fix(auth): persist generation-fenced Stage principal cleanup retries
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# Durable Stage cleanup verification
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This change replaces the SHA-pinned transient timer with a root-owned intent journal
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and a fixed host systemd retry worker. No host service is installed or enabled by
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the CI credential command. Deployment must first install the reviewed worker as
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`/opt/services/canina/stage-principal-cleanup.py` (root:root 0755), install the two
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supplied systemd units under `/etc/systemd/system`, daemon-reload, and enable/start
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`canina-stage-principal-cleanup.timer`. This is a promotion prerequisite, NOT an
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instruction to run these actions during review. The open wrapper refuses to operate
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without an enabled and active timer. Never overwrite or delete the 0700 root-owned
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`/opt/services/canina/stage-principal-cleanup` journal during deployments.
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A journal entry is fsynced before provisioning and contains the exact session,
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random generation, creation SHA, bounded TTL and immutable cleanup deadline.
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Repeated opens fail rather than replace an intent or renew TTL. Close and the
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30-second boot/periodic retry worker retain intents on lock contention, unavailable
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containers/DB, and relational deletion failures. Cleanup resolves the current Stage
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container ID once, verifies its cleanup capability, and authenticates against its
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current artifact SHA while retaining original session/generation ownership. Older
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artifacts without generation cleanup support fail closed; never roll back to one
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with a pending principal. Persisted expiry remains independently enforced at login,
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refresh and every scoped JWT request.
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Revocation commits before private-handle removal; relational deletion is subsequent.
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A transaction acquires a generation/session-fenced row lock before touching related
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records. Failed deletion retains a revoked row and a pending retry intent, but no
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credential handle. Wrong ownership/generation never invokes the handle callback.
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The CLI requires the generation supplied by the private journal; no broader admin
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or production authority was introduced.
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Verification performed in a new isolated worktree and disposable Docker network:
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- Cleanup fence tests: RED (replacement generation was revoked; callback missing),
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then GREEN (2 tests).
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- Python simulated worker tests: restart/redeploy, failed-delete retry, lock
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contention, immutable container ID/current artifact and old-CLI refusal (4 tests).
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- Persisted account lifecycle plus delete/recreate access AND refresh regression.
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- Actual CLI via ts-node with real disposable Postgres/Redis and HTTP adminLogin
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handler, injected PostgreSQL delete trigger failure: confirmed revocation,
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private handle removal, then successful repeated cleanup after trigger removal.
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- TypeScript `tsc --noEmit`: passed.
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- Full migration chain attempt on fresh disposable database: baseline failure in
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20261020000000_add_blog_freshness_authorship (`blogs` missing). Not concealed.
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Independent migration test constructed the pre-Stage schema excluding all three
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new fields, then applied the EXACT committed 20261024090000 migration with psql
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ON_ERROR_STOP before exercising persisted lifecycle. Not db-push-only testing.
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No live account, Stage/Production DB mutation, deployment, push, host service change,
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or retry of the previous pending-approval operation was performed.
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Invocation after normal reviewed deployment and host prerequisite provisioning:
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`sudo -n env CI=true STAGE_TEST_APPROVAL=owner-authorized-stage-editorial bash /opt/services/canina/releases/<promoted-sha>/scripts/stage-test-principal-host.sh <promoted-sha> <unique-session> 600 open`
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Use the same command with `close` immediately after the authorized test.
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@@ -31,15 +31,7 @@ role checks remain unchanged. The canonical default administrator is untouched.
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tests. This revokes persisted authentication BEFORE relational deletion and
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removes the private credential file. Close is idempotent when absent.
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A host systemd timer is armed before creation for independent TTL cleanup even
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if CI disappears. Persisted expiry is checked at login, refresh, and every JWT
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request, so killing the timer cannot extend access. Failed cleanup leaves revoked
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credentials. Cleanup timer is pinned to the creation SHA: finish/close before
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redeploy; if redeployed, use the approved CI recovery session with its recorded
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ownership rather than changing an unrelated account. A collision with the exact
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ID, email or mobile fails closed; an owned retry with the same secret cannot
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extend expiry. The test principal is limited in JWT strategy to task reads,
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proposal creation, Gate1 decisions and editorial failure. All other paths deny.
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A durable root-owned host cleanup journal and boot/periodic systemd retry worker must be provisioned before opening a session. Cleanup follows the current Stage artifact but retains the original exact session and generation fence; persisted expiry cannot be extended. See [cleanup verification and promotion prerequisites](stage-principal-cleanup-verification.md). No live host services are changed by review tests.
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## Verification
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