=incoming, stdout=out, stderr=err, start_new_session=True)
try:
while child.poll() is None:
guard.check()
time.sleep(.02)
guard.check()
if child.returncode:
raise RuntimeError('Inference failed (exit %d)' % child.returncode)
out.seek(0)
result = out.read(4097)
if len(result) > 4096:
raise ValueError('Oversized inference response')
return result
finally:
# Always cancel remote, even when docker exec itself failed.
try:
if self.cancel_remote:
self.cancel_remote()
finally:
try:
os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
except ProcessLookupError:
pass
child.wait(timeout=1)
def pinned_inference(image):
actual = subprocess.check_output(['docker','inspect','--format','{{.Image}}','canina-hermes'], text=True, timeout=2).strip()
if actual != image:
raise RuntimeError('Pinned installed image mismatch')
token = uuid.uuid4().hex
pidfile = '/tmp/canina-pilot-' + token + '.pid'
script = pathlib.Path(__file__).with_name('infer.py').read_text()
# Session leader is created INSIDE the container. Inner kill is independent of client.
wrapper = ('import os,signal,subprocess,sys; '
'p=subprocess.Popen(["timeout","--signal=KILL","85","/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python","-"],stdin=sys.stdin,start_new_session=True); '
'open(%r,"w").write(str(p.pid)); '
'os.path.exists(%r) and os.killpg(p.pid,signal.SIGKILL); sys.exit(p.wait())') % (pidfile, pidfile+'.cancel')
cancel = ('import os,signal; p=%r; '
'\nopen(p+".cancel","w").close()\ntry:\n pid=int(open(p).read()); os.killpg(pid,signal.SIGKILL)\n'
'except (FileNotFoundError,ProcessLookupError): pass\n'
'finally:\n'
' try: os.unlink(p)\n except FileNotFoundError: pass\n') % pidfile
def cancel_remote():
subprocess.run(['docker','exec','canina-hermes','/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python','-c',cancel], check=True, timeout=2, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
return ProcessInference(['docker','exec','-i','canina-hermes','/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python','-c',wrapper], script, cancel_remote)
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import json, pathlib, sys, tempfile, threading, time, unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
sys.path.insert(0,str(pathlib.Path(__file__).parent))
import executor as m
import runtime
from test_contract import lease
class Cancellation(unittest.TestCase):
def test_wall_deadline_kills_descendant(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
marker=pathlib.Path(root,'late')
child=f'import pathlib,time; time.sleep(.7); pathlib.Path({str(marker)!r}).touch()'
code=f'import subprocess,sys,time; subprocess.Popen([sys.executable,"-c",{child!r}]); time.sleep(5)'
with patch.object(runtime,'MAX_WALL_SECONDS',5.2):
with self.assertRaises(TimeoutError): m.execute(lease(),root,m.ProcessInference([sys.executable,'-c',code]),lambda _: None)
time.sleep(.8)
self.assertFalse(marker.exists())
def test_stalled_heartbeat_cancels_child(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
marker=pathlib.Path(root,'late'); release=threading.Event(); calls=[]
def heartbeat(_):
calls.append(time.monotonic())
if len(calls)>1: release.wait(3)
code=f'import time,pathlib; time.sleep(.7); pathlib.Path({str(marker)!r}).touch()'
try:
with patch.object(runtime,'HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL',.05),patch.object(runtime,'HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT',.1):
with self.assertRaises(TimeoutError): m.execute(lease(),root,m.ProcessInference([sys.executable,'-c',code]),heartbeat)
finally: release.set()
time.sleep(.8); self.assertFalse(marker.exists())
def test_fixture_artifact_qa_and_cost_reservation(self):
# Explicit deterministic PROCESS fixture, never reported as real model inference.
source='def clamp_quantity(quantity):\n return min(99, max(0, quantity))\n'
response=json.dumps(dict(source=source,model='Free',tools=0))
beats=[]; original=lease(); snapshot=dict(original)
def heartbeat(binding):
beats.append(time.monotonic()); binding['leaseUntil']='untrusted mutation'
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
infer=m.ProcessInference([sys.executable,'-c',f'import time; time.sleep(.25); print({response!r})'])
with patch.object(runtime,'HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL',.05):
_,report=m.execute(original,root,infer,heartbeat)
self.assertEqual(original,snapshot)
self.assertGreater(len(beats),2)
self.assertIsNone(report['costCents'])
self.assertEqual(report['costStatus'],'UNKNOWN_RETAIN_FULL_20_CENT_RESERVATION')
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
with runtime.LeaseGuard(lease(),lambda _:None) as guard: infer.run(guard)
def test_concurrent_reuse_rejected(self):
infer=m.ProcessInference([sys.executable,"-c","import time; time.sleep(.3); print(1)"])
errors=[]
with runtime.LeaseGuard(lease(),lambda _:None) as guard:
t=threading.Thread(target=lambda:infer.run(guard)); t.start()
time.sleep(.05)
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError): infer.run(guard)
t.join()
def test_explicit_false_heartbeat_denied(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
with self.assertRaises(PermissionError):
m.execute(lease(),root,m.ProcessInference([sys.executable,"-c","print(1)"]),lambda _:False)
def test_callable_not_cancellable_rejected(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
with self.assertRaises(TypeError): m.execute(lease(),root,lambda:'',lambda _:None)
if __name__=='__main__': unittest.main()
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@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
import datetime, importlib.util, pathlib, tempfile, unittest, uuid
p=pathlib.Path(__file__).with_name('executor.py')
spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('pilot',p); m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(m)
qs=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('qa',p.with_name('qa.py')); qa=importlib.util.module_from_spec(qs); qs.loader.exec_module(qa)
def lease():
d={k:str(uuid.uuid4()) for k in ('taskId','runId','leaseToken')}; d.update(environment='staging',maxCostCents=20,attempt=1,commitSha='a'*40,leaseUntil=(datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)+datetime.timedelta(seconds=30)).isoformat()); return d
class Contract(unittest.TestCase):
def test_missing_lease_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError): m.validate_lease({})
def test_bounds(self):
for k,v in [('environment','production'),('attempt',2),('maxCostCents',21),('commitSha','main'),('leaseUntil','2000-01-01T00:00:00+00:00')]:
d=lease(); d[k]=v
with self.assertRaises(ValueError): m.validate_lease(d)
def test_heartbeat_denial_prevents_inference(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
def deny(_): raise PermissionError('killed')
with self.assertRaises(PermissionError): m.execute(lease(),root,lambda:self.fail('must not infer'),deny)
def test_qa_rejects_malicious_and_wrong_behavior(self):
for source in ['import os\n','def clamp_quantity(quantity):\n return quantity\n','def clamp_quantity(quantity):\n return __import__("os").system("true")\n']:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
pathlib.Path(root,'quantity.py').write_text(source)
with self.assertRaises(ValueError): qa.verify(root)
if __name__=='__main__': unittest.main()
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import datetime, pathlib, sys, tempfile, threading, time, unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).parent))
import executor as m
import runtime
from test_contract import lease
class Heartbeats(unittest.TestCase):
def test_ongoing_denial_kills_real_child(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as root:
marker=pathlib.Path(root,'late')
code=f'import time,pathlib; time.sleep(1); pathlib.Path({str(marker)!r}).touch()'
beats=[]
def beat(binding):
beats.append(time.monotonic())
if len(beats)>1: raise PermissionError('revoked')
with patch.object(runtime,'HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL',.1):
with self.assertRaises(PermissionError):
m.execute(lease(),root,m.ProcessInference([sys.executable,'-c',code]),beat)
time.sleep(1.1)
self.assertFalse(marker.exists())
self.assertGreaterEqual(len(beats),2)
if __name__=='__main__': unittest.main()
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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# Invoked ONLY by an approved CI job on the target host; never by application startup.
