# Opt-in Stage runtime provisioning (parent wiring contract) This provisions **snapshot inventory** and credentials for the existing PREPARE transport. It does NOT create a real LLM executor. The current deterministic worker is still `llmPilot:false`. No provider credentials are collected, no cron installed, no task claimed and no worker polling/service started by the provisioner. ## CI-only host invocation Parent owns workflow/deploy.sh/AppModule; none are changed here. Run only through the existing pinned authenticated SSH CI boundary, under its Stage environment approval and serialized rollout lock. `CI=true` is an accident guard, not an auth boundary. Provisioner checks clean HEAD equals the full approved commit; no branch promotion, push, Production, RELEASE_AUTHORIZE, Docker or DB writes are performed. Only the CI account should be able to invoke this on a root-owned trusted parent. From the clean pinned release checkout on the host (not the dirty Stage checkout): ```sh CI=true STAGE_PROVISION_ENABLED=true STAGE_PROVISION_APPROVED_SHA="$DEPLOY_SHA" \ python3 scripts/provision-stage-runtime.py --uid 1000 --gid 1000 ``` Default output root is `/opt/services/canina/stage-runtime` and its parent must already exist. First creation is staged and atomically renamed. Repeating validates existing state without rotating credentials. Corrupt/missing/unsafe files fail closed, not repaired. CI MUST serialize execution and prevent untrusted edits to source/output parents; this is not a hostile-filesystem sandbox. `--root` is for CI-reviewed test/Stage locations only, not arbitrary browser input. Secure backup and separately approved rotation are parent/operator responsibilities. - `secrets/` 0700, files 0400 owned by the runtime UID (1000 in the current backend image); `hermes_username/password/signing_key` are new independent random values. - `prepare_worker_grants` contains SHA256 only, exact separate service identities `stage-prepare-worker`/WORKFLOW_WORKER and `stage-evidence-ci`/STAGE_CI. These are transport service identities, **not invented DB admin users**. - Raw `credentials/prepare_worker_token` and `credentials/stage_ci_token` stay in a CI-owner-only 0700 directory, 0400 files. Do NOT mount either into inventory or backend, log them, upload them as artifacts or send them to browsers. A later reviewed one-shot executor receives only its own token through a private file. - `artifacts/` is 0700 owned by backend UID; backend alone writes it. Persistent local disk is not object storage or external publication evidence. - `hermes_runtime_grants` is `{}`: deny all. No live admin query was needed/performed. Parent must separately query actual Stage admin IDs read-only, review exact ID to profile mapping and provision a private replacement via configuration management before claiming panel access. Never infer identities from usernames or JWT input. Deliberately changed grants require separate review; default provisioner refuses nonempty runtime grants on repeat. - Compose file-backed secrets preserve host permissions/ownership; `uid/gid/mode` declarations do not fix bind mount ownership. Verify effective host IDs if Docker uses userns remapping; do not chmod 0444 as a workaround. ## Consistent restricted export After approval, the SAME CI invocation may explicitly request one profile's source SQLite DB. Resolve its real `HERMES_HOME/state.db` through reviewed host mounts; never guess a gateway volume path or mount the original home into inventory. ```sh CI=true STAGE_PROVISION_ENABLED=true STAGE_PROVISION_APPROVED_SHA="$DEPLOY_SHA" \ python3 scripts/provision-stage-runtime.py --uid 1000 --gid 1000 \ --snapshot-db "$REVIEWED_STATE_DB" --profile default \ --snapshot-name "$UNIQUE_CI_CAPTURE_ID" ``` SQLite online `Connection.backup()` reads committed WAL frames into memory (never `cp state.db`, never `immutable=1`). A 30-second callback deadline bounds busy backup. Only explicit source/time/token/cost columns from `sessions` are projected. Private session IDs become capture-local ordinal IDs; sources use an enum; no messages, titles, prompts, user/chat IDs, paths, URLs, model config, credentials, config.yaml, auth.json, .env, cron commands, memory or skills are exported. Unknown schema/nonnumeric metadata fails. One profile per immutable capture; there is no multi-DB atomicity claim. A source DB may be large: backup is memory-bound, so size and host resources need operator review