# 9router admin consumption adapter ## Wiring (integration owner) Import `RouterUsageModule` from `backend/src/router-usage/router-usage.module` into the root application's imports. This branch deliberately does not edit app.module.ts. Existing AuthModule/JWT strategy must be registered by the application. Route requires a JWT bearer user with admin/superadmin role; API-key authentication is deliberately not enabled for this sensitive endpoint. Set backend-only `ROUTER_USAGE_CLI_TOKEN` using the existing router CLI auth token from the operator secret store. Optional `ROUTER_USAGE_BASE_URL` must be exactly `https://nr.parsaaghayi.ir` (an origin slash is accepted). Do not ship this token to the frontend. No environment/configuration was changed during implementation. No push/deploy performed; integration follows CI/CD and production needs separate Gate2. ## Exact API `GET /admin/router-usage?period=7d` (plus the existing application global prefix, if any). Allowed periods: `today`, `24h`, `7d`, `30d`, `60d`, `all`; default `7d`. Unknown query properties/custom from/to ranges and invalid periods return 400. Missing/invalid JWT is rejected by Passport; authenticated non-admin gets 403. Response is private/no-store. Response fields: - `source: "9router"`, `period` - `status: "available" | "unavailable"` - `reason: null | "not_configured" | "invalid_configuration" | "busy" | "upstream_unavailable"` - `attribution: {scope:"9router_total", hermes:null, additive:false}` - `freshness: {retrievedAt: ISO8601|null, sourceUpdatedAt:null, stale:null}`. Retrieval time is NOT a guarantee of provider freshness. The source exposes no authoritative updated-at for aggregates. No last-good cache is served. - `capabilities: {errors:false, reasoningTokens:false, cacheWriteTokens:false, quota:false, customTimeRange:false}` - `data: null | {totals, providers:[], models:[], accounts:[]}` Every metrics object contains `requests`, `inputTokens`, `outputTokens`, `cacheReadTokens`, `cacheWriteTokens`, `reasoningTokens`, `errors` (number|null). Zero is retained only if upstream reported zero; absent/invalid counters remain null. Input/output/cache map to promptTokens/completionTokens/cachedTokens; cache-read is a subset of input, never add it again. Cache-write/reasoning/errors are always null because the stats contract does not expose these aggregates. Provider rows: `{provider,...metrics}`. Model rows: `{model,provider,...metrics}`. Account rows: `{accountId,model,provider,...metrics,quota:{status:"unknown",remaining:null,resetAt:null,reason:"upstream_quota_get_mutates_credentials"}}`. Account rows are upstream account/model summaries, NOT unique account inventory; accounts without usage are absent. IDs are validated, nullable if unsafe; account names/emails are never returned. No raw upstream maps, logs, prompts, provider data or credentials are returned. Dimensions are different views of the same consumption: do NOT sum totals+models+accounts. Hermes attribution remains unknown; do NOT add Hermes telemetry to router totals. ## Deployed-source inspection and real probe Read-only inspected running `9router` image `decolua/9router:vpn`: compiled `/app/.next/server/app/api/usage/stats/route.js`, `/app/.next/server/chunks/9100.js`, `/app/.next/server/middleware.js`, `/app/.next/server/chunks/7211.js`, providers routes and `/app/open-sse/services/usage.js`. No credential tables or router DB contents were dumped/modified. Verified stats route accepts the periods above. `today` uses router-local midnight, `24h` rolling history; 7/30/60d use router-local daily buckets, `all` all retained daily aggregates. This is not arbitrary UTC timestamp filtering; retention/completeness is upstream-owned. Authenticated internal GET probe returned HTTP 200, 5 provider summaries, 21 model summaries, 21 account/model summaries. Verified model fields: requests, promptTokens, completionTokens, cachedTokens, cost, rawModel, provider, lastUsed. Account fields additionally include connectionId/accountName. Only schema/counts printed; no keys or account values printed. Public HTTPS reverse proxy path was not live-authenticated, so its separate proxy authentication/network reachability remains an operator verification step. Dashboard routes authenticate using `x-9r-cli-token` or valid `auth_token` session cookie. Normal inference API Bearer keys do NOT authenticate these dashboard routes. CLI token is NOT the contents of cli-secret: deployed middleware computes first 16 hex characters of SHA256(machine-id + "9r-cli-auth" + cli-secret). Probe derived it only inside the router process command and never emitted it; no new token or configuration was created. **Security finding:** stats `byApiKey` map keys contain raw inference keys, even when row fields are masked. Adapter discards this map entirely and never logs response bodies/errors. **Quota blocker:** `GET /api/usage/[connectionId]` calls refreshAndUpdateCredentials, including updateProviderConnection; OAuth refresh/retry can persist credentials. It is NOT read-only despite being GET. Therefore adapter does NOT call it. Provider quota handlers can return quotas (used/total/remaining/resetAt), messages or synthesized unlimited defaults; these cannot safely be treated as verified provider truth here. Quota reset grants exist in provider helpers but must never be consumed by this adapter. No safe deployed cache-only provider quota route was established. A separately reviewed router-side non-mutating, provenance/timestamp-bearing quota snapshot API is required before exposing live remaining/reset. Quota is unknown, never zero/unlimited fabricated. Connection inventory/status refresh is also not represented as quota truth. ## Bounds and verification Only fixed-origin authenticated GET `/api/usage/stats` is invoked; redirect:error, abort after 5 seconds, streaming cap 1 MiB, <=2000 rows per dimension, <=4 concurrent requests per backend process. No retries or stale cache. Schema/transport/auth/rate-limit/oversize failures produce unavailable + null data without raw errors. No SQL, POST or token refresh. Strict test-first slices observed missing contract, adapter, module failures before implementation. Disposable containers used existing backend image dependencies, read-only source mounts, network disabled and copied source into ephemeral /work; no host dependencies/build output or running containers changed. `npm run build` passed. Focused: 3 suites/24 tests passed. Full backend regression: 92 suites/781 tests passed (existing negative-path tests log expected payment/SSL errors). HTTP guard tests replace JWT authentication only and exercise real RolesGuard; deployed JWT strategy remains application-owned.