[[ "${CI:-}" == true && "${RUNTIME_READ_APPROVED_SHA:-}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]] || exit 64
root=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)
[[ "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" == "$RUNTIME_READ_APPROVED_SHA" ]] || exit 65
[[ -z "$(git status --porcelain)" ]] || exit 65
[[ "${RUNTIME_SNAPSHOT_REVIEWED:-}" == true ]] || exit 66
# Gateway remains untouched. Its original writable data volume is NEVER mounted.
# The external snapshot must already exist; do not silently initialize empty data.
docker volume inspect canina_hermes_inventory_snapshot >/dev/null
docker network inspect canina_hermes_backend >/dev/null
for name in hermes_username hermes_password hermes_signing_key; do
test -s "/opt/services/canina/secrets/$name"
done
docker compose -f "$root/infra/hermes-runtime/compose.readonly.yml" config --quiet
docker compose -f "$root/infra/hermes-runtime/compose.readonly.yml" up -d --no-build
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# Merge this job into the owning Stage workflow only after provisioning review.
# No production trigger or secret material belongs in this file.
runtime-read-acceptance:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Pinned Hermes HTTP acceptance
run: |
set -euo pipefail
image=nousresearch/hermes-agent@sha256:9774f4f39a9bb8c2f68ce728ed5e99ddbad282163be56764afacf88ed952b784
for test in test_http_acceptance.py test_serve.py test_ws_denial.py; do
docker run --rm --network none --entrypoint /opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python3 -v "$PWD/infra/hermes-runtime:/contract:ro" "$image" "/contract/$test"
done
# Apply job must require approved SHA, Stage environment approval, provisioned external
# snapshot/network/secrets, and call bash infra/hermes-runtime/ci-apply.sh on target.
# Not enabled here: parent owns actual workflow and Stage promotion.
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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
name: canina-hermes-inventory
services:
runtime-inventory:
image: nousresearch/hermes-agent@sha256:9774f4f39a9bb8c2f68ce728ed5e99ddbad282163be56764afacf88ed952b784
entrypoint: [/opt/hermes/.venv/bin/python3, /runtime/serve.py]
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
HERMES_HOME: /inventory
HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS: "1"
volumes:
- ./serve.py:/runtime/serve.py:ro
- inventory_snapshot:/inventory
secrets: [hermes_username, hermes_password, hermes_signing_key]
networks:
backend:
aliases: [canina-hermes-inventory]
security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]
cap_drop: [ALL]
pids_limit: 128
mem_limit: 1g
# No ports, host socket, original home, or egress network.
volumes:
inventory_snapshot:
external: true
name: canina_hermes_inventory_snapshot
networks:
backend:
external: true
name: canina_hermes_backend
secrets:
hermes_username:
file: /opt/services/canina/secrets/hermes_username
hermes_password:
file: /opt/services/canina/secrets/hermes_password
hermes_signing_key:
file: /opt/services/canina/secrets/hermes_signing_key
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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# Disposable acceptance fixture only; not production entrypoint.
import os,tempfile,importlib.util
os.environ['HERMES_HOME']=tempfile.mkdtemp()
os.environ['HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS']='1'
from pathlib import Path
import json
(Path(os.environ["HERMES_HOME"])/"snapshot-manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps({"schemaVersion":1,"source":"snapshot","capturedAt":"2020-01-01T00:00:00Z"}))
spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('runtime_serve','/contract/serve.py');m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m)
m.secret=lambda name:'isolated-test-only-'+name+'x'*32
import uvicorn
uvicorn.run(m.build_app(),host='0.0.0.0',port=9119,lifespan='off',access_log=False,log_level='warning')
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"""Dedicated read-inventory process: never starts cron, gateway, rooms, MCP or PTY."""
from pathlib import Path
import os, json
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from fastapi import Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from plugins.dashboard_auth.basic import BasicAuthProvider, hash_password
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.registry import register_global_provider
from hermes_cli import web_server
import uvicorn
def secret(name):
p=Path('/run/secrets')/name
if not p.is_file() or p.stat().st_size>4096: raise RuntimeError('Runtime credential unavailable')
value=p.read_text().strip()
if not value or '\n' in value or '\r' in value: raise RuntimeError('Runtime credential unavailable')
return value
def snapshot_provenance():
try:
path=Path(os.environ['HERMES_HOME'])/'snapshot-manifest.json'
if path.is_symlink() or not path.is_file() or path.stat().st_size>4096:
raise ValueError()
data=json.loads(path.read_text())
if set(data)!={'schemaVersion','source','capturedAt'} or data['schemaVersion']!=1 or data['source']!='snapshot':
raise ValueError()
captured=data['capturedAt']
if not isinstance(captured,str) or not captured.endswith('Z'):
raise ValueError()
at=datetime.fromisoformat(captured.replace('Z','+00:00'))
age=(datetime.now(timezone.utc)-at).total_seconds()
if age<0: raise ValueError()
return {'source':'snapshot','capturedAt':captured,'ageSeconds':int(age),
'freshness':'fresh' if age<=3600 else 'stale','liveProcess':'unknown'}
except (OSError, ValueError, TypeError, KeyError):
raise RuntimeError('Valid snapshot manifest required') from None
def build_app():
snapshot_provenance()
# Never execute installed status: it probes PIDs, gateway HTTP and platform health.
web_server.app.router.routes[:] = [route for route in web_server.app.router.routes
if getattr(route,'path',None)!='/api/status']
@web_server.app.get('/api/status')
async def snapshot_status():
from hermes_cli.web_server import get_version_info
return {'version':get_version_info().base_version,'gateway_running':False,
'gateway_state':None,'active_agents':0,'overall':'unknown',
'liveGatewayState':'unknown','liveActiveAgents':None}
# Place before installed catch-all UI route.
web_server.app.router.routes.insert(0, web_server.app.router.routes.pop())
register_global_provider(BasicAuthProvider(username=secret('hermes_username'),password_hash=hash_password(secret('hermes_password')),secret=secret('hermes_signing_key').encode(),ttl_seconds=300))
web_server.app.state.auth_required=True
web_server.app.state.bound_host='0.0.0.0'
# Enforce an outer exact route/method allowlist. Installed public health/status stay
# internal; protected inventory still uses installed provider middleware.
allowed={'/api/health','/api/profiles','/api/status','/api/analytics/usage','/api/sessions','/api/cron/jobs','/api/model/info'}
@web_server.app.middleware('http')
async def readonly_gate(request:Request,call_next):
path=request.url.path
if not ((request.method=='GET' and path in allowed) or (request.method=='POST' and path=='/auth/password-login')):
return JSONResponse({'detail':'Unavailable'},status_code=404)
response=await call_next(request)
if request.method!='GET' or response.status_code!=200: return response
try:
provenance=snapshot_provenance()
except RuntimeError:
return JSONResponse({'detail':'Snapshot unavailable'},status_code=503)
body=b''.join([chunk async for chunk in response.body_iterator])
data=json.loads(body)
def annotate(row):
return {**row,'provenance':provenance}
if isinstance(data,list):
data=[annotate(row) for row in data]
else:
data=annotate(data)
if path=='/api/profiles':
data['profiles']=[{**annotate(row),'gateway_running':False,'liveGatewayState':'unknown'} for row in data['profiles']]
if path=='/api/status':
# Legacy required scalars are conservative placeholders, NOT measurements.
data.update(gateway_running=False,active_agents=0,overall='unknown',gateway_state=None,
liveGatewayState='unknown',liveActiveAgents=None)
return JSONResponse(data,headers={'Cache-Control':'no-store'})
class NoSockets:
async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
if scope['type']=='websocket':
await send({'type':'websocket.close','code':1008})
return
await web_server.app(scope,receive,send)
return NoSockets()
if __name__=='__main__':
# No upstream lifespan: no eager schema reconciliation or hosted-room recovery.
# Data is an operator-prepared independent snapshot, NEVER the gateway's volume.
uvicorn.run(build_app(),host='0.0.0.0',port=9119,lifespan='off',access_log=False,log_level='warning')
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// Execute inside disposable compiled backend runner sharing fixture network namespace.