before a real capture. Output directory is new/immutable (0500, 0400 files), never overwritten: `inventory.json`, exact three-field `snapshot-manifest.json` and `export-report.json`. Manifest `capturedAt` is measured immediately after successful backup, not startup, mtime or an example. Report records actual projected row count, inventory digest, method/exclusions; it is not a signature or proof of source authenticity. No live capture was performed in this change. Never reuse fixture manifests as evidence. Projected HTTP readers never consult gateway config, state DB or cron files: model/provider are explicit `unknown`, context length is a placeholder zero, cron arrays empty mean **not captured**, session activity false is a placeholder, profile inventory doesn't establish live process availability. Status retains `liveProcess:unknown`. Usage days are relative to actual capture time. Snapshot fresh/stale provenance from the existing adapter remains mandatory. No real LLM pilot readiness follows from this inventory responding 200. ## Exact parent compose/application wiring `infra/hermes-runtime/compose.stage-provision.yml` is an opt-in merge fragment, NOT called by the existing deploy script or ci-apply.sh. Parent must include it in **every** Stage compose command after provisioning, using the existing stable Compose project identity and existing release isolation/volume rules: ```sh export STAGE_RUNTIME_SERVE_FILE="$PINNED_RELEASE/infra/hermes-runtime/serve.py" export STAGE_RUNTIME_SNAPSHOT="/opt/services/canina/stage-runtime/snapshots/$UNIQUE_CI_CAPTURE_ID" # Only inside approved CI rollout, never manually: # docker compose -p -f \ # -f "$PINNED_RELEASE/infra/hermes-runtime/compose.stage-provision.yml" \ # --profile stage-runtime-inventory ``` The fragment adds backend `PREPARE_WORKER_ENABLED=true`, fixed-path secrets `/run/secrets/prepare_worker_grants`, `/run/secrets/hermes_runtime_grants`, `hermes_username/password`, and artifact bind at `/var/lib/canina/prepare-artifacts`. It adds a project-scoped **internal** network between backend and inventory only, alias `canina-hermes-inventory` (not the live `canina-hermes`). No host port, Docker socket or live gateway volume. Inventory is read-only, nonroot, no capabilities, restricted tmpfs and pinned image, mounts only its immutable projected export and script. `create_host_path:false` fails on missing exports/storage. Original compose.readonly.yml/ci-apply.sh remain legacy review-only; do not combine those with this provisioning fragment. AppModule must keep AuthModule/JwtStrategy, import `RuntimeReadModule.registerFromFile('/run/secrets/hermes_runtime_grants')` for reads, and spread `...registerPrepareWorker()` for the opt-in worker transport (verify existing AppModule before adding duplicates). The latter defaults to no module unless exact env `true`; enabling compose alone cannot add missing imports. Routes remain service-authenticated. Artifact base is fixed to `https://stageapi.canina.ir/api/internal/prepare-worker/artifacts`; parent must verify its actual global `/api` prefix/proxy/authenticated retrieval after CI deployment. No URL here is asserted externally reachable by disposable tests. Parent still must implement/review a bounded one-shot real LLM executor separately; this commit intentionally adds neither model/provider secrets nor automatic polling. After CI rollout verify backend UID/secret readability by names only, deny-all reads, worker unauth denial, snapshot provenance and authenticated artifact digest readback before a separately authorized task. Do not call RELEASE_AUTHORIZE. ## Executed disposable validation Pinned Hermes image, `--network none`, repository mounted read-only; private TemporaryDirectory fixtures only. RED observed missing provisioner, missing exporter, wrong projected profile and acceptance of malformed credential; GREEN: four provision/export/security/CI-guard unittest cases; projected HTTP auth/profile/session/ wrong-profile/model/cron assertions; existing exact-image HTTP acceptance, TCP serve mutation denial and authenticated WebSocket 1008 denial. Compose merged config `--quiet` passed without applying it. An initial test mount mismatch was corrected (`/source` for repo-relative tests, `/contract` for legacy tests). No application backend code changed; full backend suites not rerun. No host credentials, artifact storage, snapshots, DB users, services or networks were provisioned live.