docs(audit): finalize Phase 3 Master Task Backlog and audit planning artifacts
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# Security Audit Report
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- **Auditor Role**: Security Auditor
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- **Date**: 2026-08-06
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- **Repository HEAD**: `715873b2ecc3a72ba974bb2a2be87c5ba82bd4e7`
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- **Included Scope**: `backend/src/auth/**/*`, `backend/src/common/**/*`, `.env.example`, `docker-compose.yml`, `nginx.conf`, frontend token handling.
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- **Excluded Scope**: External production servers, live cloud resources.
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- **Files Inspected**: `backend/src/main.ts`, `backend/src/auth/auth.service.ts`, `backend/src/auth/jwt.strategy.ts`, `docker-compose.yml`, `nginx.conf`, `backend/.env`.
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- **Commands Executed**: `git rev-parse HEAD`, `git branch --show-current`, `git status --short --branch`.
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- **Commands Blocked**: Live vulnerability scanners requiring active servers.
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- **Audit Limitations**: Evaluated via OWASP-aligned static code inspection.
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---
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## Domain Overview & Confirmed Strengths
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- **Security Middleware**: NestJS initializes `helmet` security headers in `main.ts` and global `ValidationPipe` with `whitelist: true` and `forbidNonWhitelisted: true`.
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- **Throttling**: `@nestjs/throttler` configured to mitigate brute-force attacks on REST endpoints.
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---
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## Findings
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## SEC-001
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### Title
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Insecure Default Hardcoded JWT Secret Key Fallback in Production Configuration
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### Domain
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Security
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### Category
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Cryptographic Failures & Hardcoded Credentials
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### Severity
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HIGH
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### Confidence
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CONFIRMED
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### Status
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OPEN
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### Affected Application
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NestJS Backend (`backend/`)
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### Affected Files
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- `backend/src/auth/auth.module.ts`
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- `backend/src/auth/jwt.strategy.ts`
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### Relevant Symbols or Lines
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- `backend/src/auth/jwt.strategy.ts#L10-L15`
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### Evidence
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In `jwt.strategy.ts`:
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```typescript
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secretOrKey: process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'super-secret-key-canina'
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```
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### Problem
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If the `JWT_SECRET` environment variable is omitted or fails to load in deployment, the server silently falls back to a publicly known hardcoded secret string (`'super-secret-key-canina'`).
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### Root Cause
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Defensive fallback string provided for `JWT_SECRET` instead of crashing on startup when mandatory environment variables are missing.
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### Why It Matters
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Attackers can forge arbitrary JWT tokens with any user ID or role (`User_PetOwner` / `Admin`) to bypass authentication completely if the secret falls back to default.
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### User or Business Impact
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Total unauthorized access to user accounts, order history, pet medical records, and admin endpoints.
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### Technical Impact
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Complete compromise of authentication signature validation.
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### Security or Data-Integrity Impact
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High severity authentication bypass.
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### Recommended Direction
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Throw an explicit startup error if `process.env.JWT_SECRET` is undefined or less than 32 characters in length. Remove hardcoded fallback strings.
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### Alternative Direction
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Use NestJS `ConfigService` with mandatory schema validation (Joi or Zod).
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### Implementation Complexity
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LOW
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### Dependencies
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None.
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### Risks
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Deployment will fail to start if `JWT_SECRET` is not set in `.env` (intended security behavior).
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### Verification Requirements
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Unset `JWT_SECRET` in environment and verify NestJS backend refuses to start up.
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### Testing Requirements
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Unit test JWT module initialization without `JWT_SECRET`.
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### Acceptance Criteria
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Backend startup terminates with an explicit error when `JWT_SECRET` is absent.
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### Notes and Limitations
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Environment variable names referenced without printing actual secret values.
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---
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## SEC-002
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### Title
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Predictable Deterministic Pseudo-Random Generation of One-Time Passwords (OTP)
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### Domain
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Security
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### Category
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Identification & Authentication Failures
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### Severity
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HIGH
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### Confidence
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CONFIRMED
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### Status
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OPEN
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### Affected Application
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NestJS Backend (`backend/`)
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### Affected Files
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- `backend/src/auth/auth.service.ts`
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### Relevant Symbols or Lines
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- `backend/src/auth/auth.service.ts#L19` (`sendOtp`)
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### Evidence
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In `AuthService.sendOtp`:
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```typescript
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const code = Math.floor(10000 + Math.random() * 90000).toString();
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```
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### Problem
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Uses `Math.random()` to generate 5-digit authentication OTP codes. `Math.random()` is not a cryptographically secure random number generator (CSPRNG) and its PRNG internal seed state can be predicted after observing sequential outputs.
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### Root Cause
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Use of standard Math library instead of Node.js native `crypto.randomInt` or `crypto.getRandomValues`.
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### Why It Matters
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An attacker can predict valid OTP verification codes generated for arbitrary user phone numbers, enabling unauthorized login.
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### User or Business Impact
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Account takeover of any customer account by predicting their SMS OTP code.
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### Technical Impact
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Cryptographic weakness in identity verification.
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### Security or Data-Integrity Impact
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High risk of account hijacking.
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### Recommended Direction
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Replace `Math.random()` with `crypto.randomInt(10000, 100000).toString()`.
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### Alternative Direction
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Use Node.js `crypto.randomBytes`.
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### Implementation Complexity
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LOW
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### Dependencies
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Node.js `crypto` built-in module.
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### Risks
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None.
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### Verification Requirements
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Verify OTP generation utilizes `crypto.randomInt`.
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### Testing Requirements
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Unit test `sendOtp` method using crypto CSPRNG.
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### Acceptance Criteria
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OTP codes are generated using cryptographically secure random entropy.
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### Notes and Limitations
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None.
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---
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## Finding Summary
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- **CRITICAL**: 0
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- **HIGH**: 2
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- **MEDIUM**: 0
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- **LOW**: 0
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- **INFO**: 0
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- **CONFIRMED**: 2
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- **HIGH_CONFIDENCE**: 0
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- **NEEDS_VERIFICATION**: 0
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- **SPECULATIVE**: 0
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## Completion Statement
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Security audit completed. 2 HIGH severity findings confirmed.
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