const assert=require('node:assert/strict');
const {HermesSessionBroker}=require('/opt/backend/dist/hermes-management/hermes-session-broker');
const {HermesAdapter}=require('/opt/backend/dist/hermes-management/hermes.adapter');
const {HermesIntegrationService}=require('/opt/backend/dist/hermes-management/hermes-integration.service');
const fetcher=(input,options)=>{const url=new URL(String(input));url.hostname='127.0.0.1';return fetch(url,options);};
(async()=>{
let reads=0;
const broker=new HermesSessionBroker(async()=>{reads++;return {username:'isolated-test-only-hermes_username'+'x'.repeat(32),password:'isolated-test-only-hermes_password'+'x'.repeat(32)};},fetcher);
const adapter=new HermesAdapter({origin:'http://canina-hermes-inventory:9119',token:()=>broker.token()},fetcher);
const runtime=new HermesIntegrationService(adapter,{authorize:async(p,action,profile)=>p.subject==='test-admin'&&action==='runtime.read'&&(!profile||profile==='default')});
await assert.rejects(()=>runtime.health({subject:'denied',profiles:[]}),{code:'FORBIDDEN'});assert.equal(reads,0);
const principal={subject:'test-admin',profiles:['default']};
assert.equal((await runtime.health(principal)).auth_required,true);
const profiles=await runtime.profiles(principal);assert(profiles.some(p=>p.name==='default'));assert(profiles.every(p=>p.name==='default'));
await assert.rejects(()=>runtime.status(principal,'outside'),{code:'FORBIDDEN'});
const status=await runtime.status(principal,'default');assert.equal(status.overall,'unknown');assert.equal(status.liveActiveAgents,null);assert.equal(status.provenance.source,'snapshot');
assert.equal(profiles[0].provenance.source,'snapshot');assert.equal(profiles[0].liveGatewayState,'unknown');
assert.equal(reads,1);
console.log('PASS real Node broker -> pinned TCP Hermes login -> adapter -> policy-filtered profiles; deny performs zero secret reads; cache coalesced');
})().catch(e=>{console.error(e.code||'contract failure');process.exitCode=1;});
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
"""Pinned image HTTP contract, no live volumes/network or provider calls."""
import os, secrets, tempfile
from pathlib import Path
os.environ['HERMES_HOME']=tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='runtime-contract-')
os.environ['HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS']='1'
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from plugins.dashboard_auth.basic import BasicAuthProvider, hash_password
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.registry import register_global_provider
from hermes_cli import web_server
password=secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
provider=BasicAuthProvider(username='contract',password_hash=hash_password(password),secret=secrets.token_bytes(32))
register_global_provider(provider)
web_server.app.state.auth_required=True
web_server.app.state.bound_host='0.0.0.0'
# No lifespan: avoids hosted-room recovery, cron/MCP and schema reconciliation threads.
client=TestClient(web_server.app,base_url='http://localhost')
def test_protected_inventory():
assert client.get('/api/profiles').status_code==401
assert client.post('/auth/password-login',json={'provider':'basic','username':'contract','password':'wrong'}).status_code==401
response=client.post('/auth/password-login',json={'provider':'basic','username':'contract','password':password})
assert response.status_code==200 and response.json()['ok'] is True
token=client.cookies.get('hermes_session_at')
assert token and provider.verify_session(access_token=token)
assert 'HttpOnly' in response.headers['set-cookie']
response=client.get('/api/profiles',headers={'Authorization':'Bearer '+token})
assert response.status_code==200 and any(p['name']=='default' for p in response.json()['profiles'])
client.cookies.clear()
assert client.get('/api/profiles',headers={'Authorization':'Bearer tampered'}).status_code==401
print('PASS exact-image HTTP wrong-login=401 login=200 HttpOnly verified-token protected-profiles=200 tampered=401')
if __name__=='__main__':test_protected_inventory()
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@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
import importlib.util, os, secrets, tempfile, threading, socket, time
from pathlib import Path
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
os.environ['HERMES_HOME']=tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='inventory-snapshot-')
os.environ['HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS']='1'
spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('runtime_serve','/contract/serve.py')
module=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(module)
values={'hermes_username':'contract','hermes_password':secrets.token_urlsafe(32),'hermes_signing_key':secrets.token_urlsafe(32)}
module.secret=lambda name:values[name]
# A capture timestamp is supplied by a reviewed exporter, never inferred at boot.
import json
manifest=Path(os.environ['HERMES_HOME'])/'snapshot-manifest.json'
for invalid in [None, {}, {'schemaVersion':1,'source':'snapshot','capturedAt':'not-a-date'}, {'schemaVersion':1,'source':'snapshot','capturedAt':'2999-01-01T00:00:00Z'}]:
if invalid is None:
manifest.unlink(missing_ok=True)
else:
manifest.write_text(json.dumps(invalid))
try:
module.build_app()
except (RuntimeError, ValueError):
pass
else:
raise AssertionError('invalid or missing manifest accepted')
manifest.write_text(json.dumps({'schemaVersion':1,'source':'snapshot','capturedAt':'2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'}))
app=module.build_app()
import uvicorn
server=uvicorn.Server(uvicorn.Config(app,host='0.0.0.0',port=9119,lifespan='off',access_log=False,log_level='warning'))
thread=threading.Thread(target=server.run,daemon=True);thread.start()
for _ in range(200):
if server.started:break
time.sleep(.05)
assert server.started
import httpx
with httpx.Client(base_url='http://127.0.0.1:9119') as c:
assert c.get('/api/profiles').status_code==401
assert c.post('/auth/password-login',json={'provider':'basic','username':values['hermes_username'],'password':'wrong'}).status_code==401
r=c.post('/auth/password-login',json={'provider':'basic','username':values['hermes_username'],'password':values['hermes_password']})
assert r.status_code==200 and r.json()['ok'] is True
assert c.get('/api/profiles').status_code==200
health=c.get('/api/health').json()
assert health['auth_required'] is True
assert health['provenance']['source']=='snapshot'
assert health['provenance']['capturedAt']=='2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'
assert health['provenance']['freshness']=='stale'
assert health['provenance']['liveProcess']=='unknown'
profiles=c.get('/api/profiles').json()['profiles']
assert profiles and all(p['liveGatewayState']=='unknown' and p['gateway_running'] is False and p['provenance']['source']=='snapshot' for p in profiles)
status=c.get('/api/status',params={'profile':'default'}).json()
assert status['overall']=='unknown' and status['gateway_state'] is None
assert status['gateway_running'] is False and status['active_agents']==0
assert status['liveActiveAgents'] is None and status['liveGatewayState']=='unknown'
for path in ['/api/model/info','/api/analytics/usage','/api/sessions','/api/cron/jobs']:
response=c.get(path,params={'profile':'default'})
if response.status_code==200:
data=response.json()
if isinstance(data,list):
assert all(r['provenance']['source']=='snapshot' for r in data)
else:
assert data['provenance']['source']=='snapshot'
assert c.post('/api/cron/jobs/example/resume').status_code==404
assert c.get('/api/config').status_code==404
assert c.get('/api/ws').status_code==404
print('PASS real TCP pinned serve: unauth401 wrong-password401 login200 inventory200 health.auth_required=true mutations/config/ws404')
server.should_exit=True;thread.join(10)
assert not thread.is_alive()
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@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
import os,tempfile,importlib.util
os.environ['HERMES_HOME']=tempfile.mkdtemp()
from pathlib import Path
import json
(Path(os.environ['HERMES_HOME'])/'snapshot-manifest.json').write_text(json.dumps({'schemaVersion':1,'source':'snapshot','capturedAt':'2020-01-01T00:00:00Z'}))
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from starlette.websockets import WebSocketDisconnect
spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location('runtime_serve','/contract/serve.py');m=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec);spec.loader.exec_module(m)
m.secret=lambda name:'test-only-'+'x'*32
app=m.build_app()
# A permitted session must NOT unlock powerful WebSocket routes.
client=TestClient(app)
r=client.post('/auth/password-login',json={'provider':'basic','username':m.secret('hermes_username'),'password':m.secret('hermes_password')})
assert r.status_code==200
for path in ['/api/ws','/api/pty','/api/events']:
try:
with client.websocket_connect(path):
raise AssertionError('Read-only boundary admitted socket '+path)
except WebSocketDisconnect as e:
assert e.code==1008, (path,e.code)
print('PASS authenticated sockets denied1008')
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# Bounded PREPARE worker transport (not an LLM pilot)
This is an opt-in Nest dynamic module and one-shot deterministic Node executor. Nothing imports it into AppModule. No live service, credential, dispatch schedule or deployment is created.
## Required parent wiring
- Import `WorkerTransportModule.register(config)` from `backend/src/orchestration-worker/worker-transport.module.ts` in the parent application only after review. Default disabled; provide empty grants until secret provisioning. The module owns its own PrepareWorkflowService/config; do not broaden existing orchestration providers.
- Provision >=32 random-byte service credential through a mounted secret `/run/secrets/prepare_worker_credential` to the pilot, and provision only its SHA256 in server grants. Never accept identity/role from request bodies, JWT browser users, headers other than this credential, or a snapshot inventory.
- `grants` is an explicit digest -> `{id,role}` mapping with independent `workerIds`/`stageCiIds`. Worker and CI identities/digests cannot overlap. Use a separate CI-only secret for `STAGE_CI`; do not give it to this executor.
- Fixed config: absolute private writable `artifactDirectory`, authenticated HTTPS `artifactBaseUrl` pointing to `/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts`, separate persistent artifact volume. The fixture host `isolated.invalid` is NOT a real uploaded artifact URI. TLS routing/URI reachability must be verified by parent Stage CI.
- Restrict routes to service network, TLS, ingress body limit (8KiB recommended), rate limit, no browser CORS credentials, no public user JWT access. The module validates strict DTO fields, but production ingress/body limits/rate controls remain parent's wiring.
- Run `node infra/hermes-worker/pilot.mjs` with explicit `PREPARE_TASK_ID` UUID and `PREPARE_WORKER_BASE_URL` HTTPS origin. It consumes exactly one task/lease, has 5s per HTTP timeout, does not retry, and exits on SIGINT/SIGTERM. No polling or global dispatch. Disable all egress except backend; do not mount shell/Docker/browser credentials or repo write access. Loopback HTTP is available only via the exported test API option, not CLI.
## Contract and bounds
POST `/internal/prepare-worker/claim`: `{taskId}` -> `{lease:null|{...}}`; heartbeat: `{taskId,runId,leaseToken}`; complete: same binding plus `report` (max 2048 chars). Server accepts only byte-exact deterministic tracer JSON derived from the immutable run; it computes SHA256, writes real content, and chooses artifact URI/cost (0 cents), not client-supplied costs/URIs/pass flags. It does **not** inspect repository contents or validate application acceptance criteria. QA here means this harmless tracer succeeded, not application QA.
Core service still owns transactional Gate1, scope, kill checks, task locks, lease fencing, reservations and VERIFYING event. Transport requires exactly 20-cent task budgets and explicit task IDs. One expired unknown-cost reservation exhausts this pilot budget; do not release it to permit retries. Interrupt means cancellation/non-RUNNING state or STOP_AGENTS; heartbeat before compute, before complete, and atomic completion recheck. File writes may leave unregistered orphan content if the final transaction is denied; retrieval requires a registered QA artifact and verifies its bytes against the requested digest.
POST `/internal/prepare-worker/stage-evidence` has a separate strict CI DTO `{taskId,runId,commitSha,sha256,evidenceSha256,uri}` and calls independently authenticated core Stage evidence ingestion. This tracer never submits it. Valid CI evidence retrieval/provenance remains CI's responsibility. No Gate2 approval/release transport exists.
Shared department budgets are not implemented by core and are not claimed here. Do not expand beyond a single bounded pilot until aggregate budgeting and live provisioning are reviewed.
## Real isolated verification
Run `bash infra/hermes-worker/test-isolated.sh green`. It creates no-network disposable PostgreSQL16, applies only the three repository v4 migrations, copies readonly source and Node22 dependency donor into private writable storage, regenerates Prisma, runs actual Nest TCP HTTP and a child Node executor, then full backend compilation. Docker DB/anonymous volume removed on exit. No live tables/containers/volumes, RELEASE_AUTHORIZE, push or deploy touched.
Evidence: `/opt/services/canina/validation/v4-worker-transport/`: `red.log` (missing module initial RED), `integrity-red.log` (real 200 vs expected409 corruption regression), `green.log`, `build.log`, `generate.log`, `tracer-evidence.json` (actual artifact content/hash). Final tests cover credential/body identity denial, disabled/overlap config, Gate1 no-dispatch, competing claims, expired/token fencing, retained20-cent budget, interrupt/kill rechecks, CI separation, real executor to VERIFYING, authenticated artifact GET and tamper rejection. Fixture commit is 40 `a` characters; this is not a repository QA claim or live Stage deployment.
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# Worker transport security review
Scope: f7048ab (parent equivalent aa99216). Narrow transport-only hardening; no orchestration/core/AppModule changes, release authority, live provisioning or deployment.
## Fixed
- Authenticated artifact retrieval now requires a local fixed-base QA registration, successful staging PREPARE run, matching immutable commit, 20-cent task, and DONE outbox bound to that exact run. Workers can read only their own outbox/run; separately provisioned Stage CI can read bounded completed tracer artifacts for independent verification. Foreign QA registrations and arbitrary authenticated workers do not suffice. Returned bytes must match both content hash and deterministic run-bound tracer report.
- Artifact base is canonical HTTPS with the exact `/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts` path: no userinfo, query, fragment, alternate port, IP literals, localhost/private-name suffixes, escaped or normalized arbitrary paths. This is static reviewed configuration, not a fetched URL. DNS resolution/reachability is deliberately not attempted; the operator must review the fixed origin and DNS/TLS routing.
- Configuration requires an actual boolean enable flag, non-overlapping valid allowlists and valid unique credential grants. Both transport snapshot and workflow config are frozen, including arrays and grant objects; caller mutation cannot change the snapshot.
- Linux descriptor-relative directory traversal with O_DIRECTORY/O_NOFOLLOW prevents symlinked path components and pins directories across renames. Final directory must be private and owned by process UID. File creation uses exclusive O_CREAT/O_EXCL/O_NOFOLLOW, never truncating existing symlinks, hardlinks or regular files. Reads use a pinned O_NOFOLLOW/O_NONBLOCK descriptor, require a private owned regular single-link file, and are bounded to 2049 bytes before digest/run binding verification.
## Preserved and verified
Bearer service digest identity, strict DTO/body impersonation rejection, independent CI role, explicit task-only claim (no queue polling), exact 20-cent cap, Gate1 gating, lease owner/token/task/run fences, unknown-cost reservation exhaustion, STOP_AGENTS and cancellation checks, atomic core completion recheck. No network fetch of artifact URLs was introduced.
The executor remains a deterministic JSON tracer: no LLM, shell, browser, deployment, repository inspection or real application QA. Successful tracer QA is not acceptance-criteria verification.
## Evidence
Actual disposable PostgreSQL16/no-network Docker fixture, Nest TCP HTTP listener, child Node22 executor and full backend `tsc -b` build: `/opt/services/canina/validation/v4-worker-security/`.
- `auth-red.log`: unrelated registered worker received 200 instead of expected 404.
- `config-red.log`: unsafe credential-bearing base accepted.
- `file-red.log`: symlink target sentinel overwritten by deterministic report.
- `freeze-red.log`: workflow config remained mutable.
- `security-green.log`: all 7 tests pass, including own-worker/CI retrieval, foreign URI denial, directory/file symlink and hardlink rejection, tamper integrity rejection, kill/lease/task fencing and actual child executor to VERIFYING.
- `build.log`: full backend `tsc -b` exit 0.
- `tracer-evidence.json`: actual fixture task/run/hash/content, GET200, cost0. External URI reachability explicitly NOT_TESTED_ISOLATED_FIXTURE_HOST.
## Limits / residual responsibilities
Linux `/proc/self/fd` is required; unsupported platforms fail closed. Protect the artifact mount and its ancestry from same-UID/root attackers; they remain outside this process boundary. File and database cannot commit atomically: a killed/denied/competing completion can leave an unregistered orphan, deliberately unreadable and never overwritten automatically. No retry/cleanup redesign was added. Descriptor pinning prevents path redirection but does not promise availability during hostile renames. Symlink/hardlink swaps are tested; exhaustive adversarial scheduling is not claimed.
Parent still owns service-network restriction, reviewed origin/DNS/TLS reachability, body/rate limits, secret provisioning, Stage CI evidence provenance, aggregate department budgets and integration tests. All workers remain unwired/default-disabled; no live secrets or RELEASE_AUTHORIZE used.
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import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
/** One explicit task, one attempt, fixed computation; no shell, prompt, browser or LLM. */
export async function runOnce({baseUrl, credential, taskId, allowLoopbackHttp=false, signal}) {
const url = new URL(baseUrl);
if (url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash || (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !(allowLoopbackHttp && url.protocol === 'http:' && ['127.0.0.1','[::1]'].includes(url.hostname)))) throw new Error('HTTPS service origin required');
if (!credential || credential.length < 32) throw new Error('Service credential required');
async function post(route, body) {
signal?.throwIfAborted();
const timeout=AbortSignal.timeout(5000);
const r=await fetch(new URL('/internal/prepare-worker/'+route,url), {method:'POST',redirect:'error',signal:signal ? AbortSignal.any([signal,timeout]) : timeout,headers:{authorization:'Bearer '+credential,'content-type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify(body)});
const text=await r.text();
if(text.length>8192) throw new Error('Oversized service response');
if(!r.ok) throw new Error('Worker request denied: '+r.status);
return JSON.parse(text);
}
const {lease}=await post('claim',{taskId});
if(!lease) return {state:'IDLE'};
if(lease.taskId!==taskId || lease.environment!=='staging' || lease.maxCostCents!==20 || !/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/.test(lease.commitSha)) throw new Error('Unbounded lease rejected');
const binding={taskId,runId:lease.runId,leaseToken:lease.leaseToken};
await post('heartbeat',binding); // stop/interrupt recheck before any computation
signal?.throwIfAborted();
const report=JSON.stringify({kind:'DETERMINISTIC_PREPARE_TRACER',schemaVersion:1,taskId,runId:lease.runId,commitSha:lease.commitSha,environment:'staging',llmPilot:false,browserExecuted:false,shellExecuted:false,deploymentExecuted:false,checks:['lease-bound identity','deterministic JSON serialization'],actualCents:0});
await post('heartbeat',binding); // stop/interrupt recheck immediately before completion
return post('complete',{...binding,report});
}
if (process.argv[1] && import.meta.url===pathToFileURL(process.argv[1]).href) {
const controller=new AbortController();
process.once('SIGINT',()=>controller.abort());
process.once('SIGTERM',()=>controller.abort());
try {
const credential=(await readFile('/run/secrets/prepare_worker_credential','utf8')).trim();
const result=await runOnce({baseUrl:process.env.PREPARE_WORKER_BASE_URL,credential,taskId:process.env.PREPARE_TASK_ID,signal:controller.signal});
console.log(JSON.stringify(result));
} catch { console.error('Bounded PREPARE tracer failed; no completion assumed'); process.exitCode=1; }
}
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
E="${WORKER_EVIDENCE_DIR:-/opt/services/canina/validation/v4-worker-transport}"
mkdir -p "$E"
DB="v4-worker-test-${RANDOM}"
trap 'docker rm -fv "$DB" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' EXIT
docker run -d --name "$DB" --network none -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=disposable -e POSTGRES_DB=worker postgres:16-alpine >/dev/null
for n in $(seq 1 60); do if docker exec "$DB" pg_isready -U postgres >/dev/null 2>&1; then break; fi; sleep 1; done
for migration in 20261022000000_add_orchestration_v4_core 20261022190000_harden_orchestration_ledger 20261023170000_prepare_workflow_outbox; do
docker exec -i "$DB" psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -U postgres -d worker < "$ROOT/backend/prisma/migrations/$migration/migration.sql" > "$E/$migration.log"
done
docker run --rm --userns=host --network "container:$DB" -e DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres:disposable@127.0.0.1:5432/worker -e WORKER_TRANSPORT_DB=1 -e TRACER_EVIDENCE_PATH=/evidence/tracer-evidence.json -e TMPDIR=/work/tmp -v "$ROOT:/source:ro" -v /opt/services/canina/worktrees/orchestration-v4-runtime/backend/node_modules:/deps:ro -v "$E:/evidence" node:22-bookworm bash -c '
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p /work/backend /work/infra /work/tmp
cp -a /source/backend/. /work/backend/
cp -a /source/infra/. /work/infra/
cp -a /deps /work/backend/node_modules
cd /work/backend
./node_modules/.bin/prisma generate > /evidence/generate.log 2>&1
npm test -- --runInBand orchestration-worker > /evidence/'"${1:-green}"'.log 2>&1
npm run build > /evidence/build.log 2>&1
'
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CI job side only. Never execute host deploy logic in the runner filesystem.
set -euo pipefail
set +x
fail() { printf 'ERROR: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit 2; }
[[ ${GITHUB_ACTIONS:-${GITEA_ACTIONS:-}} == true && ${BRANCH:-} == develop && $# == 0 ]] || fail 'CI-only Stage deployment; Production is blocked'
[[ ${DEPLOY_SHA:-} =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]] || fail 'immutable DEPLOY_SHA required'
# Repository secret DEPLOY_KEY is the historical approved devops SSH credential.
# Never fall back to baked-in runner keys, agent forwarding or docker.sock.
[[ -n ${DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS:-} ]] || fail 'provision DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS: independently verified [87.248.133.138]:2234 host key; never use ssh-keyscan trust-on-first-use'
[[ -n ${DEPLOY_KEY:-} ]] || fail 'provision existing approved DEPLOY_KEY for devops@87.248.133.138:2234'
for tool in ssh ssh-keygen mktemp; do command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || fail "job context missing $tool"; done
umask 077
scratch=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$scratch"' EXIT
printf '%s\n' "$DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS" > "$scratch/known_hosts"
printf '%s\n' "$DEPLOY_KEY" > "$scratch/key"
unset DEPLOY_KEY DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS
ssh-keygen -F '[87.248.133.138]:2234' -f "$scratch/known_hosts" >/dev/null || fail 'DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS has no pinned deployment endpoint'
# Only the validated SHA enters the remote command; no user-controlled shell text.
ssh -F /dev/null -T -p 2234 -i "$scratch/key" \
-o BatchMode=yes -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o IdentityAgent=none \
-o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile="$scratch/known_hosts" \
-o GlobalKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o ConnectTimeout=15 \
devops@87.248.133.138 "sudo -n bash -s -- $DEPLOY_SHA" <<'HOST'
set -euo pipefail
set +x
umask 077
fail() { printf 'ERROR: host context: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit 2; }
[[ $# == 1 && $1 =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]] || fail 'immutable SHA required'
[[ ! -e /.dockerenv && ! -e /run/.containerenv ]] || fail 'refusing container filesystem'
[[ $(id -u) == 0 ]] || fail 'noninteractive approved sudo required'
for tool in bash python3 docker git flock realpath install wget; do command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || fail "missing $tool"; done
[[ -d /opt/services/canina/stage/.git && -d /opt/services/proxy/certs/canina ]] || fail 'Stage operational checkout/certificates unavailable'
[[ -s /opt/services/canina/stage/.support-chat.env && ! -L /opt/services/canina/stage/.support-chat.env ]] || fail 'Stage runtime env unavailable'
docker compose version >/dev/null
docker volume inspect stage_canina_stage_db stage_canina_stage_uploads >/dev/null
docker network inspect traefik_public >/dev/null
printf 'Host context validated; Stage commit=%s; runtime env present; Production blocked\n' "$1"
script=$(mktemp)
trap 'rm -f "$script"' EXIT
wget --no-proxy -qO "$script" "https://git.parsaaghayi.ir/parsa/canina/raw/commit/${1}/scripts/deploy.sh"
# CI marker exists only across this authenticated, fixed Stage boundary.
GITHUB_ACTIONS=true DEPLOY_SHA="$1" bash "$script" develop
HOST
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@@ -1,103 +1,137 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
set +x
# CI/CD-only Stage rollout; Production awaits separate reviewed authorization.
if [ "${GITHUB_ACTIONS:-${GITEA_ACTIONS:-}}" != true ] || [ "${1:-}" != develop ] || [ "$#" != 1 ]; then
echo 'ERROR: refusing deployment outside CI/CD Stage rollout' >&2
exit 2
fi
if [[ ! "${DEPLOY_SHA:-}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]; then
echo 'ERROR: refusing deployment without an immutable commit SHA' >&2
echo "ERROR: refusing deployment without an immutable commit SHA" >&2
exit 2
fi
# END ROLLOUT GUARD
exec 9>/opt/services/canina/stage-backend-deploy.lock
flock -n 9 || { echo 'Stage deployment already in progress' >&2; exit 1; }
umask 077
export DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 COMPOSE_DOCKER_CLI_BUILD=1
# Stage is an operational reference, NEVER a checkout/build target.
STAGE_DIR=/opt/services/canina/stage
RELEASE_ROOT=/opt/services/canina/releases
TARGET_DIR="$RELEASE_ROOT/$DEPLOY_SHA"
mkdir -p "$RELEASE_ROOT"
[ ! -L "$RELEASE_ROOT" ] && [ "$(realpath "$RELEASE_ROOT")" = "$RELEASE_ROOT" ]
# Do not overwrite a prior release or retry with stale generated configuration.
mkdir "$TARGET_DIR"
git clone --no-checkout --single-branch --branch develop https://git.parsaaghayi.ir/parsa/canina.git "$TARGET_DIR"
export DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1
export COMPOSE_DOCKER_CLI_BUILD=1
# Ensure nexus is connected to default bridge network so docker build can reach it
docker network connect bridge nexus 2>/dev/null || true
# Nexus npm registry
NEXUS_IP=$(docker inspect -f '{{.NetworkSettings.Networks.bridge.IPAddress}}' nexus 2>/dev/null || true)
if [ -z "$NEXUS_IP" ]; then
NEXUS_IP="172.17.0.3"
fi
NPM_REGISTRY="http://${NEXUS_IP}:8081/repository/bitchpedar/"
BRANCH="${1:-develop}"
echo "Starting Deployment for branch: ${BRANCH}"
if [ "$BRANCH" == "develop" ]; then
COMPOSE_FILE="compose.stage.yml"
TARGET_DIR="/opt/services/canina/stage"
BACKEND_HOST="backend_stage"
APP_HOST="stage.canina.ir"
ADMIN_HOST="stageadmin.canina.ir"
API_URL="https://stageapi.canina.ir"
CONTAINER_PREFIX="canino_backend_stage"
else
COMPOSE_FILE="compose.prod.yml"
TARGET_DIR="/opt/services/canina/prod"
BACKEND_HOST="backend_prod"
APP_HOST="canina.ir"
ADMIN_HOST="admin.canina.ir"
API_URL="https://api.canina.ir"
CONTAINER_PREFIX="canino_backend_prod"
fi
mkdir -p "$TARGET_DIR"
if [ ! -d "$TARGET_DIR/.git" ]; then
echo "Cloning repository into $TARGET_DIR..."
git clone -b "$BRANCH" https://git.parsaaghayi.ir/parsa/canina.git "$TARGET_DIR"
git -C "$TARGET_DIR" cat-file -e "${DEPLOY_SHA}^{commit}"
git -C "$TARGET_DIR" merge-base --is-ancestor "$DEPLOY_SHA" "origin/$BRANCH"
git -C "$TARGET_DIR" reset --hard "$DEPLOY_SHA"
else
echo "Pulling latest changes in $TARGET_DIR..."
cd "$TARGET_DIR"
git fetch origin "$BRANCH"
git cat-file -e "${DEPLOY_SHA}^{commit}"
git merge-base --is-ancestor "$DEPLOY_SHA" "origin/$BRANCH"
git reset --hard "$DEPLOY_SHA"
cd -
fi
cd "$TARGET_DIR"
git cat-file -e "${DEPLOY_SHA}^{commit}"
git merge-base --is-ancestor "$DEPLOY_SHA" origin/develop
git checkout --detach "$DEPLOY_SHA"
[ "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$DEPLOY_SHA" ]
# Keep operational files out of status/accidental commits in this disposable clone.
printf '\n.support-chat.env\n.revalidation.env\n.stage-base.json\n.stage-compose.json\n' >> .git/info/exclude
# Runtime secrets/config must never enter the frontend Docker build context.
printf '\n.support-chat.env\n.revalidation.env\n.stage-*.json\n' >> .dockerignore
# Only these backend/frontend runtime env files are required. Do not copy the
# dirty compose, .env, uploads, bot state, certificates, or arbitrary Stage files.
for name in .support-chat.env .revalidation.env; do
if [ -e "$STAGE_DIR/$name" ] || [ -L "$STAGE_DIR/$name" ]; then
[ -f "$STAGE_DIR/$name" ] && [ ! -L "$STAGE_DIR/$name" ]
[ -z "$(git -C "$STAGE_DIR" ls-files -- "$name")" ]
[ -z "$(git ls-files -- "$name")" ]
install -m 600 "$STAGE_DIR/$name" "$TARGET_DIR/$name"
# Capture the bot key from Docker before recreating the bot; runner mounts may not include the host env file.
if docker inspect canina-bot >/dev/null 2>&1; then
LIVE_BOT_KEY=$(docker inspect -f '{{range .Config.Env}}{{println .}}{{end}}' canina-bot | awk -F= '$1 == "SUPPORT_INTERNAL_KEY" {print substr($0, index($0, "=") + 1); exit}')
if [ -n "$LIVE_BOT_KEY" ]; then
grep -v '^SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY=' .support-chat.env > .support-chat.env.tmp 2>/dev/null || true
printf 'SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY=%s
' "$LIVE_BOT_KEY" >> .support-chat.env.tmp
mv .support-chat.env.tmp .support-chat.env
chmod 600 .support-chat.env
fi
done
[ -s .support-chat.env ] || { echo 'ERROR: missing Stage support runtime env' >&2; exit 1; }
# Never inspect/recreate/mutate the shared support bot or infer keys from it.
# Certs remain the explicit operational absolute bind from tracked compose.
python3 - <<'PY'
from pathlib import Path
p = Path('nginx.conf')
s = p.read_text()
for key, value in {'__BACKEND_HOST__': 'backend_stage', '__APP_HOST__': 'stage.canina.ir', '__ADMIN_HOST__': 'stageadmin.canina.ir'}.items():
s = s.replace(key, value)
p.write_text(s)
PY
# Wrapper also covers every compose call in the sourced rollout helper. Explicit
# project/files/env-file prevent release-SHA projects and ambient .env loading.
docker() {
if [ "${1:-}" = compose ]; then
shift
command docker compose -p stage --env-file /dev/null --project-directory "$TARGET_DIR" -f "$TARGET_DIR/.stage-compose.json" "$@"
else
command docker "$@"
unset LIVE_BOT_KEY
fi
# Inject support-chat runtime configuration from CI/CD without committing secrets.
# The bot is the runtime owner of the internal key; synchronize only the
# matching value into the colocated backend env file, never into Git or logs.
BOT_ENV="/opt/services/ai/canina-bot/support.env"
if [ -r "$BOT_ENV" ]; then
BOT_KEY=$(awk -F= '$1 == "SUPPORT_INTERNAL_KEY" {print substr($0, index($0, "=") + 1); exit}' "$BOT_ENV")
if [ -n "$BOT_KEY" ]; then
touch .support-chat.env
grep -v '^SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY=' .support-chat.env > .support-chat.env.tmp || true
printf "SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY=%s\n" "$BOT_KEY" >> .support-chat.env.tmp
mv .support-chat.env.tmp .support-chat.env
chmod 600 .support-chat.env
fi
}
# Render privately: config contains env secrets, so never emit it to CI logs.
command docker compose -p stage --env-file /dev/null --project-directory "$TARGET_DIR" -f scripts/compose.stage.yml config --format json > .stage-base.json
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
from pathlib import Path
config = json.loads(Path('.stage-base.json').read_text())
expected = {'canina_stage_db': 'stage_canina_stage_db', 'canina_stage_uploads': 'stage_canina_stage_uploads'}
if set(config['services']) != {'db_stage', 'redis_stage', 'backend_stage', 'frontend_stage'}:
raise SystemExit('ERROR: unexpected Stage service set')
for key, name in expected.items():
if config['volumes'][key].get('name') != name:
raise SystemExit('ERROR: Stage volume identity mismatch')
config['volumes'][key] = {'name': name, 'external': True}
if config['networks']['traefik_public'].get('name') != 'traefik_public' or not config['networks']['traefik_public'].get('external'):
raise SystemExit('ERROR: Stage network identity mismatch')
backend = config['services']['backend_stage']
if backend['container_name'] != 'canino_backend_stage' or config['services']['frontend_stage']['container_name'] != 'canino_frontend_stage':
raise SystemExit('ERROR: Stage container identity mismatch')
mounts = backend.get('volumes', [])
if not any(m.get('type') == 'volume' and m.get('source') == 'canina_stage_uploads' and m.get('target') == '/app/uploads' for m in mounts):
raise SystemExit('ERROR: missing Stage uploads volume')
for service in config['services'].values():
for mount in service.get('volumes', []):
if mount.get('type') == 'bind' and (mount.get('source'), mount.get('target')) != ('/opt/services/proxy/certs/canina', '/app/ssl_certs'):
raise SystemExit('ERROR: unexpected Stage bind mount')
Path('.stage-compose.json').write_text(json.dumps(config))
Path('.stage-base.json').unlink()
PY
# Read-only checks: missing external storage must fail, never provision blank DB.
docker volume inspect stage_canina_stage_db stage_canina_stage_uploads >/dev/null
docker network inspect traefik_public >/dev/null
[ -d /opt/services/proxy/certs/canina ]
# Builds only app images; DB/Redis and support-bot remain untouched.
docker compose --progress plain build backend_stage frontend_stage
unset BOT_KEY
fi
if [ -n "${SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY:-}" ]; then
touch .support-chat.env
grep -v '^SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY=' .support-chat.env > .support-chat.env.tmp || true
printf 'SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY=%s\n' "$SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY" >> .support-chat.env.tmp
mv .support-chat.env.tmp .support-chat.env
chmod 600 .support-chat.env
fi
if [ ! -s .support-chat.env ]; then
echo "ERROR: missing .support-chat.env / SUPPORT_CHAT_KEY; refusing deployment" >&2
exit 1
fi
# ✅ فایل‌های کانفیگ را از پوشه‌ی scripts مخزن به TARGET_DIR کپی می‌کنیم
echo "Copying configuration files in $TARGET_DIR..."
cp "scripts/$COMPOSE_FILE" "docker-compose.yml"
sed -i 's/- REDIS_PORT: 6379/- REDIS_PORT=6379/g' "docker-compose.yml" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "Patching nginx.conf for environment..."
sed -i "s/__BACKEND_HOST__/${BACKEND_HOST}/g" "nginx.conf"
sed -i "s/__APP_HOST__/${APP_HOST}/g" "nginx.conf"
sed -i "s/__ADMIN_HOST__/${ADMIN_HOST}/g" "nginx.conf"
echo "Using Nexus npm proxy: $NPM_REGISTRY"
NPM_REGISTRY_ARG="--build-arg NPM_REGISTRY=${NPM_REGISTRY}"
echo "Building Docker images..."
docker compose --progress plain build \
--build-arg NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL="${API_URL}/api" \
--build-arg VITE_API_URL="${API_URL}" \
${NPM_REGISTRY_ARG}
# Never recreate the shared Production support bot during a Stage rollout.
source scripts/rollout-stage.sh
stage_rollout
echo 'Deployment for develop completed successfully!'
# Auto-cleanup old docker builder cache to keep disk healthy (keeps latest 6GB)
echo "Cleaning up old docker build cache..."
docker builder prune -af --keep-storage 6GB 2>/dev/null || true
docker image prune -f 2>/dev/null || true
echo "Deployment for $BRANCH completed successfully!"
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@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix='canina-rollout-') as d:
query = "const {PrismaClient}=require('@prisma/client');const p=new PrismaClient();(async()=>{await p.product.findMany({take:1,include:{ingredientList:true,symptoms:true}});await p.supportConversation.findMany({take:1});await p.orchestrationTask.findMany({take:1,include:{runs:true,events:true,budgetLedger:true}});console.log('PASS: actual Prisma legacy catalog/support and v4 relation queries');})().catch(()=>{console.error('Prisma compatibility failed');process.exitCode=1}).finally(()=>p.$disconnect());"
run(cmd[:-3]+['node','-e',query])
after=sql("SELECT table_name,column_name,data_type,is_nullable,column_default FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name <> '_prisma_migrations' AND table_name NOT LIKE 'orchestration_%' ORDER BY 1,2;")
# Compare only the exact pre-existing table set; new additive tables are not legacy.
after='\n'.join(line for line in after.splitlines() if line.split('|',1)[0] in tables)+'\n'
assert before==after,'Legacy column definitions changed'
for table in tables: sql(f'SELECT * FROM "{table}" LIMIT 0;')
v4=sql("SELECT tablename FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public' AND tablename LIKE 'orchestration_%' ORDER BY 1;").splitlines()
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@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
import os, pathlib, subprocess, tempfile, unittest
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
class BoundaryTests(unittest.TestCase):
def run_wrapper(self, **updates):
env = dict(os.environ, GITHUB_ACTIONS='true', BRANCH='develop', DEPLOY_SHA='a'*40)
for name in ('DEPLOY_KEY','DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS'): env.pop(name, None)
env.update(updates)
return subprocess.run(['bash', str(ROOT/'scripts/ci-host-deploy.sh')], env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)
def test_missing_pinned_host_identity_fails_before_network(self):
result = self.run_wrapper(DEPLOY_KEY='sentinel-secret')
self.assertNotEqual(result.returncode, 0)
self.assertIn('DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS', result.stderr)
self.assertNotIn('sentinel-secret', result.stdout+result.stderr)
def test_guards_refuse_non_ci_production_and_injection(self):
for updates in ({'GITHUB_ACTIONS':'false'}, {'BRANCH':'main'}, {'DEPLOY_SHA':'a'*40+';touch bad'}, {'DEPLOY_SHA':''}):
result = self.run_wrapper(**updates)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 2)
self.assertNotIn('provision', result.stderr)
def test_authentication_is_noninteractive_and_sha_is_only_remote_argument(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
tools = pathlib.Path(d)
# Deliberate transport double: validates invocation, never a live deploy.
(tools/'ssh').write_text('#!/bin/bash\nprintf "%s\\n" "$@" > "$TRACE"\n/bin/cat > "$PAYLOAD"\nexit "${SSH_RESULT:-0}"\n')
(tools/'ssh').chmod(0o755)
known = '[87.248.133.138]:2234 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
for code in ('0','255'):
result = self.run_wrapper(DEPLOY_KEY='sentinel-secret', DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS=known, PATH=d+':'+os.environ['PATH'], TRACE=d+'/trace', PAYLOAD=d+'/payload', SSH_RESULT=code)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, int(code), result.stderr)
trace = (tools/'trace').read_text()
for option in ('StrictHostKeyChecking=yes','BatchMode=yes','IdentitiesOnly=yes','IdentityAgent=none','devops@87.248.133.138','sudo -n bash -s -- '+'a'*40): self.assertIn(option,trace)
self.assertNotIn('sentinel-secret', trace+result.stdout+result.stderr)
lines = trace.splitlines()
key = pathlib.Path(lines[lines.index('-i')+1])
self.assertFalse(key.exists(), 'temporary credential must be cleaned even on SSH failure')
payload = (tools/'payload').read_text()
self.assertIn('/raw/commit/${1}/scripts/deploy.sh', payload)
self.assertIn('python3',payload)
self.assertIn('refusing container filesystem',payload)
self.assertNotIn('docker run', payload)
self.assertNotIn('git reset', payload)
def test_workflow_uses_only_authenticated_wrapper(self):
workflow = (ROOT/'.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml').read_text()
self.assertIn('scripts/ci-host-deploy.sh',workflow)
self.assertIn('DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS }}',workflow)
self.assertIn('DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}',workflow)
self.assertNotIn('cd scripts',workflow)
self.assertNotIn('./deploy.sh',workflow)
if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main()
+5 -91
View File
@@ -13,12 +13,9 @@ class RolloutTests(unittest.TestCase):
script=(ROOT/'scripts/deploy.sh').read_text()
workflow=(ROOT/'.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml').read_text()
self.assertIn('DEPLOY_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}',workflow)
self.assertIn('/raw/commit/${DEPLOY_SHA}/scripts/ci-host-deploy.sh',workflow)
wrapper=(ROOT/'scripts/ci-host-deploy.sh').read_text()
self.assertIn('/raw/commit/${1}/scripts/deploy.sh',wrapper)
self.assertNotIn('git reset',script)
self.assertIn('git checkout --detach "$DEPLOY_SHA"',script)
self.assertIn('/opt/services/canina/releases',script)
self.assertIn('/raw/commit/${DEPLOY_SHA}/scripts/deploy.sh',workflow)
self.assertIn('git reset --hard "$DEPLOY_SHA"',script)
self.assertNotIn('git reset --hard "origin/$BRANCH"',script)
def test_commit_guard_rejects_missing_and_malformed_sha_before_side_effects(self):
guard=(ROOT/'scripts/deploy.sh').read_text().split('# END ROLLOUT GUARD')[0]
@@ -36,91 +33,7 @@ class RolloutTests(unittest.TestCase):
workflow=(ROOT/'.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml').read_text()
run=workflow.split(' run: |',1)[1]
self.assertEqual(run.strip().splitlines()[0].strip(),'set -euo pipefail')
self.assertIn('bash "$wrapper"',run)
import textwrap
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
tools=pathlib.Path(d)
(tools/'wget').write_text('#!/bin/sh\nexit 42\n')
(tools/'wget').chmod(0o755)
# Execute the real job block; failed download must not launch wrapper.
result=subprocess.run(['bash','-c',textwrap.dedent(run)], env=dict(os.environ, PATH=d+':'+os.environ['PATH'], BRANCH='develop', DEPLOY_SHA='a'*40, DEPLOY_KEY='test-not-a-key', DEPLOY_KNOWN_HOSTS='test-pin'), capture_output=True,text=True)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode,42,result.stderr)
def test_isolated_deploy_preserves_dirty_stage_and_stable_storage(self):
import json, shutil
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
base = pathlib.Path(directory)
source, stage, releases, tools = [base / n for n in ('source', 'stage', 'releases', 'tools')]
for p in (source, stage, tools): p.mkdir()
def git(*args, cwd=source):
return subprocess.check_output(['git', *args], cwd=cwd, text=True).strip()
git('init', '-b', 'develop')
git('config', 'user.email', 'test@example.invalid')
git('config', 'user.name', 'Test')
shutil.copytree(ROOT/'scripts', source/'scripts')
shutil.copyfile(ROOT/'.dockerignore', source/'.dockerignore')
(source/'nginx.conf').write_text('__BACKEND_HOST__')
git('add', '.')
git('commit', '-qm', 'fixture')
sha = git('rev-parse', 'HEAD')
git('init', '-b', 'develop', cwd=stage)
git('config', 'user.email', 'test@example.invalid', cwd=stage)
git('config', 'user.name', 'Test', cwd=stage)
(stage/'dirty').write_text('original')
git('add', '.', cwd=stage)
git('commit', '-qm', 'stage', cwd=stage)
(stage/'dirty').write_text('staged')
git('add', '.', cwd=stage)
(stage/'dirty').write_text('unstaged')
for n in ('.support-chat.env', '.revalidation.env'):
(stage/n).write_text('TEST_SECRET=never-log-this\n')
before = git('status', '--porcelain', cwd=stage), git('diff', '--binary', 'HEAD', cwd=stage), (stage/'.git/index').read_bytes()
config = {'services': {
'db_stage': {'volumes': [{'type': 'volume', 'source': 'canina_stage_db', 'target': '/var/lib/postgresql/data'}]},
'redis_stage': {},
'backend_stage': {'container_name': 'canino_backend_stage', 'volumes': [
{'type': 'volume', 'source': 'canina_stage_uploads', 'target': '/app/uploads'},
{'type': 'bind', 'source': '/opt/services/proxy/certs/canina', 'target': '/app/ssl_certs'}]},
'frontend_stage': {'container_name': 'canino_frontend_stage'}},
'volumes': {n: {'name': 'stage_'+n} for n in ('canina_stage_db','canina_stage_uploads')},
'networks': {'traefik_public': {'name': 'traefik_public', 'external': True}}}
(base/'config.json').write_text(json.dumps(config))
(tools/'docker').write_text('#!/bin/bash\nprintf "%s\\n" "$*" >> "$TRACE"\nif [[ "$*" == *"config --format json"* ]]; then /bin/cat "$FIXTURE"; fi\nif [[ "$*" == *"run --rm"* && "${FAIL_MIGRATION:-}" == 1 ]]; then exit 42; fi\n')
(tools/'docker').chmod(0o755)
script = (ROOT/'scripts/deploy.sh').read_text()
script = script.replace('/opt/services/canina/stage-backend-deploy.lock', str(base/'lock')).replace('/opt/services/canina/stage', str(stage)).replace('/opt/services/canina/releases', str(releases)).replace('https://git.parsaaghayi.ir/parsa/canina.git', str(source)).replace('[ -d /opt/services/proxy/certs/canina ]', 'true')
deploy = base/'deploy.sh'
deploy.write_text(script)
env = dict(os.environ, GITHUB_ACTIONS='true', DEPLOY_SHA=sha, PATH=str(tools)+':'+os.environ['PATH'], TRACE=str(base/'trace'), FIXTURE=str(base/'config.json'))
for fail in ('1', '0'):
if releases.exists(): shutil.rmtree(releases)
(base/'trace').write_text('')
result = subprocess.run(['bash', str(deploy), 'develop'], env=dict(env, FAIL_MIGRATION=fail), capture_output=True, text=True)
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 42 if fail == '1' else 0, result.stderr)
trace = (base/'trace').read_text()
compose = [line for line in trace.splitlines() if line.startswith('compose ')]
self.assertTrue(compose)
self.assertTrue(all(line.startswith('compose -p stage --env-file /dev/null --project-directory '+str(releases/sha)) for line in compose))
self.assertNotIn('canina-bot', trace)
self.assertNotIn('remove-orphans', trace)
self.assertNotIn('up -d --no-deps db_stage', trace)
self.assertNotIn('never-log-this', result.stdout+result.stderr)
if fail == '1': self.assertNotIn('up -d', trace)
else:
self.assertLess(trace.index('migrate deploy'), trace.index('up -d --no-deps backend_stage'))
self.assertLess(trace.index('exec -T backend_stage'), trace.index('up -d --no-deps frontend_stage'))
release = releases/sha
self.assertEqual(git('rev-parse', 'HEAD', cwd=release), sha)
self.assertEqual((release/'.support-chat.env').stat().st_mode & 0o777, 0o600)
self.assertIn('.stage-*.json', (release/'.dockerignore').read_text())
self.assertIn('.support-chat.env', (release/'.dockerignore').read_text())
self.assertIn('.revalidation.env', (release/'.dockerignore').read_text())
self.assertEqual((release/'.stage-compose.json').stat().st_mode & 0o777, 0o600)
effective = json.loads((release/'.stage-compose.json').read_text())
self.assertEqual(effective['volumes'], {n: {'name': 'stage_'+n, 'external': True} for n in ('canina_stage_db','canina_stage_uploads')})
self.assertEqual(before, (git('status', '--porcelain', cwd=stage), git('diff', '--binary', 'HEAD', cwd=stage), (stage/'.git/index').read_bytes()))
retry = subprocess.run(['bash', str(deploy), 'develop'], env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)
self.assertNotEqual(retry.returncode, 0)
self.assertIn('./deploy.sh "${BRANCH}"',run)
def test_migration_failure_never_starts_apps(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
@@ -147,3 +60,4 @@ class RolloutTests(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn('exec -T backend_stage node',trace)
self.assertNotIn('up -d --no-deps frontend_stage',trace)
self.assertNotIn('SUCCESS',result.stdout)
if __name__=='__main__': unittest.main()